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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This civil action is before the Court on rehearing, gra ted 
July 12, 1989, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction of this appeal under and 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
The rules applicable to appeals from a judgment of a district 
court in a civil matter have changed several times since the Notice 
of Appeal was filed in this case on January 6, 1984. At that time, 
appellate practice and procedure was governed by Rules 72-76 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Shortly thereafter, on November 9, 1984, the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure were adopted and promulgated by the Utah 
Supreme Court to be effective January 1, 1985. Simultaneously, 
the prior rules concerning appellate practice and procedure before 
the Utah Supreme Court were repealed. 
As a result of the creation of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
1986, however, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure were 
superseded by two different sets of appellate rules. The Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals were promulgated by the Utah Supreme 
Court and made effective January 13, 1987. The Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure were then amended to reflect the changes in the 
statutory jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court and the appellate 
practices and procedures before the Court. The rules were renamed 
amc-w007.chd 
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the "Rules of the Utah Supreme Court", and became effective April 
20, 1987. 
The interpretation of Rule 75 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rules 11 and 12 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court may be dispositive of this matter on rehearing. They are, 
therefore, reprinted verbatim in the addendum hereto, as appendices 
A, B, and C, respectively. 
The Introductory Note of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Appellate Procedure, published simultaneously with 
the promulgation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1984 
and reprinted immediately following the "Foreword" to the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court in 1987, is critical to the determination 
of the impact of these rule changes on this appeal. Consequently, 
the Introductory Note is also reprinted verbatim in Appendix D 
hereto. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff, Stephen Whitehead, when the vehicle in which he was 
riding, a Jeep Commando, was struck from behind by defendant Larry 
Anderson, causing the vehicle to roll over. Plaintiffs alleged 
that defendant Anderson was negligent and that he was in the course 
and scope of his employment with defendant Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Company at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs later 
joined defendants Jeep Corporation and American Motors Sales 
amc-w007.chd - 2 -
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Corporation, claiming that their vehicle, manufactured by defendant 
Jeep Corporation in 1971 and originally marketed by defendant 
American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, was 
defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous at the time it ft 
the hands of the manufacturer• 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following trial to a jury, the Fourth Judicial District Court 
entered judgment on the jury verdict for the plaintiff Stephen 
Whitehead and against all defendants in the total amount of 
$1,638,125.00. Liability on the judgment was apportioned pursuant 
to further findings by the jury that defendants Jeep Corporation 
and American Motors Sales Corporation were 70% responsible for the 
injuries sustained by Mr. Whitehead and that defendant Anderson 
was 30% responsible. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
On appeal, defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation ("AMC/Jeep") sought reversal of the trial court's 
judgment against them on the grounds that the trial court 
repeatedly made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions of 
law and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence to 
the extent that the jury was permitted to hear only one side of the 
case. Specifically, AMC/Jeep argued that the trial court erred (a) 
in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory 
evidence, (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's fundamental right to cross-
examine plaintiffs' witnesses, (c) in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep 
amc-v.O07.chd 
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to rebut such evidence by excluding substantial portions of 
AMC/Jeep's own evidence, (d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for 
mistrial based upon improper closing arguments by opposing counsel, 
(e) in excluding all evidence relating to the presence of and 
plaintiff's failure to. utilize available seat belts, (f) in 
refusing to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer 
to include a statute of limitations defense, and (g) in refusing 
to direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of their starute 
of limitations defense. 
In a decision announced February 2, 1989, this Court reversed 
the judgment of the trial court against AMC/Jeep and remanded the 
case for new trial, stating with respect to the improper admission 
of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence offered by plaintiffs rhat 
[g]iven our standard of review of the admissibility 
of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
plaintiffs' films in light of the foundation laid by 
their experts... 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
28 (February 2, 1989), but holding that the trial court did err in 
limiting AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses and in excluding significant portions of AMC/Jeep's own 
evidence. 
With regard to the improper limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination of plaintiffs' experts, the Court stated: 
An assertion or opinion given on direct testimony 
that bears on a key issue in the case is a proper subject 
of cross-examination. While the trial court's attempt 
to avoid confusion of the issues and a long and 
cumbersome trial is understandable, defendants were 
amc-w007.chd - 4 -
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entitled to conduct cross-examination into the basis r,r 
the opinions offered by plaintiffs' expert witnesses .x:.J 
to probe the comparisons they had made on direct 
examination. 
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off during their 
attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The 
numerous objections of plaintiffs1 counsel, many of which 
were improperly sustained, prevented defendants from 
probing the basis of opinions given by plaintiffs1 
experts on comparisons they had made in their direct 
examination. As a result, the issues were presented to 
the jury without the added light that thorough cross-
examination sheds. We find therefore that the trial 
court erred in limiting defendants' cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The trial court did not 
limit those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles 
on their direct examination. Hence cross-examination 
should not have been so restricted. 
Id. at 29-30. 
The Court also held that the district court erred in excluding 
significant portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence, stating, in part,, as 
follows: 
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates 
discovery orders under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. However, defendants point out that the 
discovery covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep 
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep CJ5. The film 
simply was not covered by the language of the 
interrogatory. Although plaintiffs' experts were allowed 
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films 
of CJ5s based on their foundational testimony that its 
handling was substantially similar to that of the 
Commando, that ruling does not place the film within the 
scope of material sought in the pretrial discovery 
request. The dissenting opinion would have defendants 
divine the scope of the requests by a trial court ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence which came much later. 
This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The tests 
were not produced to show the handling of the "66-73 Jeep 
Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose. 
Defendants maintained that the handling of the CJ5 and 
the Commando were not the same. The tests were offered 
to rebut evidence presented by plaintiffs that the CJ5 
was defective because of its handling characteristics. 
Although this evidence could have been excluded on the 
amc-v.-007.chd 
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basis of relevancy had the trial court earlier excluded 
plaintiffs1 films, once the court allowed plaintiffs to 
try their case on the basis of comparison with the CJ5, 
it could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to 
rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the presentation 
of their case. The trial court erred in excluding the 
film on the basis that defendants had failed to comply 
with orders regarding discovery. 
. at 30. 
Defendants offered a second film in conjunction with 
Heitzman's testimony. This film showed non-Jeep vehicles 
doing mechanically induced rollovers similar to those 
shown in plaintiffs1 film. After excluding defendants 
first film for failure to produce it in discovery, the 
trial court ruled that this second film was not 
admissible...[on the basis of relevancy]...The evidence 
was offered to rebut the tests shown on plaintiffs1 films 
and to demonstrate that there was no design defect in 
the Commando because virtually any vehicle would roll 
when subjected to such tests. 
We have no quarrel with the rule of law relied upon 
in the dissenting opinion that "evidence of the condition 
of other products is irrelevant and not admissible to 
establish a defect in a particular product." This is a 
sound rule when properly applied as it was in the cases 
cited in the dissenting opinion. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of 
Jeep CJ5s rolling. In Part I of this opinion, we upheld 
the admissibility of those films because of the [expert 
testimony regarding] substantial similarity of the 
vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle in which 
plaintiffs were injured. However, plaintiffs in 
presenting their case did not stop there. They produced 
several experts who repeatedly in their testimony drew 
comparisons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles 
to non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that 
the Jeep in which they were riding was of an unsafe 
design and had a tendency to roll much easier than other 
vehicles.. .Under the rule of law relied upon by the 
dissenting opinion/ that evidence of the condition of 
other products is not admissible to establish a defect 
in a particular product, it may be questioned whether 
such comparisons should have been admitted because of the 
lack of similarity. However. right or wrong, plaintiffs' 
experts were allowed to draw the comparisons between the 
rollover propensities of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles. 
Certainly then, defendants should have been allowed in 
-v.-007.chd 
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rebuttal to prove the experience of plaintiffs1 experts 
and to introduce into evidence the film showing non-Jeep 
vehicles doing mechanically induced rollovers similar to 
those shown in plaintiffs' film. This situation is 
wholly different from the situations in the two above 
cases relied upon in the dissenting opinion where the 
plaintiff was not allowed to make comparisons when the 
circumstances were dissimilar. 
* * * * * 
Defendants7 expert, Dr. Warner, offered exhibit No. 
13 0, a storyboard, to illustrate his testimony that the 
vehicle in question had been involved in a prior accident 
that compromised the structural integrity of the roof. 
Plaintiffs7 counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit 
was not material. The trial court sustained the 
objection. Plaintiffs1 experts had testified that the 
roof of the vehicle was defectively designed, thus 
contributing to plaintiffs1 injuries. Evidence 
illustrating how the roof had been damaged in a prior 
accident was relevant to rebut this assertion. The trial 
court erred in sustaining plaintiffs' objection to 
exhibit No. 130. 
* * * * * 
. at 31. 
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred 
in excluding all references to the availability of 
seatbelts and plaintiffs' failure to use 
them...Defendants contend that the evidence of seatbelts 
was relevant and necessary to show (1) that their 
presence was a factor the jury should consider when 
determining if the vehicle was unsafe as designed, and 
(2) that plaintiffs' injuries could have been prevented 
or lessened by the use of seatbelts and therefore the 
jury should be allowed to determine whether plaintiffs' 
duty of ordinary care or their duty to mitigate damages 
required them to wear seatbelts. 
We agree that evidence of how the presence of 
seatbelts affected the design safety of the vehicle 
should be admitted... 
. at 32. 
The Court then concluded as follows: 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that 
-\v007.chd 
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error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected. In the instant case, the trial court 
erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendants. 
That evidence was necessary to rebut the assertions that 
plaintiffs made to establish liability. This error was 
compounded by unduly restricting the scope of defendants' 
cross-examination. Given the conflicting testimony 
presented on this key issue, we cannot say that the 
substantial rights of defendants were not affected by the 
combined effects of the erroneous exclusion of the 
evidence and the limitation of cross-examination. While 
no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence that defendants were able to present to the 
jury their theory of the case and that a fair trial was 
had. 
We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. 
Id. at 32. A copy of the full opinion is reprinted for the 
convenience of the Court in Appendix E. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background Facts. 
This litigation revolves around a Jeep Commando manufactured 
by Jeep Corporation in December, 1971 (T. , 10/25/83, at 930; R. 
2710), nearly eight years before plaintiffs7 accident, for sale by 
appellant American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model 
year, at least seven years before plaintiffs7 accident. 
The Commando at issue in this case was purchased in "used" 
condition by George Mollner of Orem, Utah in 1975 or 1976 (T. , 
10/19/83, at 336; R. 2105), Mr. Mollner made several repairs and 
alterations to the Commando (id., at 336-338, 343, 347-355; R. 
2105-2107, 2112, 2116-2124), and on October 16, 1979, permitted his 
daughter, plaintiff Deborah Whitehead, to use the Commando to move 
amc-w007.chd - 8 -
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some household items. .(Id., at 338; R. 2107.) Deborah Whitehead 
picked up her husband, plaintiff Steven Whitehead, in American 
Fork, Utah, and proceeded to drive him on Interstate 15 towards 
Springville. (IdL, at 375-376; R. 2144-2145.) After plaintiffs 
had been on the freeway for several miles, and while they were 
traveling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour, the Commando 
was struck from behind by another vehicle; a large 1978 Oldsmobile 
station wagon driven by defendant Larry Anderson. (Id., at 3 7 7-
382; R. 2146-2147.) At the time it struck plaintiffs' Commando, 
defendant Anderson's Oldsmobile was traveling at the rate of 65 to 
70 miles per hour; 15 miles per hour faster than plaintiffs, (T. , 
10/20/83, at 552; R. 2327.) The Oldsmobile struck the Commando on 
its left rear corner, causing it to spin in a clockwise manner. 
(Id. , at 556; R. 2329.) The Commando went out of control (T. , 
10/19/83, at 382; R. 2151), hit the median, and rolled over. (Id. , 
at 383; R. 2152.) During the course of the accident, Deborah and 
Steven Whitehead sustained various injuries, the most serious of 
which was a spinal cord injury sustained by Steven Whitehead 
resulting in paraplegia. (Id., at 447; R. 2216.) At the time of 
the accident, the Commando was equipped with seat belts, but 
plaintiffs Deborah and Steven Whitehead were not wearing them. 
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint herein on November 
20, 1979, naming only Larry Anderson, the driver of the Oldsmcbile 
station wagon that struck the Commando from behind, as a defendant. 
(R. 7-8.) Plaintiffs subsequently added Anderson's employer, 
amc-v.007.chd 
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Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, as a defendant, and then 
filed a Second Amended Complaint on July 31, 1980, naming AMC/Jeep. 
(R. 84-87.) 
B. Pre-Trial Rulings. 
Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1983. . One day 
prior to that date, however, the trial court made the first in a 
series of crucial, erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary rulings 
which were to dictate the entire three-week trial that followed. 
On October 17, 1983, the trial court considered plaintiffs7 Motion 
In Limine "to allow the admissibility of a certain pictorial movie 
developed by Dynamic Science, Inc. for the Insurance Institute of 
Highway Safety," purporting to depict automobiles rolling ever 
during "normal" highway maneuvers. (R. 1128-1129.) AMC/Jeep 
objected to the motion (R. 1200-1224) and to the admission of the 
film on the grounds that: (1) the Dynamic Science film showed Jeep 
CJ5s and CJ7s rolling over, not Commandos;1 (2) the tests 
reflected in the film were conducted under conditions wholly 
dissimilar to the off-center rear-end collision which led to 
plaintiffs1 accident; and (3) plaintiffs offered no foundation to 
show that the maneuvers depicted in the film were in any way 
relevant to the issue before the court and jury in this case. 
AMC/Jeep further objected to the film on the ground that it had 
The evidence showed that CJ5's have a wheel base 2 0 inches 
shorter than the wheel base of a Commando. (T. , 10/24/83, at 659, 
672; R. 2436, 2449.) It was also clear that a longer wheel base 
makes a vehicle more resistant to rollover. (Id., at 676-675; R. 
2451-2452). 
amc-w007.chd - 1 0 -
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been selectively edited to dramatize the rollovers and to enhance 
the visual impact, destroying the value of the film as 
demonstrative evidence. For example, the film showed 
anthropomorphic dummies, fully dressed, being tossed about 
violently during a rollover- There was no evidence that plaintiffs 
experienced similar movement during their accident. Finally, 
AMC/Jeep argued that if plaintiffs were allowed to show the film 
raising the inference that the non-Commando vehicles depicted in 
it were "comparable" to a Commando, AMC/Jeep should similarly be 
allowed to introduce evidence showing that, in fact, the Commando's 
handling characteristics and resistance to rollover compared 
favorably to other vehicles. (T. , Abstracts from Transcripts of 
Trial, 10/17/83, at 53-59; R. 4856-4861.) The trial court 
nevertheless rejected AMC/Jeep7s arguments against the Insurance 
Institute film and ruled that any difference between the tests 
depicted in that film and the actual events of plaintiffs' accident 
would go "to the weight of it and not to the admissibility." (Id. , 
at 60; R. 4863; see also id., at 62; R. 4865.) 
On the morning of October 18, 1983, just before the trial 
began, the trial court also addressed plaintiffs' Motion in Limine 
"to preclude the defendants or their witnesses or attorneys from 
mentioning the subject of seat belts or the use or nonuse of seat 
belts at the trial of this case." (R. 1274-1294.) AMC/Jeep 
opposed the motion arguing that (1) the failure of plaintiffs to 
utilize their seat belts was relevant to the issues of comparative 
amc-v.007.chd 
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fault and mitigation of damages, and (2) the presence of seat belts 
in the Commando was relevant to the question whether the Commando 
was defectively designed. Here, as throughout the trial, the trial 
court barred any comment on the presence of or plaintiffs' failure 
to utilize the Commando's seat belts. (See also T. Abstracts from 
Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, at 88, 156; R. 4891, 4959.) (T. 
10/18/83, at 12; R. 1763.) 
C. Plaintiffs' Case in Chief. 
During the presentation of plaintiffs' case-in-chief, Newell 
Knight was called as a witness for plaintiffs to express an opinion 
as to the allegedly "defective" nature of the accident vehicle. 
(T., 10/20/83, at 541; R. 2314.) AMC/Jeep, anxious to assure that 
all such testimony would be related to Commandos and that the jury 
not be misled into believing that "a Jeep is a Jeep," attempted to 
limit the testimony to the relevant characteristics of the 
Commando. Beginning with Mr. Knight, however, the trial court 
embarked on an erroneous course of permitting plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses to lump all Jeep vehicles into the same evidentiary ball, 
(id., at 559-560; R. 2327-2328; see especially id., at 559-559; R. 
2331-2332; id., at 560; R. 2333), thus obscuring the unique 
characteristics of the Commando. - — 
Plaintiffs then called LeRoy Maurice Shaw, a consultant in 
automotive safety. (T., 10/24/83, at 631; R. 2408.) As 
plaintiffs' counsel began to delve into Mr. Shaw's opinion about 
the Commando's handling characteristics, AMC/Jeep elicited by way 
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of voir dire that one of his basic exhibits — a mathematical 
prediction of the so-called "roll-over threshold" of a Commando 
(Exhibit 56) — was actually based on information and data with 
respect to the Jeep CJ5 and CJ7 — not the Commando. (Id., at 67 2-
679; R. 2450-2457.) The trial court, nevertheless, admitted the 
evidence over the objection of AMC/Jeep (id., at 678; R. 2456), and 
then exacerbated the error by unduly restricting the right of 
AMC/Jeep to test Mr. Shaw's credibility by repeatedly sustaining 
objections to cross-examination into Mr. Shaw's knowledge of the 
design period of the accident vehicle. (Id., at 782-783; R. 2561-
2562.) 
Similarly, through their "star" witness, Robert Lloyd 
Anderson, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce two additional 
films prepared at Dynamic Science showing Jeep CJ5s, not Commandos, 
rolling over when subjected to extraordinary tests never 
encountered under normal driving conditions and certainly not 
encountered by plaintiffs during the course of their accident. 
AMC/Jeep objected to the admission of these films on the ground 
that they showed CJ5s, not Commandos, rolling over as the result 
of mechanically-induced maneuvers that bore no relation to the 
circumstances of plaintiffs1 accident. One of the tests, for 
example, showed a CJ5 undergoing a maneuver in which 24 0 degrees 
of steer is mechanically input into the vehicle in the span of 1.8 
seconds while the speed of the vehicle is being artificially 
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maintained. (T. , 10/25/83, at 910; R. 2690.)2 No attempt was made 
to show any connection between the maneuvers depicted in the film 
and the actual events of plaintiffs' accident. In fact, Mr. 
Anderson admitted that he had "no way of knowing" what type of 
.steering maneuvers were undertaken by Mrs. Whitehead during the 
course of the accident. (Id., at 957; R. 2737.) The trial court 
nevertheless overruled AMC/Jeep's objection to the films, stating 
that "I'll let you get at it any way you want to by cross-
examination or whatever. But I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule 
your objection with respect to those films." (Jd. , at 109; R. 
4912.) 
The objectionable films were then shown to the jury as 
exemplary of the handling characteristics of "CJ vehicles". (T. , 
10/25/83, at 906; R. 2676.) The plain and intended implication 
was that the vehicles shown in those films were similar to the 
Commando and that they demonstrated the circumstances experienced 
by plaintiffs and the accident vehicle at the time of the accident 
even though Mr. Anderson admitted that he, in fact, had no way of 
knowing what steering movements were made by plaintiffs immediately 
prior to and during plaintiffs' accident. (Id., at 956-957; R. 
2736-2737.) 
20ther maneuvers depicted in the films included a "test at 2 5 
miles an hour and 180 degrees on the steering wheel. Then we go 
up to 270 degrees. And the next turn is 360 degrees." (T., 
10/25/83, at 915-916; R. 2695-2700.) 
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The ultimate point made by Mr. Anderson was that the handling 
characteristics of "Jeeps", (CJ5s and CJ7s) coupled with their 
"rollover propensities", rendered the Commando involved in this 
case unreasonably dangerous. (Id., at 897; R. 2677.) Mr. Anderson 
further testified that other vehicles he had tested, the S10 Blazer 
and the Chevy Chevette, did not have delays in handling response 
similar to those of a "Jeep", (id., at 896; R. 2676), and that 
"most vehicles" would maintain control in situations similar to 
those experienced by plaintiffs at the time of the accident. (Id. , 
at 1039-1040; R. 2818-2819.) 
In its cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, AMC/Jeep attempted 
to rebut Mr. Anderson's characterization and implication that 
"Jeeps" are more dangerous than other automobiles on the road by 
asking him: (1) whether other vehicles would have gone out of 
control if subjected to circumstances like those which caused 
plaintiffs' accident (id., at 963; R. 2743); (2) whether he thought 
that other vehicles with similar track widths were also defective 
(id., at 1001; R. 2780); (3) whether he thought other vehicles were 
defective (id.); (4) whether other vehicles have the same center 
of gravity as a Commando (id., at 1003; R. 2782); 5) whether all 
convertibles are defective if they do not have rollbars (id., at 
1004; R. 2783); (6) whether he knows what other vehicles will do 
when subjected to the tests shown in the films (id., at 1005, 1018; 
R. 2784, 2797); and (7) whether CJ5s have different suspensions 
than a Commando. (Id., at 1047; R. 2826.) In spite of previous 
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assurances by the trial court that AMC/Jeep would be permitted to 
cross-examine Mr. Anderson on these issues (T. , 10/25/83, Abstracts 
from Transcript of Trial, at 109; R. 4912), however, the trial 
court sustained plaintiffs7 objections to these questions and 
precluded AMC/Jeep from pursuing its cross-examination of 
plaintiffs7 key expert witness. 
The trial courtfs decision to admit films of CJ5s to 
demonstrate the characteristics of a Commando combined with the 
trial court1s rigid restriction of AMC/Jeep1s cross-examination of 
Mr. Anderson led to AMC/Jeep^ first Motion for Mistrial on October 
26, 1983. (T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 
123; R. 4926.) The grounds for the Motion were that plaintiffs1 
experts had been allowed, without foundation, to declare the 
Commando unreasonably dangerous based (1) upon comparisons to other 
vehicles undergoing maneuvers in no way related to the subject 
accident, (2) upon certain calculations derived from tests of CJ5s, 
not Commandos, and (3) upon opinion testimony that "Jeeps" roll 
over more easily than "other vehicles," while AMC/Jeep had been 
barred from showing that the relevant characteristics of Jeeps, in 
fact, compared favorably with other vehicles. (Id., at 117-123; 
R. 4920-4926.) The trial court, nevertheless, denied the Motion 
for Mistrial stating that "under the circumstances as they exist 
at this time in this lawsuit, the evidence of what other vehicles 
do is irrelevant." (Id., at 130; R. 4933.) The trial court later 
attempted to justify its erroneous ruling as prohibiting AMC/Jeep 
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"from attempting to show that the subject Jeep in this case was 
safe by evidence which shows that other vehicles not manufactured 
by Jeep are also unsafe." (T., 10/26/83, at 1171; R. 2949.) The 
trial court had permitted plaintiffs1 experts to compare "Jeeps" 
with vehicles manufactured by others. It was only when AMC/Jeep 
sought to inquire further into that very comparative testimony that 
the trial court concluded it was irrelevant. In so ruling, the 
trial court did not even suggest to the jury that the comparisons 
adduced by plaintiffs should not be considered. (Id., at 60; R. 
4863; see also Id. at 62; R. 4865.) 
Plaintiffs' next expert witness was John N. Noettl. Mr. 
Noettl, like Mr. Anderson, brought along a film showing CJ5s 
rolling over. Mr. Noettl's film, however, also shows fully clothed 
anthropomorphic "dummies" being tossed about during the testing. 
AMC/Jeep objected to this film on the basis of its lack of 
relevance and its inflammatory nature (T., Abstracts from 
Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 131-133; R. 4934-4936), but after 
being shown in chambers on October 26, 1983 (T. 10/26/83, at 1205; 
R. 2982) , the trial court ruled that it could be admitted. As with 
all of plaintiffs7 films, there was absolutely no foundation for 
the implicit proposition that the maneuvers exhibited in the film 
were related to the maneuvers experienced by the accident vehicle 
during the accident. Mr. Noettl was then permitted to testify that 
the "Jeep" is easier to overturn than a "passenger car.11 (Id., at 
1262; R. 3039.) As was the case with Mr. Anderson, however, 
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AMC/Jeep's efforts to cross examination on this point were blocked 
by the trial court. (Id., at 1266; R. 3043.) 
D. AMC/Jeep*s Case. 
AMC/Jeep began its case on October 27, 1983. Before AMC/Jeep 
called its chief expert, however, the trial court heard plaintiffs' 
objections to two films to be introduced through that expert. One 
film was of a CJ5 and was intended to rebut plaintiffs' evidence 
purporting to prove that CJ5s roll over under certain emergency 
situations. The film demonstrated the CJ5's stability when 
subjected to extreme emergency situations. (T., 10/27/83, at 1561, 
1565-1566; R. 3343, 3347-3348.) The second film was similarly 
intended to rebut plaintiffs7 theory that Jeeps roll more often 
than other vehicles, or that Jeeps are the only vehicles that would 
have rolled under the circumstances of the plaintiffs' accident. 
AMC/Jeep was precluded from presenting its evidence, however, the 
court ruling that neither film was admissible. (Id., at 1571, 
1576; R. 3353; 3358.) 
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to call Edward Heitzman, a mechanical 
engineer with extensive experience in the field of automobile 
safety. (Id., at 1577-1587; R. 3359-3369.) Through Mr. Heitzman, 
AMC/Jeep attempted to introduce a film showing non-Jeep vehicles 
undergoing certain maneuvers with "outriggers" attached,"3 for the 
30utriggers are attached to a test vehicle in order to restrain 
it from rolling over completely. An expert's eye and ear can 
discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers would have rolled 
over but for the outriggers. (T., 10/28/83, at 1744; R. 3527,) 
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purpose of rebutting plaintiffs' film which had shown a Commando 
equipped with " out riggers.'' Plaintiffs' expert, Mr- Anderson, had 
testified that but for the outriggers the Commando in his film 
would have rolled over. (T., 10/25/83, at 918-926; R. 2698-2706,) 
Mr. Heitzman testified, however, that, in his opinion, Mr. 
Andersonfs film did not illustrate situations in which the Commando 
would have rolled. (T. , 10/28/83, at 1674-1676; R. 3457-3459.) 
Mr. Heitzman would then have utilized his film to illustrate to the 
jury the difference between a vehicle with outriggers "rolling" and 
a similarly equipped vehicle not rolling. The film would also have 
rebutted plaintiffs' testimony that only Jeeps, as opposed to more 
common vehicles, would roll over in emergency situations. AMC/Jeep 
needed these films in order to illustrate Mr. Heitzman's point that 
many types of vehicles — not just Jeeps and certainly not just 
Commandos — will roll over when subjected to the conditions 
illustrated in plaintiffs' films. The films would have shown that, 
in fact, other vehicles subjected to the same type of tests wculd 
have rolled over. (T. , 10/28/83, at 1746-1750; R. 3529-3533.) The 
court, however, refused to permit the introduction of appellants' 
film "because it's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because they 
involve other vehicles which the jury would have to take into 
consideration as to how it was done, the comparisons, the whole 
works. . . ." (Id., at 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-3530, 3533.) 
AMC/Jeep then called Dr. Charles Warner, a mechanical engineer 
and automobile accident consultant, to reconstruct the accident and 
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to give his opinion that the characteristics of the Commando had 
nothing to do with the extent of plaintiffs' injuries, that 
virtually any automobile would have rolled under the circumstances 
presented in this case, and that the injuries suffered by 
plaintiffs were not caused by the fact, that the accident vehicle 
happened to be a Commando. A crucial aspect of Dr. Warner's 
testimony was his study and reconstruction of the probable 
movements of plaintiffs inside the vehicle during the course of the 
accident. (T., 10/31/83, at 1956-1961; R. 3743-3748.) In support 
of this testimony Dr. Warner had prepared a series of photographs 
demonstrating his opinion. (Id., at 1961; R. 3748.) The trial 
court, however, sustained plaintiffs' objection to this 
demonstrative exhibit on the ground "that the probative value is 
limited at least because of the photographs not being 
representative of just what did happen to vehicles." (Id., at 
1967; R. 3754.) AMC/Jeep had, of course, based many of its 
objections to plaintiffs' evidence on precisely this ground. The 
only difference was that the trial court overruled AMC/Jeep's 
objections but sustained those made by plaintiffs. 
Dr. Warner was next to testify with respect to certain tests 
he performed on an exemplar vehicle — a Commando. The film showed 
a Commando undergoing certain emergency maneuvers with outriggers 
attached and would have demonstrated that the Commando is a stable 
vehicle. The film would also have demonstrated Dr. Warner's 
opinion that the Commando will remain upright when subjected to 
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realistic emergency situations. AMC/Jeep also intended to 
introduce a film, through Dr. Warner, demonstrating rollover and 
the type of damage that typically occurs during rollover. (Id., 
at 1976; 3764.) The two films were shown in chambers (id., at 
1979-1983; R. 3767-3771), plaintiffs objected to both, and the 
trial court ruled that both were inadmissible on the grounds that 
they were "not probative of any issues except perhaps the test 
which was made. . . ." (Id. at 1986; R. 3774.) Again, no 
explanation was offered by the court as to why plaintiffs' film -
- which showed a Commando performing certain extreme maneuvers that 
one could not reasonably expect to encounter (but of course showed 
rollovers) presented probative evidence, while the Warner film, 
showing no rollovers, did not. 
Dr. Warner was also asked to testify as to his opinion 
regarding the movement of plaintiffs inside the Commando during 
the course of the accident to rebut plaintiffs' contention that 
the commando's roof was defective and that it had crushed during 
the course of the accident causing plaintiff Steven Whitehead's 
back injury. (See, e.g., T., 10/24/83, at 663-664; R. 2441-2442.) 
The trial court, however, excluded each and every exhibit offered 
to demonstrate this testimony. (T. , 10/31/83, at 2009-2011; R. 
3797-3799.) 
AMC/Jeep then made a proffer, in chambers, of Dr. Warner's 
testimony with respect to plaintiffs' failure to use seat belts. 
Dr. Warner would have testified that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead 
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"been using the seat belt in all probability he would not have 
received the spinal injury that he did receive." (Id., at 2018; 
R. 3806.) The trial court again ruled, however, that no evidence 
of seat belts would be admitted. As the trial court put it: "to 
speculate what the seat belt might have done in this type of 
situation is just something that the jury ought not to do, and they 
will not have, under my ruling, the obligation to consider. . . . 
Therefore, there will be no more evidence in this case with regard 
to seat belts. I want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll go 
from there." (Id., 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808.) 
Dr. Warner was next asked to express his opinion with respect 
to the "buckling" experienced by the Commando during the course of 
the accident. Dr. Warner had examined the actual accident vehicle 
and had prepared an exhibit that demonstrated his opinion that the 
Commando had been in a prior accident. It was Dr. Warner's opinion 
that the prior accident had caused damage to the Commando which 
resulted in a weakening of its structural integrity. This 
weakening, he concluded, in turn contributed to the injury suffered 
by plaintiffs in the accident. (Id. , at 2024; R. 3812.) The trial 
court sustained plaintiffs' objection to this demonstrative exhibit 
as well, (id. , at 2026; R. 3814), even though Dr. Warner had 
actually testified without objection to all of the information in 
the exhibit. 
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E. Closing Argument, 
Finally, after a three-week trial during which the record 
reflects plaintiffs were unrestrained in their presentation of 
irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, AMC/Jeep was severely 
restricted by the court's rulings limiting their cross-examination 
of plaintiffs' witnesses, virtually all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative 
evidence had been excluded and their witnesses hamstrung by the 
court's rulings limiting their testimony, the ultimate effects of 
the trial court's rulings were noted in closing argument: 
(1) Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue (a) that 
AMC/Jeep had offered "No positive proof. None at all."; (T. 
11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582); (b) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring no 
evidence, none at all," (id. , at 33; R. 4583); and (c) that 
AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce of engineering data" 
(id. at 35; R. 4585); and 
(2) Counsel for defendant Larry Anderson made the 
following flatly incorrect statement to the jury: 
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test data 
of the plaintiff's experts, knowing exactly 
what they had done, even to the height of the 
outriggers off the ground; why didn't they go 
out and get a Commando, put some outriggers on 
there and go do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 'We have 
done the same kind of tests that the plaintiffs 
did, we have put the same number of degrees of 
steer in on a Commando, and that vehicle 
wouldn't turn over'; why didn't they do that? 
I'll tell you why: They were afraid to do it. 
The didn't dare do it. Because they knew that 
Commando would turn over. 
(Id., at 109; R. 4659.) 
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AMC/Jeep had, of course, done precisely what Defendant 
Anderson's counsel asserted had not been done. When it became 
apparent for the first time during trial that the Court was not 
going to properly limit the admission of irrelevant and 
inflammatory demonstrative evidence, in an effort to show that the 
Commando was defective and unreasonably dangerous, AMC/Jeep 
obtained an exemplar vehicle, a Commando, had it tested in the very 
respects stated in the above quotation, and proffered rebuttal 
evidence of the results of those tests, both in the form of 
testimony and in the form of demonstrative motion pictures. The 
tests were systematically and erroneously excluded by the trial 
court, however based upon Defendants' failure to produce them in 
response to pretrial discovery requests, even though the evidence 
had been developed during the trial for the express purpose of 
rebutting plaintiffs' improper evidentiary offerings. 
AMC/Jeep's motion for a mistrial based upon the subsequent 
false, misleading and prejudicial arguments of opposing counsel was 
nevertheless denied. (Id., at 193, 197; R. 4743, 4747.) 
Following these arguments the jury returned a Special Verdict 
finding: (1) that the Commando was defective to the extent that 
it was unreasonably dangerous to the purchaser or user; (2) that 
the defective condition of the Commando was a proximate cause of 
plaintiff Steven Whitehead's injuries; (3) that AMC/Jeep was 70% 
at fault for the injuries sustained by plaintiff Steven Whitehead; 
and (4) that general and special damages totalled $1,638,125.00. 
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(R. 1359-1361.) The trial court then entered judgment in 
accordance with the Special Verdict, (R. 1362-1364), and denied 
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in 
the Alternative for a new Trial (R. 1569-1574, 1642-1644.) 
F* Post Trial Proceedings. 
On January 5, 1984, AMC/Jeep gave Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court (R. 1659-1660) under and pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appendix A. On 
January 13, 1984, AMC/Jeep filed and served its Designation of 
Record (R. 1661-1663), under and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
75 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Appendix A), designating 
that the entire record be certified in this case as follows: 
All records and transcripts of all proceedings in 
the above-entitled matter, including all pleadings, 
documents, and evidence, and excluding only the 
transcript of voir dire jury selection. 
(R. 1661-1662.) AMC/Jeep's Designation of Record is reprinted for 
the convenience of the Court in Appendix F. 
The Brief of Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation was served May 16, 1984 (Appendix G) ; Respondents7 
Brief was served August 2, 1984 (Appendix H) ; and Appellants' Reply 
Brief was served October 2, 1984 (Appendix I) . Oral Arguments were 
presented April 17, 1986, and the Court issued its opinion in the 
case February 2, 1989. (Appendix E). Rehearing was granted July 
12, 1989. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new questions or 
rehash old arguments but to allow the court to correct mistakes and 
consider misapprehensions. A losing party may not use a petition 
for rehearing to present to the Supreme Court a new theory or 
contention which was neither in the record as it was before the 
Court nor in the argument made. Matters which were not presented 
during the original hearing are deemed to have been waived, either 
expressly or by implication, and may not be considered on a 
petition for rehearing. Similarly rehearings are not granted to 
reargue matters determined by the original decision. Where the 
petitioner's brief on rehearing merely restates arguments raised 
previously and discussed in the dissenting opinion to the Supreme 
Court's original decision, and where the Supreme Court's original 
decision has considered and disposed of each point raised by the 
petitioner on the original appeal, rehearing is improper. 
On rehearing, plaintiffs have asked the Court to set aside its 
February 2, 1989 decision reversing and remanding the case for a 
new trial, and, instead, to affirm the decision of the trial court. 
In the alternative, plaintiffs ask that the case be remanded for 
a new trial on liability only. 
As grounds therefor, plaintiffs argue: 
1. that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were within its 
discretion under the circumstances of this case and this court 
failed to give proper deference to the trial court's determination 
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that comparison with other vehicles was not a critical aspect of 
plaintiffs7 case; 
2. that this court erred in considering defendants' claims 
of error with respect to the exclusion of exhibits, where the 
exhibits were purportedly not made part of the record on appeal; 
and 
3.*: that this court erred in accumulating what plaintiffs 
characterize as "insubstantial and nonprejudicial error". 
On the first point, plaintiffs simply reargue, practically 
verbatim, the dissenting opinion in this case. On the second and 
third points, plaintiffs improperly raise new issues for the first 
time on this rehearing. Rehearing has, therefore, been 
improvidently granted and should be dismissed without further 
proceedings. 
Plaintiffs7 claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated upon the 
theory of product liability as enunciated in Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. A critical element of plaintiffs7 
proof in this case is, therefore, that the product (Whitehead's 
Jeep Commando) was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time 
it left the seller's hands. In an effort to prove this most 
critical element, plaintiff offered expert testimony that the 
Commando was purportedly "substantially similar77 to the Jeep CJ5, 
and that the CJ5 was purportedly defective because certain tests 
show that the CJ5 is more likely to roll over than other vehicles, 
including passenger cars. Defendants were not permitted to cross-
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examine plaintiffs' expert witnesses on these comparisons, however. 
An assertion of opinion given on direct testimony that bears on a 
key issue in the case is a proper subject of cross-examination. 
The comparisons made by plaintiffs' expert witnesses were 
unquestionably offered to show that the Jeep Commando was 
defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous; consequently, they 
"bear on a key issue" in plaintiffs' product liability case against 
AMC/Jeep as a matter of law, and the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining otherwise. 
The exhibits offered by defendants and improperly excluded 
by the trial court were part of the record on appeal both by 
designation and as a matter of law. Defendants' Designation of 
Record requested that all proceedings in the trial court, with the 
single exception of the voir dire examination of the jury venire, 
be certified in this case. Furthermore, Rule 11 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court provides, as a matter of law, that "the 
original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the 
clerk of the district court shall constitute the record on appeal 
in all cases." Rule 12 provides, however, that "physical exhibits 
other than documents shall not be transmitted by the clerk unless 
he is directed to do so by a party or by the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court." The record, as transmitted in this case, contains a list 
of the 218 exhibits filed in the District Court, which exhibits 
constitute part of the record on appeal in this case as a matter 
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of law. 
In Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1959), this 
Court recognized the propriety and announced the standard for 
reversing and remanding a personal injury case for new trial based 
upon the cumulative effect of several trial court errors* That 
standard was properly applied in this case, even though the errors 
recognized by the Court were individually substantial and 
prejudicial. 
Finally, this Court must reject plaintiffs' new request to 
limit reversal of this case to the issue of liability only. A 
partial retrial could not be conducted without injustice, since it 
would be virtually impossible under the facts of this case to mask 
the first jury's verdict for the plaintiff from the new jury that 
would be sitting at the time the case is retried. The prejudicial 
inference that would be created by a limited remand is obvious and 
impermissible. 
The Court's February 2, 1989 decision in this case was 
thorough, thoughtful and correct. It should be reaffirmed and the 
case should be remanded to the trial court for retrial consistent 
therewith. 
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ARGUMENT 
!• The Trial Courts Evidentiary Rulings 
Exceeded Permissible Discretion. 
Plaintiffs first argue on rehearing that "[t]he majority 
opinion in this case failed to give proper deference to the trial 
court's determination that comparison with other vehicles was not 
a "critical aspect" of plaintiffs' case." Petitioner's Brief on 
Rehearing at 6. Plaintiffs contend "[s]uch comparisons were 
irrelevant and inadmissible", and that "[t]he few comparative 
statements which were made by plaintiff's experts were minor and 
insignificant when compared with the main thrust of plaintiff's 
case". Id. More specifically, plaintiffs assert that the Court's 
limitation of cross-examination was not prejudicial because 
"[p]assenger vehicles were not an issue in the case and only 
obliquely compared by plaintiff's experts to Jeeps". Id. at 20. 
This argument is nothing more than a rehash of plaintiffs' 
earlier briefs and a reargument of the dissenting opinion in this 
case. It is, therefore, wholly improper on rehearing and should 
not be considered. 
By way of substantive response, however, appellants point out 
that plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated upon the 
theory of strict product liability as enunciated in Section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as adopted by this Court in 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co. , 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
The elements of a claim under Section 402A are: 
(1) that defendant is engaged in the business of selling and 
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did sell the product at issue in the case; Section 402A(1); 
(2) that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous 
at the time it left the sellerfs hands; Section 402A(1) , and 
Comments (g) and (i); 
(3) that the plaintiff is the ultimate consumer or user of 
the allegedly defective product; Section 402A(1); 
(4) that the product's defective and unreasonably dangerous 
condition caused the plaintiff physical harm; Section 402A(1); and 
(5) that the allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold; Section 
402A(1)(b). 
These elements of a plaintiff's cause of action for strict 
product liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, were the key issues in plaintiff's product liability case 
against AMC/Jeep as a matter of law. 
In an effort to prove the most critical element of its product 
liability cause of action — that the Jeep Commando being driven 
by Deborah Whitehead on the day of the accident made the basis of 
this litigation was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the 
time it left the hands of AMC/Jeep: 
(1) Plaintiffs offered and were permitted to display to the 
jury one film after another showing Jeep CJ5s (not Commandos) , 
rolling over in response to mechanically induced test programs 
bearing no resemblance to the accident conditions; 
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(2) Plaintiffs' experts were then permitted to compare Jeep 
CJ5s to Commandos, and testify, without any foundation whatsoever, 
that Jeep Commandos are "substantially similar" to Jeep CJ5s; 
(3) Plaintiffs' experts were then permitted to compare 
"Jeeps" with "other vehicles" (including utility vehicles and 
passenger cars) and to conclude, without any foundation, that 
"other vehicles" would not have rolled over under the circumstances 
presented; and 
(4) Hence, "Jeeps" are defectively designed and unreasonably 
dangerous. 
See Statement of Facts, supra at 12-18. 
"An assertion of opinion given on direct testimony that bears 
on a key issue in the case is a proper subject of cross-
examination." Whitehead at 29. The comparisons made by 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses were unquestionably offered to show 
that the Jeep Commando was defectively designed and unreasonably 
dangerous; consequently, they "bear on a key issue" in plaintiffs' 
product liability case against AMC/Jeep as a matter of law. 
Petitioners' first point on rehearing is, therefore, entirely 
without merit. 
II. Exhibits Offered by Defendants and 
Improperly Excluded by the Trial Court 
Were Made Part of the Record on Appeal. 
Plaintiffs next make a hypertechnical argument that 
defendants' exhibits, which this Court found had been improperly 
excluded from evidence by the trial court, "were never before the 
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Court for examination nor made part of the record on appeal." 
Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 21. To make that argument, 
however, plaintiffs selectively quote and completely misrepresent: 
(1) AMC/Jeep's Designation of Record on Appeal; 
(2) the factual context in which this argument is raised; and 
(3) the law applicable to this issue. 
Specifically, plaintiffs argue that AMC/Jeep's designation of 
record merely included "all pleadings, documents, and evidence."/ 
Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 21-22, when, in fact, AMC/Jeep's 
Designation of Record requested that all proceedings in the trial 
court, with the single exception of the voir dire examination of 
the jury venire, be certified in this case, as follows: 
All records and transcripts of all proceedings in 
the above-entitled matter, including all pleadings, 
documents, and evidence, and excluding only the 
transcript of voir dire jury selection. 
(R. 1661-1662) Appendix F. 
Next, plaintiffs argue that this issue was raised in its 
initial "Brief of Respondents Deborah Whitehead and Stephen 
Whitehead dated August 2, 1984 (at page 45)", and that it is merely 
"renewing" that argument here. 
In fact, plaintiffs made an entirely different argument in 
their earlier brief. In that brief they argued as follows:D 
The films offered by Heitzman were simply 
The period following "evidence" within the purportedly 
quoted material has been improperly added by plaintiffs and does 
not appear in AMC/Jeep's Designation of Record. 
This is the entire argument reprinted verbatim and in context! 
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inadmissible because of appellants7 violation of the 
orders of the court. In addition, the court determined 
that the films were not relevant. The persuasive effect 
of the film cannot be demonstrated or argued without its 
admission in evidence. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before 
the trier of fact will not be considered on 
appeal before the Supreme Court. 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 
(Utah 1983); In re Estate of Kropf, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 
1978); Corbett v. Corbett. 24 Utah 378, 472 P.2d 430 
(1970) . 
At no time prior to rehearing have plaintiffs ever suggested 
that the AMC/Jeep exhibits improperly excluded by the trial court 
were not part of the "record" in this case, or before the Court for 
examination in connection with this appeal. Plaintiffs are, 
therefore, precluded from even raising the issue now. 
A losing party cannot use a petition for rehearing to present 
to the Supreme Court a new theory or contention which was neither 
in the record as it was before the Court nor in the argument made. 
Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah 1982), quoting 
Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778 (1918). Accord 
State Board of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 745 P.2d 58 
(Wyo. 1987) (Rehearing may not be had on matters which were not 
urged at the original hearing or for the purpose of affording the 
opportunity to present new questions or issues. Matters which were 
not brought at the original hearing are deemed to have been waived, 
either expressly or by implication, and may not be considered on 
petition for rehearing); Kentner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 298 Or. 69, 689 
P.2d 955 (1984) (Generally, a contention not raised in connection 
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with the original hearing will not be considered on a petition for 
rehearing, as the purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new 
questions or rehash old arguments but to allow the court to correct 
mistakes and consider misapprehensions); Rosson v. Boyd, 727 P.2d 
765 (Alaska 1986); Wernberg v. State, 519 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1974); 
Waters v. Double L,, Inc., 114 Idaho 256, 755 P. 2d 1294 (Ida. App. 
1987), aff'd as clarified 115 Idaho 705, 769 P.2d 582 (1989); 
Weyerhaeuser Co. . Inc. v. United Pacific Ins. Co. , 83 Or. App. 556, 
732 P.2d 921 (1987); Hansen v. Singmaster Ins. Agency, Inc., 82 
Or. App. 219, 728 P.2d. 69 (1986); First Interstate Bank of Oregon 
v. Havnes, 75 Or. App. 18, 704 P.2d 1165 (1985). 
Even if this Court determines to consider the argument on the 
merits, however, plaintiffs are incorrect as a matter of law. The 
"record on appeal" is defined in Rule 11(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
Rule 11. The Record on Appeal. 
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The 
original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, 
the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index 
prepared by the clerk of the district court shall 
constitute the record on appeal in all cases. 
Defendants' exhibits filed in the district court, and offered into 
evidence were therefore a part of the record on appeal as a matter 
of law. Accord. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 
635, 638 (9th Cir. 1969); Munqin v. Florida East Coast Rwv Co. , 416 
F.2d 1169, 1171, n.6 (1969); United States v. Cain. 467 F.2d 704, 
707-708, n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Craddock's Adm'r v. Craddock's 
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AdmLr, 274 N.C. 343, 163 SE 387, 390 (1932). 
Rule 11 goes on to note that with respect to papers and 
exhibits, only those prescribed under paragraph (d) of the Rule 
shall actually be transmitted to the Supreme Court. Id. 
Rule 12 of the Rules of the Utah.Supreme Court then states in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(3) Transmission of Exhibits. Documents of unusual 
bulk or weight, and physical exhibits other than 
documents shall not be transmitted by the clerk unless 
he is directed to do so by a party or by the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court• 
Rule 12(b)(3), Utah R. S. Ct. (1987). 
The quoted language of Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, promulgated April 20, 1987, is identical to 
that contained in Rules 11 and 12 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, promulgated November 9, 1984 (Compare Appendix A to 
Appendix B), and substantially similar to that contained in their 
predecessor, Rule 75(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provided in pertinent part as follows: 
Large exhibits such as machinery or parts thereof, 
bulky objects, clothing, narcotics, firearms, large maps 
or charts, burglars' tools and items stolen in burglary 
cases, will not be transmitted to this court pursuant to 
this rule, unless inspection thereof by the court is 
deemed essential to a determination of the cause. When 
such an item is designated, the clerk of the district 
court shall retain the same in his possession until 
specifically requested by the clerk of the Supreme Court 
to forward it to the court... 
Rule 75(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983); Appendix A. 
The Introductory Note of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Appellate Procedure, published simultaneously with 
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the promulgation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1984 
and reprinted immediately following the Foreword to the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court in 1987, provides guidance to the bench and 
bar in the transition to the new rules of appellate procedure: 
It is recognized that in the transition from the 
prior rules to these new appellate rules, some problems 
may be encountered with respect to those cases that are 
in the course of appeal on the effective date of these 
Rules. It is intended that unless there is substantial 
prejudice in a particular case which results from the 
application of or compliance with these Rules, the Rules 
shall govern as of the effective date, all appellate 
procedure and practice in civil and criminal cases before 
the Supreme Court, including cases presently in process. 
If a claim of hardship or prejudice is claimed to exist 
as to a transitional case, application for appropriate 
relief may be made to the Supreme Court or to the Clerk 
of the Court on an ad hoc basis. 
* * * * * 
The Advisory Committee Notes, while not promulgated 
or formally adopted by the Supreme Court, may be used as 
a guide to and for appropriate references in the 
construction of the Rules. 
Appendix D. 
As a matter of practice, only documentary exhibits are ever 
transmitted to the Supreme Court on appeal, unless and until the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court requests the Clerk of the District Court 
to transmit a particular non-documentary exhibit for examination. 
Such requests for exhibits from the district court are made 
telephonically, in the ordinary course, and no written record is 
maintained of such requests.6 
The physical Record checked out from the Supreme Court 
Clerk's Office by appellants in connection with the preparation of 
this Brief on Rehearing evidences that this Court has, in fact, 
requested and obtained from the Clerk of the District Court, 
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The record, as transmitted in this case, contains a list of 
the 218 exhibits filed in the District Court, which exhibits 
constitute a part of the record on appeal in this case as a matter 
of law, under and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 1540-1549) That list of 
exhibits is then included in the Index (R. 1712) to facilitate the 
Court's request for specific exhibits, as necessary. 
The physical record, as constituted at the time it was checked 
out in connection with this brief on rehearing, includes some of 
the exhibits filed with the District Court in this case, but not 
all of them by any means. There is no indication anywhere in the 
record of the proceedings on this appeal when or why these exhibits 
were transmitted to the Supreme Court, and officials of the Supreme 
Court Clerk's office have no recollection of the circumstances 
surrounding the request(s) for these exhibits. Their presence in 
the file bears eloquent testimony to the fact that the members of 
this Court are capable of accessing the exhibits at any time they 
deem them necessary to their deliberations, however, and 
plaintiffs' effort to invade the internal deliberations of this 
Court to determine specifically what was reviewed or not reviewed 
by members of the Court in connection with an appeal is clearly 
improper, as a matter of law. 
several of the non-documentary exhibits made the subject of 
Appellants' claims of error in this case, which were not originally 
transmitted when the Record was lodged with the Supreme Court in 
1984. 
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III. The Trial Court's Errors Are Not Justified 
by Pre-Trial Rulings. 
Plaintiffs next attempt to reargue, for the fourth time during 
this appeal, that the trial court7s erroneous evidentiary rulings 
were actually sanctions properly imposed by the trial court as a 
result of defendants' purported failure to make discovery. 
(Respondents7 Motion to Strike at 6-11; Respondents7 Brief at 5-
19; Respondents7 Petition for Rehearing at 9-17; Petitioner7s Brief 
on Rehearing at 23-37.) 
Each time the issue has been raised, appellants have 
responded. (Response of American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation to plaintiffs7 Motion to Strike at 4-6; Reply Brief 
of Appellants at 4-18; Appellants7 Answer to Petition for 
Rehearing at 8-15.) Furthermore, this Court7s opinion demonstrates 
on its face that those arguments have been carefully reviewed, 
thoroughly understood, and thoughtfully considered. 
Specifically, the Court states in its opinion as follows: 
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred 
in excluding certain films and exhibits offered by them 
as evidence. They called a Mr. Heitzman as an expert 
witness to testify regarding the handling characteristics 
of Jeep vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s 
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers. Plaintiffs 
objected on the around that the introduction of the film 
violated previous orders of the court regarding 
discovery. The objection was sustained. 
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories seeking any 
testing Jeep had done regarding the handling 
characteristics of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando. At a 
hearing on plaintiffs7 motion to compel discovery. Judge 
Sorenson ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory 
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arguments 
in chambers on the admissibility of the film, the court 
ruled: 
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I think that in the context of all the 
circumstances and with respect to discovery 
procedures...I think the plaintiffs were 
entitled to have, or see, the films and test 
results before trial pursuant to their 
discovery interrogatories..., the films are not 
admissible. 
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates 
discovery orders under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. However, defendants point out that the 
discovery covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep 
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep CJ-5. The film 
simply is not covered by the language of the 
interrogatory. Although plaintiffs' experts were allowed 
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films 
of CJ-5s based on their foundational testimony that its 
handling was substantially similar to that of the 
Commando, that ruling does not place the film within the 
scope of material sought in the pretrial discovery 
request. The dissenting opinion would have defendants 
divine the scope of the requests by a trial court ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence which came much later. 
This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The tests 
were not produced to show the handling of the "66-13 Jeep 
Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose. 
Defendants maintained that the handling of the CJ-5 and 
the Commando were not the same. The tests were offered 
to rebut evidence presented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5 
was defective because of its handling characteristics. 
Although this evidence could have been excluded on the 
basis of relevancy had the trial court earlier excluded 
plaintiffs' films, once the court allowed plaintiffs to 
try their case on the basis of comparison with the CJ-5, 
it could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to 
rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the presentation 
of their case. The trial court erred in excluding the 
film on the basis that defendants had failed to comply 
with orders regarding discovery. 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. 
A vigorous dissent clearly demonstrates how thoroughly the 
matter has been reviewed and how thoughtfully it has been 
considered. Id. at 36. It is, therefore, improper for plaintiffs 
to reargue that issue on rehearing. 
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Rehearings are not granted to reargue matters determined by 
the original decision- Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ind. Comm., 90 Ariz. 
379, 368 P.2d 450 (1962). A petition for rehearing should be 
entertained only when the Supreme Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended some material matter. Matter of Estate of Herrmann, 
100 Nev. 149, 679 P.2d 246 (1984). Indeed, Rule 35(a) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court clearly directs the petitioner on 
rehearing to "state with particularity the points of law or fact 
which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or 
misapprehended". Where the petitioner's brief on rehearing merely 
restates arguments raised previously and discussed in the 
dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court's original decision, and 
where the Supreme Court's original decision has considered and 
disposed of each point raised by the petitioner on the original 
appeal, rehearing is improper. Board of Trustees of Weston County 
School Dist. No. 1 v. Holso, 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978). The purpose 
of rehearing is not to raise new questions or rehash old arguments 
but to allow the Court to correct mistakes and consider 
misapprehensions. Kentner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 298 Or, 69, 689 P.2d 
955 (1984). Accord In re Shirk's Estate, 194 Kan. 671, 401 P.2d 
279 (1965); Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 78 Nev. 69, 369 P.2d 676, 
cert, denied 371 U.S. 821 (1962). 
As exhaustively demonstrated in appellants' three previous 
briefs on this point, AMC/Jeep responded fully, or properly 
objected, to all of plaintiffs' discovery requests in this 
amc-w007.chd 
- 4 1 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
litigation. Plaintiffs' discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep 
information relating to the demonstrative evidence erroneously 
excluded by the trial court, except in the case of rebuttal 
evidence created during the course of the trial and excluded 
because it was not produced pursuant to the Court's discovery 
orders prior to trial, and this court has inexplicably upheld the 
exclusion of that evidence anyway. The arguments presented on this 
point in the Reply Brief of Appellants at 4-18 (Appendix I) are 
incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth. 
Plaintiffs now argue for the first time, however: 
(1) that the Court might have excluded defendants' evidence 
for failure to respond fully to expert witness interrogatories; and 
(2) that AMC/Jeep should have known what plaintiffs' trial 
strategy was going to be based upon the deposition testimony of 
plaintiffs' experts to the effect that there was no foundation to 
support their testimony that the Jeep Commando was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous. 
These arguments cannot properly be considered for the first time 
on rehearing. In Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P. 2d 678, 681 (Utah 
1982) this Court held that "[a] losing party cannot use a petition 
for rehearing 'to present to this Court a new theory or contention 
which was neither in the record as it was before this court nor in 
the arguments made.'" (quoting Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 
170 P. 774, 778 (1918)). 
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More importantlyf the trial court did not exclude the evidence 
on either basis and could not properly have done so under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure as they existed at that time. Rule 
26(b)(4) then provided in pertinent part as follows: 
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of 
facts known and opinions held by experts under the 
provisions of subdivision (b) (1) of this Rule may be 
obtained only as follows: 
(A) A party may discover facts known or opinions 
held by an expert who has been retained or specially 
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation 
or preparation for trial only as provided by Rule 35 or 
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which 
the party seeking discovery is not able to obtain the 
discovery of requested facts or opinions on the same 
subject by other means, or otherwise upon a showing that 
manifest injustice would result unless discovery is 
permitted. 
That rule has, of course, subsequently been amended to permit 
expert witness discovery, but the amendment did not occur until 
years after the trial of this case. Indeed, plaintiffs did not 
even ask the Court to exclude the evidence on the basis of the 
objections put forward on rehearing. Under this Court's standard 
of review on rehearing, those arguments are simply inappropriate. 
IV. This Court Properly Held that the 
Erroneous Exclusion of Evidence and the 
Improper Restriction of Cross-Examination 
Combined to Require Reversal. 
In the case of Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P. 2d 781, 
787 (1959), this Court reversed and remanded a personal injury case 
for new trial based upon the cumulative effect of several trial 
court errors, stating: 
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose 
for us to decide whether any one of the errors above 
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discussed, considered separately, would constitute 
sufficient prejudicial error to require a new trial. The 
question is whether the case was presented to the jury 
in such a manner that it is reasonable to believe there 
was a fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a 
just verdict. If errors were committed which prevented 
this being done, then a new trial should be granted, 
whether it resulted from one error, or from several 
errors cumulatively. We expressly do not mean to say 
that trivia Which would be innocuous in themselves can 
be added together to make sufficient error to result in 
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real and 
substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would 
affect the result. However, errors of the latter 
character, which may not by themselves justify a 
reversal, may well, when considered together with others, 
render it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such 
event justice can only be served by the granting of a new 
trial, absent the errors complained of. It is so 
ordered... 
Similarly, in State v. St. Clair. 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 
(1955), the Court stated: 
None of the rulings on evidence, considered singly, 
may seem of any great import. But the defendant is 
nevertheless entitled to have them considered 
cumulatively and as part of the over-all picture in 
determining whether he had a fair opportunity to present 
his defense. 
Id. at 328; and 
The proposition for us to decide here is not whether 
any of the irregularities herein discussed would 
separately have been such as to constitute prejudicial 
error and require a new trial. It is recognized that a 
combination of errors which, when singly considered might 
be thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, might in 
their cumulative effect do so. 
Id. at 332; Accord Moss v. Magnetic Peripherals, Inc., 744 P.2d 
1285, 1288 (Okla. App. 1987). 
Plaintiffs' argument that the Court's decision in this case 
"adopts a 'cumulative error doctrine' and overrules, sub silentio. 
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prior decisions of this Court to the contrary," Petitioner's Brief 
on Rehearing at 41, is simply inaccurate• The case of Bundv v. 
Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988), on which plaintiffs principally 
rely for their argument, merely held that the cumulative error 
standard did not apply in that case because there were no 
substantial errors. Id. at 806. The Court expressly recognized, 
however, the existence of a "cumulative error" doctrine in cases 
where a number of errors prejudice the defendant's right to a fair 
trial. Id. Similarly, in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 
1974), cited by plaintiffs, the Court merely found that the errors 
were insubstantial. 
The holdings in Richlin v. Gooding Amusement Co. , 113 Ohio 
App. 99, 170 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1960) and Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co, , 
116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279, 286 (1962), cited by plaintiffs, 
are distinguishable from the present case in that they are 
predicated on the fact that the various errors complained of were 
unrelated to one another. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. Nash, 226 Ga. 
706, 177 S.E.2d 70, 72-73 (1970), which relies on the Nicholas 
holding, is further distinguishable in that the appellant did not 
specify cumulative error as a basis for reversal. 
In this case, the Court properly held that: 
1. after permitting plaintiffs to present, through 
their expert witnesses, a theory of liability that the accident 
vehicle (a Jeep Commando) was defective and unreasonably dangerous 
because: 
(a) it was purportedly "substantially similar" to 
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the CJ5; and 
(b) the CJ5 was purportedly defective because 
certain tests purportedly showed that the 
CJ5 was more likely to roll over than other 
vehicles, including passenger cars; 
2. the trial court then erroneously: 
*
:
 (a) cut defendants off during their attempts to 
cross-examine plaintiffs7 experts, preventing 
defendants from probing the basis of the 
opinions given by plaintiffs' experts on 
comparisons they had made in their direct 
examination, allowing the issues to be 
presented to the jury without the added light 
that thorough cross-examination sheds 
(Whitehead at 29; and 
(b) excluded defendants7 own expert testimony and 
exhibits to rebut the plaintiffs7 theory of 
liability (Id. at 30-32). 
The Court specifically observed as follows: 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of 
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld 
the admissibility of those films because of the 
[purported] substantial similarity of the vehicle shown 
in the films to the vehicle in which plaintiffs were 
injured. However, plaintiffs in presenting their case 
did not stop there. They produced several experts who 
repeatedly in their testimony drew comparisons of the 
rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to non-Jeep 
vehicles. Plaintiffs7 aim was to show that the Jeep in 
which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had 
a tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For 
example, plaintiffs7 expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: 77There 
is no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll 
over than some others.77 Likewise, plaintiffs7 expert, 
Mr. Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to turn 
a passenger car over.77 Finally, Mr. Anderson, another 
of plaintiffs7 experts, testified that Jeep vehicles have 
77a delay in the handling response77 that is greater than 
S10 Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule of law 
relied upon by the dissenting opinion, that evidence of 
the condition of other products is not admissible to 
establish a defect in a particular product, it may be 
questioned whether such comparisons should have been 
admitted because of the lack of similarity. However, 
right or wrong, plaintiffs7 experts were allowed to draw 
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the comparisons between the rollover propensities of Jeep 
and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants should 
have been allowed in rebuttal to prove the experience of 
plaintiffs' experts and to introduce into evidence the 
film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced 
rollovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs/ film... 
Id. at 31. 
Similarly, the Court properly held that:* 
1. After receiving expert testimony presented by the 
plaintiffs that the accident vehicle was defective at the time it 
left the hands of the manufacturer because its roof collapsed 
during the rollover made the subject of this litigation, thus 
contributing to the plaintiffs' injuries; 
2. The trial court erroneously sustained plaintiffs7 
objection (on the basis of materiality) to the admissibility of an 
exhibit offered by defendants to show that the accident vehicle had 
been involved in a prior accident that had compromised the 
structural integrity of the vehicle's roof. Id. 
Finally, the Court properly held that evidence of how the 
presence of seat belts affected the design safety of the vehicle 
was erroneously excluded under the circumstances of this case. 
Id. at 32. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' contention in its Brief on Rehearing, 
the aforesaid errors do not constitute isolated, insubstantial and 
nonprejudicial errors. Indeed, as this Court properly held: 
Given the conflicting testimony presented on this key 
issue, we cannot say that the substantial rights of 
defendants were not affected by the combined effects of 
the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the 
limitation of cross-examination. While no one error by 
itself perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative effect 
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of the several errors undermines our confidence that 
defendants were able to present to the jury their theory 
of the case and that a fair trial was had. 
Id. at 32. 
This finding is completely consistent with the standard 
enunciated in Ivie v. Richardson. supra, and particularly 
appropriate when the Court was required to consider the impact of 
the evidentiary limitations and exclusions in the context of the 
plaintiffs' arguably improper comparative theory of liability. 
Those evidentiary limitations and exclusions were individually 
significant and prejudicial* Collectively they were simply 
devastating. 
V, Finally, This Court Must Reject 
Plaintiff's New Request to Limit Reversal 
of the Case to the Issue of Liability 
Permitting the Damage Award to Accrue 
Interest Pending Retrial of the Liability 
Issues. 
In Hvland v. St. Mark's, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738 
(1967), this Court stated that 
[t]here are undoubtedly some instances where limiting a 
trial to the issue of damages only may be justified, as 
our rules allow. But courts generally do not look with 
favor upon such a restriction. The reasons why this is 
so in personal injury actions are well exemplified in 
this case. The questions relating to the plaintiff's 
injury, how it happened, who was at fault, and the pain 
and injury occasioned thereby, are so intermingled that 
if there is to be a new trial, in fairness to both 
parties it should be on all issues. 
Similarly, in Groen v. Tri-O, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), this 
Court determined that the new trial in a personal injury action 
should be on liability and damages. As here, one party claimed 
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that because the jury had made a finding on the amount of damages, 
only liability should be retried. The Court stated in a footnote, 
however, that "[w]hether such a finding should be reopened in 
connection with a new trial on the issue of liability depends on 
whether the two issues are so intermingled that fairness to both 
parties requires retrial on both." Cf. Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 
P,2d 730, 735 (Utah 1982). Without explanation the Court 
determined that the retrial should involve damages as well as 
liability. Groen v. Tri-O, 667 P.2d at 607, n.ll. 
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Maxwell v. Portland 
Terminal RR Co. , 253 Or. 573, 456 P.2d 484, 486 (1969) is also 
persuasive: 
In the ordinary two-party personal-injury case, ... 
evidence of fault can influence the jury's measurement 
of damages; and the kind and degree of injuries may 
influence some jurors in their evaluation of the evidence 
on liability...Whatever logical problems these elements 
of lawyer folklore may suggest, we believe that neither 
side in this type of case should be encouraged to 
manipulate errors in one trial to gain advantage in a new 
trial before a new jury. Accordingly, we hold that the 
new trial in a personal injury case ordinarily should be 
a new trial on all contested factual issues, regardless 
of the ability of the parties on appeal to pinpoint error 
so as to show that the error, if any, may have affected 
only one issue. There will, of course, be exceptional 
cases in which the trial court, in the exercise of 
judicial discretion, properly will limit the issues for 
a new trial. But the standard to be applied in the 
exercise of this discretion is reasonable certainty that 
the issue or issues to be eliminated from the second 
trial are no longer viable issues in the case and that 
their removal will not prejudice the right of either 
party to the kind of jury trial to which he would have 
been entitled but for the error or errors necessitating 
the new trial. 
And the Colorado Supreme Court points out in Bassett v. 
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O'Dell, 178 Colo. 425, 498 P.2d 1134, 1135 (1972) that: 
[i]t is also clear that a partial retrial could not be 
conducted without injustice, since it would be virtually 
impossible under the facts of this case to mask the first 
jury's verdict for the plaintiff from the new jury that 
would be sitting at the time the case is retried. The 
prejudicial inference that would be created by a limited 
remand is to us obvious. 
"A claim for damages arising out of a personal injury is 
unliquidated in the sense that the defendant cannot know, prior to 
judgment, the precise amount he is going to be required to pay. 
Therefore, courts, in the absence of an applicable statute, apply 
the general rule for unliquidated claims and do not allow interest 
as a part of the damages awarded in such an action." 22 Am. Jur. 
2d Damages § 667 (1988). 
In Utah, of course, "special damages'' arising in personal 
injury actions accrue interest from the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to a cause of action, under and pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants and Respondents on Rehearing respectfully suggest 
that rehearing has been improvidently granted in this case, and 
urge the Court to reaffirm its February 2, 1989, decision in this 
matter, reversing and remanding this case to the trial court for 
a new trial on all issues. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 1989. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(As Amended 1983) 
Rule 75 
Record on Appeal-Briefs 
(a) Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal. Within ten 
days after the filing of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall 
serve upon the respondent and file with the district court a 
designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and 
evidence to be contained in the record on appeal unless the 
respondent has already served and filed a designation. Within ten 
days after the service and filing of such a designation, any other 
party to the appeal may serve and file a designation of additional 
portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be included. 
If the respondent files the original designation, the parties shall 
proceed under subdivision (b) of this Rule as if the respondent 
were the appellant. 
(1) Within fifteen days after filing the notice of appeal, 
the appellant shall file with the clerk of the district court his 
certificate stating (a) that a transcript of evidence has been 
ordered from the court reporter, or (b) that he does not intend to 
rely on said transcript. For failure to so file such certificate 
the appeal may be dismissed. 
(b) Transcript. If the trial or hearing was stenographically 
reported and appellant designates for inclusion any evidence or 
proceedings at such trial or hearing, the appellant shall file with 
his designation a copy of the reporter's transcript of the evidence 
or proceedings included in his designation. If the designation 
does not include all of the evidence, the appellant shall file a 
copy of such parts thereof as the respondent may need to enable him 
to designate the parts he desires to have added, and if the 
appellant fails to do so the court on motion nay require him to 
furnish the additional parts needed. The copy so filed by the 
appellant shall be available for the use of the other parties. In 
the event that a copy of the reporter's transcript or of the 
necessary portions thereof is already on file, the appellant shall 
not be required to file an additional copy. 
(c) Form of Testimony. Testimony of witnesses designated for 
inclusion need not be in narrative form, but may be in question and 
answer form. A party may prepare and file with his designation a 
condensed statement in narrative form of all or part of the 
testimony, and any other party to the appeal, if dissatisfied with 
the narrative statement, may require testimony in question and 
answer form to be substituted for all or part thereof. 
(d) Statement of Points. No assignment of errors is 
necessary. If the appellant does not designate for inclusion the 
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complete record and all the proceedings and evidence in the action, 
he shall serve with his designation a concise statement of the 
points on which he intends to rely on the appeal. 
If the respondent desires to cross appeal, or if the appellant 
has filed a statement of the points on which he intends to rely and 
the respondent desires to have the appellate court consider other 
or additional matters, the respondent shall, within 10 days after 
the service and filing of appellant's designation, or if the 
parties stipulate as to the record on appeal, within 10 days from 
the filing of such stipulation, serve and file a statement of 
respondent's points, either by way of such cross appeal or for the 
purpose of having considered other or additional matters than those 
raised by appellant. 
(e) Record to be Abbreviated. All matter not essential to 
the decision of the questions presented by the appeal shall be 
omitted. Formal parts of all exhibits and more than one copy of 
any document shall be excluded. Documents shall be abridged by 
omitting all irrelevant and formal portions thereof. For any 
infraction of this Rule or for the unnecessary substitution by one 
party of evidence in question and answer form for a fair narrative 
statement proposed by another, the appellate court may withhold or 
impose costs as the circumstances of the case and discouragement 
of like conduct in the future may require; and costs may be imposed 
upon offending attorneys or parties. 
Whenever the transcript exceeds 400 pages in length the court 
may order the appellant to prepare and file with the record an 
abstract of the testimony by preparing a concise statement of the 
same in narrative form. The statement shall contain appropriate 
references to the pages of the transcript. If the respondent or 
any other party is dissatisfied with the abstract he may prepare 
a separate statement of the testimony or propose amendments to the 
abstract filed by the appellant. If any party deems an abstract 
unnecessary or too burdensome he may apply to the court for an 
order relieving him from compliance. 
(f) Stipulation as to Record. Instead of serving 
designations as above provided, the parties by written stipulation 
filed with the clerk of the district court may designate the parts 
of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be included in the 
record on appeal. 
(g) Record to be Prepared by Clerk—Necessary Parts. The 
clerk of the district court, under his hand and the seal of the 
court/ shall transmit to the Supreme Court a true copy of the 
matter designated by the parties (unless the original papers are 
designated for inclusion in the record, in which event he shall 
transmit such original papers), but shall always include, whether 
or not designated, the originals or copies of the following: The 
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material pleadings without unnecessary duplication; the pretrial 
order, if any; the verdict or the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law; in an action tried without a jury, the masters report, if 
any; the opinion, if any, the judgment, order, or part thereof 
appealed from; the notice of appeal (or order granting an 
interlocutory appeal) with date of filing; the designations or 
stipulations of the parties as to matter to be included in the 
record; and any statement by the appellant or the respondent of the 
points on which such party intends to rely- The matter so 
certified and transmitted constitutes the record on appeal. The 
copy of the transcript filed as provided in subdivision (b) of this 
Rule shall be certified by the clerk as a part of the record on 
appeal and the clerk may not require an additional copy as a 
requisite to certification. 
Large exhibits such as machinery or parts thereof, bulky 
objects, clothing, narcotics, firearms, large maps or charts, 
burglars1 tools and items stolen in burglary cases, will not be 
transmitted to this court pursuant to this rule, unless inspection 
thereof by the court is deemed essential to a determination of the 
cause. When such an item is designated, the clerk of the district 
court shall retain the same in his possession until specifically 
requested by the clerk of the Supreme Court to forward it to the 
court. Appropriate notation of such retained exhibits shall be 
made on the clerkfs certificate. 
(h) Power of Court to Correct or Modify Record. It is not 
necessary for the record on appeal to be approved by the district 
court or a judge thereof except as provided in subdivisions (m) and 
(o) of this Rule; but if any difference arises as to whether the 
record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the 
record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to 
either party is omitted from the record on appeal by error or 
accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or 
the district court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, on a proper 
suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission 
or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary that a 
supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk 
of the district court. All other questions as to the content and 
form of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court. 
(i) Order as to Original Papers or Exhibits. Whenever the 
district court is of the opinion that original papers or exhibits 
should be inspected by the Supreme Court or sent to that court in 
lieu of copies (and the appellant has not designated that such 
original papers be a part of the record on appeal), it may make 
such order therefor and for the safekeeping, transportation, and 
return thereof as it deems proper. 
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(j) Record for Preliminary Hearing in Appellate Court. If 
prior to the time the complete record on appeal is settled and 
certified as herein provided, a party desires to make in the 
Supreme Court a motion for dismissal, for a stay pending appeal, 
for additional security on the bond on appeal or on the supersedeas 
bond, or for any intermediate order, the clerk of the district 
court at his request shall certify and transmit to the Supreme 
Court such portion of the record or proceedings below as is needed 
for that purpose, 
(k) Several Appeals. When more than one appeal is taken from 
the same judgment, a single record on appeal shall be prepared 
containing all the matter designated or agreed upon by the parties, 
without duplication. 
(1) Form of Record—Size of Paper and Style of Type* The 
general form of the record, including the size of paper, weight, 
margins, kind and spacing of type, shall be the same as required 
by Rule 10(d), The pleadings, proceedings, and papers shall be 
chronologically arranged, the pages thereof numbered, and the 
record shall be prefaced with an alphabetical index specifying the 
page on which each paper, pleading, proceeding, and the testimony 
of each witness may be found. If the record is insufficient or if 
it is not prepared and arranged in accordance with the foregoing 
directions, the court may order the appellant to make the same 
conform thereto. 
(m) Appeals When No Stenographic Report Available. In the 
event no stenographic report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or is available, the appellant may 
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best 
available means, including his recollection, for use instead of a 
stenographic transcript. This statement shall be served on the 
respondent who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto 
within 10 days after service upon him. Thereupon the statement, 
with the objections or proposed amendments, shall be submitted to 
the district court for settlement and approval and as settled and 
approved shall be included by the clerk of the court in the record 
on appeal. 
(n) Transmission of Original Papers. At the time of filing 
a stipulation as to the record on appeal, or if no stipulation is 
filed, at the time of filing any designation of the parts of the 
record to be included in the record on appeal, the parties, or 
party filing such designation may specify that the original papers 
filed in the action be transmitted to the Supreme Court in lieu of 
copies. If a transcript of the testimony is on file, the appellant 
may designate that such transcript be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court; otherwise, the appellant shall file with the clerk for 
transmission such transcript of the testimony as he deems necessary 
for his appeal, subject to the right of the respondent either to 
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file additional portions or to require the appellant so to do, 
under the provisions of subdivision (b) of this Rule- After the 
appeal has been disposed of, any original papers shall be returned 
to the custody of the district court. The provisions of 
subdivisions (h) , (j), (k) , (1), and (m) of this Rule shall be 
applicable to appeals where the original papers are transmitted to 
the Supreme Court, but with reference to such original papers 
rather than to a copy or copies. 
(0) Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal. When the questions 
presented by an appeal to the Supreme Court can be determined 
without an examination of all the pleadings, evidence, and 
proceedings in the court below, the parties may prepare and sign 
a statement of the case showing how the questions arose and were 
decided in the district court and setting forth only so many of the 
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential 
to a decision of the questions by the appellate court. The 
statement shall include a copy of the judgment appealed from, a 
copy of the notice of appeal with its filing date, and a concise 
statement of the points to be relied on by the appellant. If the 
statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions 
as the court may consider necessary fully to present the questions 
raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the district court and 
shall then be certified to the Supreme Court as the record on 
appeal* 
(p) Briefs on Appeal. 
(1) Time for Filing. Within one month after the record on 
appeal is filed in the Supreme Court, unless a motion to dismiss 
the appeal has been interposed, in which event within 20 days from 
the denial of such motion, the appellant shall file with the clerk 
of the Supreme Court not less than ten copies of his brief on 
appeal, and shall serve upon the opposing party not less than two 
copies of such brief. Within one month after the service upon him 
of appellant's brief, the respondent shall file with the clerk of 
the Supreme Court at least ten copies of his brief and serve upon 
appellant at least two copies thereof. A reply brief nay likewise 
be served and filed by the appellant at any time before the first 
day of the session of court at which the case is set for hearing. 
(2) Contents. The appellant's brief shall contain in order: 
(1) a table of contents including a concise statement of the points 
upon which appellant intends to rely for a reversal of judgment or 
order of the court below, without redundancy or duplicity and in 
the same order in which such points are argued in the brief, and 
including an alphabetical index of the cases and authorities cited; 
(2) (a) a short one-sentence statement of the nature of the case; 
(b) the disposition made of the case in the lower court; (c) the 
exact nature of the relief sought on appeal, and (d) a concise 
statement of the material facts of the case citing the pages of the 
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record supporting such statement; (3) the argument under separate 
headings in so far as such separation is practicable; (4) the cover 
of all briefs shall set forth the full title of the case, plaintiff 
in the court below being named first and designated as Plaintiff-
Appellant or Plaint iff-Respondent as the case might be and the 
defendant below designated as Defendant-Appellant or Defendant-
Respondent as the case might be, the party on whose behalf filed, 
the court from which appeal is taken, the name of the judge who 
presided, and names and mailing addresses of counsel for the 
respective parties. 
If the respondent agrees with the statement of facts set forth 
in appellant's brief, he shall so indicate• If he controverts it, 
he shall state wherein such statement is inconsistent with the 
facts and shall make a statement of the facts as he finds them, 
giving reference to the pages of the record supporting his 
statement and controverting appellant's statement- In other 
respects, respondent's brief shall conform to the same requirements 
set forth above for appellant's brief. 
The reply brief, if any, shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in respondent's brief, and shall conform generally 
to the requirements of other briefs. 
No brief shall be filed with such court which exceeds 50 
pages, exclusive of the index, notes, appendices and copies of 
documents, written instruments, pleadings and other similar 
matters, which must be on separate pages from the main body of the 
brief, without first obtaining special permission, on good cause 
shown, from the Supreme Court or a Justice thereof. 
(3) Corrections and Newly Uncovered Cases. Briefs are 
distributed to the justices usually not earlier than two weeks 
before the beginning of the session* Up to that time they will be 
lodged in the office of the clerk. Errors should be discovered 
before that time and corrections made directly in ink on the copies 
of the briefs. Likewise, with the additions of newly uncovered 
cases with their citations, except that the proposition to which 
the newly added cases apply, shall also be specified. 
In the event corrections are not timely made on the briefs 
directly, and in order to save the time of the justices making 
corrections on a tightly articulated calendar, a party desiring to 
make any corrections or add any additional authorities, shall, not 
later than the day of the argument, submit to the clerk for 
insertion in the brief, ten typewritten copies of such corrections 
or additional authorities on paper the same size as the brief, the 
correcting page to be given the same number as the page sought to 
be corrected. Each such page shall set forth the title of the 
case, the name of the party for whose benefit the correction or 
addition is made, and a statement giving the line or lines of the 
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page where the corrections should be made, and in the case of 
additional authorities, shall designate the proposition> or 
propositions to which they apply. 
In case corrections or authorities not uncovered before the 
argument are tendered, the insertion sheets as above specified in 
the manner and number above set out may be made by mail to the 
clerk's office. 
(4) Size and Style. All briefs must be printed in not less 
than ten-point type on good white, unglazed paper, 6 inches wide 
by 9 inches long, with inside margins of not less than one inch, 
and with double leaded text and single leaded citations and 
quotations; provided, that upon application of a party, the court 
or any justice thereof, may where the circumstances require, make 
an order dispensing with printed briefs and permitting typewritten 
briefs to be filed. Typewritten briefs must be on unglazed white 
paper, 6 inches wide by 9 inches long. The impression must be on 
one side of the paper only and must be double spaced, except for 
matter customarily single spaced and indented, with adequate 
margins on the top and sides of each page. Briefs and appendices 
may be produced by standard typographic printing or by any 
duplicating or copying process which produces a clear, black, 
permanent image on white paper. 
All briefs shall be bound on the left side and securely 
fastened, with an outside cover of heavy weight paper. All copies 
must be neat and the matter therein clearly legible. The clerk 
shall examine all briefs before filing the same and if they are not 
prepared in accordance with this Rule he shall not file them, but 
shall return them to be properly prepared. 
(5) Cost of Printing Taxable. The actual expense of printing 
briefs not to exceed $2.00 for each page of printed matter may be 
taxed as costs. Costs of typewritten briefs, including 
mimeographed or carbon copies may be taxed at not to exceed $.50 
per page, except if planographed copies or copies prepared by 
similar process or photographed copies are filed, the additional 
expense of preparing such copies, not to exceed $.25 per page may 
be taxed as costs. 
(q) Application of Rule to Original Proceedings in the 
Supreme Court. The provisions of subdivisions (1) and (p) of this 
Rule shall apply to the record, if any, and to all briefs filed in 
an original proceeding in the Supreme Court, in so far as such 
provisions are applicable; provided that the plaintiff in any such 
original proceeding shall file his brief within one month from the 
return date of the writ. 
(r) Filing Copies of Motions and Applications for 
Extraordinary Writs. Motions and answers thereto made in the 
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Supreme Court must be in writing, served upon opposing counsel, and 
at least six copies thereof filed with the clerk* A motion to 
dismiss an appeal must be accompanied by a memorandum of 
authorities in support thereof. 
When an application is made to the Supreme Court for an 
extraordinary writ to be issued in the exercise of original 
jurisdiction, six copies of such application must be filed with the 
clerk, together with a brief memorandum of authorities upon which 
the applicant relies for the issuance of the writ. 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
(As Amended 1984) 
Rule ll. The Record on Appeal. 
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The original papers 
and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of 
proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of the 
district court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. 
However with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed 
under paragraph (d) of this Rule shall be transmitted to the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Pagination and Indexing of the Record. Immediately upon 
filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court 
shall prepare an index of all of the original papers filed in the 
district court, and shall paginate those papers in chronological 
order. 
(c) Duty of Appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, 
the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is taken, 
each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) 
and (e) of this Rule and shall take any other action necessary to 
enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the record. A single 
record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers and Exhibits on Appeal. 
(1) Criminal Cases. All of the original papers in a criminal 
case shall be included by the clerk of the district court as part 
of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil Cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain 
in the custody of the cleric of the district court, as set forth in 
Rule 12(b)(2) during preparation and filing of briefs. 
The district court clerk shall establish rules and procedures 
for checking out the record, after pagination, for use by the 
parties in briefing. 
(A) Civil Cases with Short Records. In civil cases 
where all original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of 
the original pages will be transmitted to the Supreme Court 
upon completion of the filing of briefs by the parties, as set 
forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such cases, the appellant shall 
serve a notice upon the clerk of the district court, 
simultaneous with the filing of appellant's reply brief with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court, of the date in which 
appellant's reply brief was filed; if appellant does not 
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk 
of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the 
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filing of respondent's brief with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. . 
(B) All Other Civil Cases* In all other civil cases 
where the original papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties 
shall file with the clerk of the district court, within 10 
days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate 
designation of those papers referred to in their respective 
briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to 
the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court by the clerk of the district court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order 
from which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or 
conclusions of law filed or delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda 
upon which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(e) The Transcript of Proceedings; Duty of Appellant to 
Order, Notice to Respondent if Partial Transcript is Ordered. 
(1) Request for Transcript; Time for Filing. Within 10 days 
after filing the notice of appeal the appellant shall request from 
the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not 
already on file as he deems necessary. The request shall be in 
writing and within the same period a copy shall be filed with the 
clerk of the district court. If no such parts of the proceedings 
are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall 
file a certificate to that effect. 
(2) Transcript Required of all Evidence Regarding Challenged 
Finding or Conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence, he shall include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion* 
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(3) Statement of Issues; Cross-Designation by Respondent. 
Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant 
shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a 
statement of the issues he intends to present on the appeal and 
shall serve on the respondent a copy of the request or certificate 
and of the statement. If the respondent deems a transcript of 
other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, he shall, within 
10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a 
designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested 
such parts, and has so notified the respondent, the respondent may 
within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in 
the district court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of Reporter. At-the time of the request, a party 
shall make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter for payment 
of the cost of the transcript. 
(f) Agreed Statement as the Record on Appeal. In lieu of the 
record on appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this Rule, the 
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case showing how 
the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the 
district court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred 
and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, 
it, together with such additions as the court may consider 
necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall 
be approved by the district court and transmitted by the district 
court clerk to the Clerk of the Supreme Court as the record on 
appeal within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The index 
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court by the clerk of the 
district court upon approval by the district court of the 
statement. 
(g) Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings When no Report 
was Made or When the Transcript is Unavailable. If no report of 
the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if 
a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement 
of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, 
including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the 
respondent, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto 
within 10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any 
objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the 
district court for settlement and approval and as settled and 
approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in 
the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any 
difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what 
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occurred in the district court, the difference shall be submitted 
to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the 
truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the 
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties 
by stipulation, or the district court, or the Supreme Court, either 
before or after the record is transmitted to the Supreme Court, on 
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the 
omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a 
supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall 
serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 
10 days after service any party may serve objections to the 
proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content 
of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court. 
Rule 12. Transmission of the Record. 
(a) Duty of Reporter to Prepare and File Transcript; Notice 
to Supreme Court. Upon receipt of a request for a transcript, the 
reporter shall acknowledge at the foot of the request the fact that 
he has received it and the date on which he expects to have the 
transcript completed and shall transmit the request, so endorsed, 
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If the transcript cannot be 
completed within 30 days of receipt of the request the reporter 
shall seek an extension of time from the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
and the action of the Clerk shall be entered on the docket and the 
parties notified. In the event of the failure of the reporter to 
file the transcript within the time allowed, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court shall notify the district judge and take such other 
steps as may be directed by the Supreme Court including but not 
limited to an order relieving the reporter of his regular duties 
until such time as the transcript is completed. Upon completion 
of the transcript the reporter shall file it with the clerk of the 
district court and shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court that 
he has done so. 
(b) Transmittal of Record on Appeal to Supreme Court; Duty 
of District Court Clerk 
(1) Duty of District Court Clerk in Criminal Cases. In 
criminal cases, all of the original papers and the index prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) will be transmitted by the clerk of the 
district court to the Clerk of the Supreme Court upon completion 
of the transcript under paragraph (a) above, or if there is no 
transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
(2) Duty of District Court Clerk in Civil Cases. In civil 
cases, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, the record 
shall remain in the custody of the district court clerk during the 
preparation and filing of briefs. When the transcript is completed 
pursuant to paragraph (a) above for purposes of the appeal, the 
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clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit a certified 
copy of the index prepared pursuant to Rule 11(b) to the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court. Within 20 days from the date of receipt of the 
notice of appellant pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(A) or within 20 days 
of receipt of the designations from all parties to the appeal 
pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B), the clerk of the district court shall 
forthwith transmit to the Clerk of the Supreme Court the papers, 
transcript and exhibits in the appeal. 
(3) Transmission of Exhibits. Documents of unusual bulk or 
weight, and physical exhibits other than documents shall not be 
transmitted by the clerk unless he is directed to do so by a party 
or by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A party must make advance 
arrangements with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of 
exhibits of unusual bulk or weight* 
(c) Retention of the Record in the District Court by Order 
of Court. If the record or any part therein is required in the 
district court for use there pending the appeal beyond the time set 
forth in paragraph (b) hereof, the district court may make an order 
to that effect, and the clerk of the district court shall retain 
the record or parts thereof subject to the request of the Supreme 
Court, and shall transmit a copy of the order and of the index 
together with such parts of the original record as the district 
court shall order and copies of such parts as the parties may 
designate* 
(d) Stipulation of Parties that Parts of the Record Be 
Retained in the District Court. The parties may agree by written 
stipulation filed in the district court that designated parts of 
the record shall be retained in the district court unless 
thereafter the Supreme Court shall order or. any party shall request 
their transmittal. The parts thus designated shall nevertheless 
be a part of the record on appeal for all purposes. 
(e) Record for Preliminary Hearing in Supreme Court. If 
prior to the time the record is transmitted a party desires to make 
any motion in the Supreme Court, the clerk of the district court 
at the request of any party shall transmit to the Supreme Court 
such parts of the original record as any party shall designate. 
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RULES OP THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
(1986) 
Rule 11• The Record on Appeal 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers 
and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of 
proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of the 
district court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. 
However with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed 
under Paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of the record. Immediately upon 
filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court 
shall prepare an index of all the original papers filed in the 
district court, and shall paginate those papers in chronological 
order. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, 
the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is taken, 
each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of Paragraphs (d) 
and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to 
enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the record. A single 
record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers and exhibits on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the original papers in a criminal 
case shall be included by the clerk of the district court as part 
of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain 
in the custody of the clerk of the district court, as set forth in 
Rule 12(b)(2), during prepaxation and filing of briefs. 
The district court clerk shall establish rules and procedures 
for checking out the record, after pagination, for use by the 
parties in briefing. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases 
where all the original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all 
of the original papers will be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court upon completion of the filing of briefs by the parties, 
as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such cases, the appellant 
shall serve a notice upon the clerk of the district court, 
simultaneous with the filing of appellant's reply brief with 
the clerk of the Supreme Court, of the date in which 
appellant's reply brief was filed; if appellant does not 
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk 
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of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the 
filing of respondent's brief with the clerk of the Supreme 
Court. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases 
where the original papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties 
shall file with the cleric of the district court, within 10 
days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate 
designation of those papers referred to in their respective 
briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to 
the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of 
the Supreme Court by the clerk of the district court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order 
from which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or 
conclusions of law filed or delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda 
upon which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any: 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to 
order; notice to respondent if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days 
after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from 
the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not 
already on file as the appellant deems necessary. The request 
shall be in writing, and within the same period, a copy shall be 
filed with the clerk of the district court and the clerk of this 
court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, 
within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to 
that effect with the clerk of the district court and a copy thereof 
with the clerk of this court. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
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that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence, he shall include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by respondent. 
Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant 
shall, within 20 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a 
statement of the issues he intends to present on the appeal and 
shall serve on the respondent a copy of the request or certificate 
and of the statement. If the respondent deems a transcript of 
other parts of the proceedings to be necessary/ he shall within 10 
days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a 
designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested 
such parts, and has so notified the respondent, the respondent may 
within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in 
the district court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party 
shall make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter for payment 
of the cost of the transcript. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the 
record on appeal as defined in Paragraph (a) of this rule, the 
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case showing how 
the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the 
district court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred 
and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, 
it, together with such additions as the court may consider 
necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall 
be approved by the district court and transmitted by the district 
court clerk to the clerk of the Supreme Court as the record on 
appeal within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The index 
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court by the clerk of the 
district court upon approval by the district court of the 
statement. 
(g) Statement of the evidence or proceedings when no report 
was made or when the transcript is unavailable. If no report of 
the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if 
a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement 
of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, 
including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the 
respondent, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto 
within 10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any 
objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the 
district court for settlement and approval and as settled and 
approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in 
the record on appeal. 
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(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any 
difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what 
occurred in the district court, the difference shall be submitted 
to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the 
truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the 
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties 
by stipulation, or the district court or the Supreme Court, either 
before or after the record is transmitted to the Supreme Court, on 
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the 
omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a 
supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall 
serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 
10 days after service any party may serve objections to the 
proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content 
of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court. (Amended, 
effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 12. Transmission of the record. 
(a) Duty of reporter to prepare and file transcript; notice 
to Supreme Court. Upon receipt of a request for a transcript, the 
reporter shall acknowledge at the foot of the request the fact that 
he has received it and the date on which he expects to have the 
transcript completed and shall transmit the request, so endorsed, 
to the clerk of the Supreme Court. If the transcript cannot be 
completed within 30 days of receipt of the request the reporter 
shall seek an extension of time from the clerk of the Supreme Court 
and the action of the clerk shall be entered on the docket and the 
parties notified. In the event of the failure of the reporter to 
file the transcript within the time allowed, the clerk of the 
Supreme Court shall notify the district judge and take such other 
steps as may be directed by the Supreme Court including but not 
limited to an order relieving the reporter of his regular duties 
until such time as the transcript is completed. Upon completion 
of the transcript the reporter shall file it with the clerk of the 
district court and shall notify the clerk of the Supreme Court that 
he has done so. 
(b) Transmittal of record on appeal to Supreme Court; duty 
of district court clerk. 
(1) Duty of district court clerk in criminal cases. In 
criminal cases, all of the original papers and the index prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) will be transmitted by the clerk of the 
district court to the clerk of the Supreme Court upon completion 
of the transcript under Paragraph (a) above, or if there is no 
transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
(2) Duty of district court clerk in civil cases. In civil 
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cases, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, the record 
shall remain in the custody of the district court clerk during the 
preparation and filing of briefs• When the transcript is completed 
pursuant to Paragraph (a) above for purposes of the appeal, the 
clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit a certified 
copy of the index prepared pursuant to Rule 11(b) to the clerk of 
the Supreme Court. Within 20 days from the date of receipt of the 
notice of appellant pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(A) or within 20 days 
of receipt of the designations from all parties to the appeal 
pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B), the clerk of the district court shall 
forthwith transmit to the clerk of the Supreme Court the papers, 
transcript and exhibits in the appeal. 
(3) Transmission of exhibits. Documents of unusual bulk or 
weight, and physical exhibits other than documents shall not be 
transmitted by the clerk unless he is directed to do so by a party 
or by the clerk of the Supreme Court. A party must make advance 
arrangements with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of 
exhibits of unusual bulk or weight. 
(c) Retention of the record in the district court by order 
of court. If the record or any part therein is required in the 
district court for use there pending the appeal beyond the time set 
forth in Paragraph (b) hereof, the district court may make an order 
to that effect, and the clerk of the district court shall retain 
the record or parts thereof subject to the request of the Supreme 
Court, and shall transmit a copy of the order and of the index 
together with such parts of the original record as the district 
court shall order and copies of such parts as the parties may 
designate. 
(d) Stipulation of parties that parts of the record be 
retained in the district court. The parties may agree by written 
stipulation filed in the district court that designated parts of 
the record shall be retained in the district court unless 
thereafter the Supreme Court shall order or any party shall request 
their transmittal. The parts thus designated shall nevertheless 
be a part of the record on appeal for all purposes. 
(e) Record for preliminary hearing in Supreme Court. If 
prior to the time the record is transmitted a party desires to make 
any motion in the Supreme Court, the clerk of the district court 
at the request of any party shall transmit to the Supreme Court 
such parts of the original record as any party shall designate. 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE OF SUPREME COURT ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
These Rules provide for appellate procedure and practice 
before the Supreme Court of Utah in all cases, civil and criminal, 
and are effective the 1st day of January, 1985. The Rules have 
been promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to its 
rule-making power under 78-2-4 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
Simultaneous with the effective date of these Rules, the prior 
rules concerning appellate procedure and practice before the 
Supreme Court, Rule 54(d)(3) and (4), Rules 65B(g) and Rules 72-
76, with the exception of Rule 73(h) through (1), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (hereinafter "URCivP"), inclusive, are repealed. 
Rule 73(h)-(l) URCivP governing appeals from a justice court to a 
district court are not repealed and remain in force and effect. 
It is recognized that in the transition from the prior rules 
to these new appellate rules, some problems may be encountered with 
respect to those cases that are in the course of appeal on the 
effective date of these Rules. It is intended that unless there 
is substantial prejudice in a particular case which results from 
the application of or compliance with these Rules, the Rules shall 
govern as of the effective date, all appellate procedure and 
practice in civil and criminal cases before the Supreme Court, 
including cases presently in process. If a claim of hardship or 
prejudice is claimed to exist as to a transitional case, 
application for appropriate relief may be made to the Supreme Court 
or to the Clerk of the Court on an ad hoc basis. 
In general, Rules 1 through 13 govern appeals from district 
courts and juvenile courts of the State to the Supreme Court; Rules 
14 through 18 govern appeals to and reviews by the Supreme Court 
from the orders and decisions of administrative agencies, 
commissions and boards; Rules 19 and 20 govern extraordinary writs 
before the Supreme Court; and rules 21 through 39 govern filing 
and service, computation of time, motion practice, briefs, oral 
argument, decision of the Court, costs, petitions for rehearing, 
discipline, and other general provisions of practice and procedure 
before the Supreme Court. 
These Rules follow the general format of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "FRAP")• However there are 
significant departures, both philosophical and practical, from the 
federal rules at points where it was determined that the adopted 
provisions better achieved the objectives of appellate practice or 
were more applicable to practice before the Supreme Court of Utah. 
The Advisory Committee Notes, while not promulgated or 
formally adopted by the Supreme Court, may be used as a guide to 
and for appropriate references in the construction of the Rules. 
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CODE• co Whitehead v. Americ 
Provo. Utah 101 Utah -
was merely incidental that he chose to make 
them from his home. 
We hold that the "coming and going rule" is 
applicable in cases involving third-party 
negligence claims. Where a third party is 
seeking to hold an employer vicariously liable, 
the employee must be in the "course and scope 
of his employment," that is, he must be acting 
to benefit his employer and subject to his 
control. The trial court erred in ruling that 
Anderson was in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident as a 
matter of law. The order directing a verdict in 
favor of plaintiffs and Anderson is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to enter judgment in 
favor of VALIC in accordance with the jury 
verdict. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
L AMC/Jeep was held liable for the remaining 70 
percent because of the negligent design of the 1972 
Jeep Commando in which plaintiffs were riding. 
AMC/Jeep has filed a separate appeal, No. 19695, 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, which we also decide today. 
Cue as 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendants American Motors Sales Corpo-
t Motors Sates Corp. ~-
*. Rep. 27 2H 
ration and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) 
appeal a judgment awarded plaintiff Stephen 
Whitehead on a products liability claim. 
On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead 
was driving south on I-15 near Orem, Utah, 
in a 1972 Jeep Commando that she had bor-
rowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen, 
was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant 
Larry Anderson was returning home from 
work in his automobile, a short distance 
behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsraobile 
station wagon he was driving was traveling 
approximately fifteen miles per hour faster 
than the Commando. The Oldsmobile struck 
the Commando on the left rear corner; the 
Commando went out of control and rolled. 
Stephen Whitehead suffered a spinal injury 
and was rendered a paraplegic. 
Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead 
filed their original complaint on November 21, 
1979, naming Anderson as defendant. The 
complaint was later amended, adding Ande-
rson's employer, Variable Annuity Life Ins-
urance Company,1 and AMC and Jeep as 
defendants. 
During the nearly four years between the 
filing of the original complaint and the begi-
nning of trial, the parties engaged in extensive 
discovery. Plaintiffs propounded three sets of 
interrogatories to AMC/Jeep. Their failure to 
timely answer the interrogatories brought 
motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery. 
AMC/Jeep's answers, when received, pro-
mpted a motion to strike as unresponsive and 
additional motions to compel discovery h~ 
plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions v 
held on October 29, 1982, where Judge S«-re-
nsen2 went through the interrogatories and 
answers. He modified some of the questions, 
gave orders for supplemental answers to be 
given, and stated that if the answers stood as 
given, he would sustain objections to evidence 
not conforming with the answers. Plaintiffs 
orally asked for sanctions against AMC/Jeep 
for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no 
formal motion was made and no order for 
sanctions was ever issued, plaintiffs did file a 
motion in limine after the supplemental 
answers were filed seeking to prohibit AMC/ 
Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to 
the subjects of certain interrogatories. The 
court reserved ruling on the motion until the 
evidence was offered. 
Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on 
October 7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of 
a film produced by Dynamic Science that 
showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling over in staged 
tests. Upon a prescreeninng of the film and 
over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled 
that the film was admissible. Plaintiffs also 
moved to exclude all evidence as to the avail-
ability and their nonuse of seat belts. After 
reviewing memoranda of the parties and pro-
ffers of proof, the court barred references to 
the availability or nonuse of seat belts. 
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American Motors Sales Corporation filed its 
answer to the complaint in September 1983, 
over three years after being named in the 
amended complaint and just one month prior 
to the trial. It raised Utah Code Ann. §78-
15-3(1) (1987) as a defense. This statute bars 
the bringing of a products liability action 
"more than six years after the date of initial 
purchase for use or consumption.9 Jeep Cor-
poration moved to amend its answer to also 
include this defense; the motion was denied. 
Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and 
continued for three weeks. The jury determ-
ined that AMC and Jeep were negligent in the 
design of the vehicle and awarded damages to 
Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal, 
raising several issues which we will separately 
consider. 
I. 
Defendants contend that they should have 
been allowed to interpose a defense based on 
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3 (1987), which 
provides that product liability actions are 
barred if brought "more than six years after 
the initial purchase/ In Berry arreL Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we 
held that statute to be unconstitutional; ther-
efore, defendants'point is moot. 
n. 
Defendants contend that the court erred in 
admitting plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In 
reviewing questions of admissibility of evid-
ence at trial, deference is given.to the trial 
court's advantageous position; thus, that 
court's rulings regarding admissibility will not 
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
Bollock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 
1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985); sec also Collins v. 
B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
The criteria for establishing the admissibility 
of crash test films, such as those in issue here, 
are that the data be relevant, that the tests be 
conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to those of the actual occurrence, and 
that its presentation not consume undue 
amounts of time, not confuse the issues, apd 
not mislead the jury. Endicott v. Nissan 
Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. 95 (1977); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. 
Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 
F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981); Renfro Hosiery 
M2b Co. v. United Cash Register Co., 552 
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); see Weaver v. Ford 
Motor Co., 382 F.'Sujpp. 1068 (EJD. Pa. 
1974), afVd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(without published opinion); see also Collins 
v. BS. Goodrich, 558 F2d at 910. 
Defendants objected to admission of tests of 
CJ-5s on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20-
inch shorter wheelbase, giving it different 
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steering and handling characteristics than the 
Commando. Defendant also objected on 
grounds that the tests were not substantially 
similar to the accident conditions. The tests 
were * J turns" where 588 degrees of steering 
were suddenly input while a constant vehicle 
speed was maintained. The test vehicles had 
also been "specially prepared" to accentuate 
the rollovers depicted in the films. The requi-
rement of "substantial similarity of condit-
ions" does not require absolute identity; 
however, they must "be so nearly the same in 
substantial particulars as to afford a fair 
comparison in respect to the particular issue to 
which the test is directed." Illinois Central 
GulfR.IL v. Ishee, 317 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss. 
1975) (emphasis added). The films here were 
offered to show the handling characteristics of 
the Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs' experts test-
ified at length that the handling characteristics 
of the CJ-5s shown in the tests and the 
Commando were substantially similar. Defe-
ndants by cross-examination and presenta-
tion of their own evidence endeavored to bring 
out the differences between the test and the 
accident and between the vehicle tested and 
the vehicle in question. 
Given our standard of review of the admi-
ssibility of evidence at trial, we cannot dearly 
say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting plaintiffs' films in light of the 
foundation laid by their experts. As the trial 
court stated in admitting the films, any diffe-
rences between.the tests and the accident here 
would go to the weight the jury would give the 
evidence. Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d 
1044, 1046 (Okla. 1981); see Lopez v. Allen, 
96 Idaho 866, ,871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175 
(1975). 
III. 
Defendants next contend that the trial court 
erred in limiting their cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. While unduly 
harsh limitation pf a key expert witness can 
amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope 
of cross-examination is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and should not be 
disturbed absent a showing of abuse. Stare v. 
Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 
(1972); State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 
987 (1969); N.V. Maatschappij v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1978). In 
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 
(Wyo. 1978), the Wyoming court held that it 
was prejudical error to refuse to allow cross-
examination regarding a critical aspect of 
plaintiffs proof. There the court stated: 
Having offered his expert opinion, 
the witness exposes himself to int-
errogation which ordinarily would 
have no place in the cross-
examination of a factual witness, 
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but the expert exposes himself to 
the most searching kind of investi-
gation into his qualifications, the 
extent of his knowledge and the 
reasons for his opinion, including 
the facts and other matters upon 
which it is based. 
/d. at 1133. 
Defendants contend that there were several 
instances where the trial court's limiting of 
cross-examination prevented them from 
examining the basis of opinions offered by 
plaintiffs* experts. In his direct testimony, 
plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that 
the Jeep Commando was defective because its 
track width was narrow and its center of 
gravity high, making it easily susceptible to 
rollovers. He also testified concerning the 
handling characteristics of Blazers, Chevy 
Chcvet tes , and CJ-7s . On cross-
examination, he was asked: 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
have the same track width? 
Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained on the grounds 
it's irrelevant. 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
have about the same center of ' 
gravity? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel-
evant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: If you drive a three-quaner-
ton pickup, is it the same as driving 
a Honda Accord; handling, stee-
ring? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel-
evant. ./ 
CourU^ aed. 
Q: tHake another vehicle that 
has'wider track width and lower 
center of gravity, can it be rolled on 
a level surface with driver (steering] 
input? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel-
evant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Defendants contend that not allowing them to 
cross-examine Anderson with regard to 
characteristics of other vehicles and how they 
would react under the conditions depicted in 
plaintiffs* film left unchallenged the assertions 
that track .width and center of gravity are the 
essential characteristics in determining a 
vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that Jeeps 
are more dangerous than •other vehicles" 
because their track width is narrower and their 
center of gravity higher. Mr. Anderson had 
been allowed to compare Jeeps with other 
vehicles, including the Chevy Chevette, which, 
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contrary to the thesis of the dissenting 
opinion, is not a utility vehicle. Defendant 
should have been allowed to probe the com-
parisons Anderson made. 
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. Noettl, 
another expert witness, testified: "It was very 
difficult to turn a passenger car over/ On 
cross-examination, he was asked the basis of 
this opinion. 
Q: What experience have you had 
in trying to rollover [sic] a passe-
nger vehicle? 
Mr. Johnson: Object on the basis 
of relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into 
testing all other kinds of vehicles, 
because we've got enough problems 
with the one. So, I'm going to 
sustain the objection. 
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting 
opinion, it is clear that by inquiring as to his 
experience, defendants were attempting to 
probe the expert's credibility and the found-
ation for his testimony that it is difficult to 
roll a passenger car. 
On recross-examination, Mr. Noettl was 
also asked: 
Q: I think we were talking about 
what you would expect to happen 
to the Commando or any other 
vehicle that's hit under the circu-
mstances you have been describing. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you feel that any 
vehicle would come out of that sit-
uation unscathed, basically? 
Plaintiffs objection to this question was, also 
sustained. 
An assertion or opinion given. on direct 
testimony that bears on a key issue in the case 
is a proper subject of cross-examination. 
While the trial court's attempt to avoid con-
fusion of the issues and a long and cumber-
some trial, is understandable, defendants were 
entitled to conduct cross-examination into 
the basis of the opinions offered by plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons 
they had made on direct examination. 
. Here defendants were repeatedly cut off 
during their attempts to cross-examine plai-
ntiffs* experts. The numerous , objections. of 
plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were imp-
roperly sustained, prevented defendants from 
probing the basis of opinions given by plain-
tiffs' experts on comparisons they had made 
in their direct examination. As a result, the 
issues were presented to the jury without the 
added light that thorough cross-examination 
sheds. We find therefore that the trial court 
erred in limiting defendants* cross-
examination of plaintiffs', expert witnesses. 
The trial court did not limit those experts to 
comparisons to utility vehicles on their, direct 
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examination. Hence cross-examination 
should not have been so restricted. 
IV. 
Defendants also contend that the trial court 
erred in excluding certain films and exhibits 
offered by them as evidence. They called a 
Mr. Heitzman as an expert witness to testify 
regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep 
vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s 
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers. 
Plaintiffs objected on the ground that the 
introduction of the film violated previous 
orders of the court regarding discovery. The 
objection was sustained. 
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories 
seeking any testing Jeep had done regarding 
the handling characteristics of the 1966-73 
Jeep Commando. At a hearing on plaintiffs' 
motion to compel discovery, Judge Sorenson 
ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory 
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arg-
uments in chambers on the admissibility of the 
film, the court ruled: 
I think that in the context of all the 
circumstances and with respect to 
discovery procedures ... I think the 
plaintiffs were entitled to have, or 
see, the films and test results before 
trial pursuant to their discovery 
interrogatories ... , the films are not 
admissible. 
The trial court can exclude evidence that vio-
lates discovery orders under rule 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, 
defendants point out that the discovery 
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep 
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep 
CJ-5. The film, simply is not covered by the 
language of the interrogatory. Although plai-
ntiffs' experts were allowed at trial, over 
objections of defendants, to show films of CJ-
5s based on their foundational testimony that 
its handling was substantially similar to that of 
the Commando, that ruling does not place the 
film within the scope of material sought in the 
pretrial discovery request. The dissenting 
opinion would have defendants divine the 
scope of the requests by a trial court ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence which came much 
later. This burden cannot fairly be placed on 
them. The tests were not produced to show the 
handling of the "66-73 Jeep Commando," 
nor were they offered for that purpose. Def-
endants maintained that the handling of the 
CJ-5 and the Commando were not the same. 
The tests were offered to rebut evidence pre-
sented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5 was defe-
ctive because of its handling characteristics. 
Although this evidence could have been excl-
uded on the basis of relevancy had the trial 
court earlier excluded plaintiffs' films, once 
the court allowed plaintiffs to try their case on 
the basis of comparison with the CJ-5, it 
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could not then refuse defendants the opport-
unity to rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in 
the presentation of their case. The trial court 
erred in excluding the film on the basis that 
defendants had failed to comply with orders 
regarding discovery. 
Defendants offered a second film in conju-
nction with Heitzman's testimony. This film 
showed non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically 
induced rollovers similar to those shown in 
plaintiffs* film. After excluding defendants* 
first film for failure to produce it in discovery, 
the trial court ruled that this second film was 
not admissible, stating: 
Now, the other one rests on a dif-
ferent principle, I think. And the 
question that I have there is, the 
relevancy of it and whatever else 
you might want to raise. 
The evidence was offered to rebut the tests 
shown on plaintiffs* films and to demonstrate 
that there was no design defect in the Com-
mando because virtually any vehicle would roll 
when subjected to such tests. 
We have no quarrel with the rule of law 
relied upon in the dissenting opinion that 
"evidence of the condition of other products is 
irrelevant and not admissible to establish a 
defect in a particular product." This is a 
sound rule when properly applied as it was in 
the cases cited in the dissenting opinion. For 
example, in Clark v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry., 
197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W. 964 (1917), a 
rowboat rented from the defendant capsized, 
causing four minors to drown. The Michigan 
court held that it was error to attempt to 
prove the unseaworthiness of the capsized boat 
by admitting evidence of the various condit-
ions of repair of the other boats kept for hire 
by the defendant. 
Similarly, in Detroit, T.& L R.R. v. 
Banning, 173 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 
338 U.S. 815 (1949), also cited in the dissen-
ting opinion, the plaintiff, a railroad brak-
eman, was injured while making a flying 
switch. He brought suit against his employer 
railroad, contending that the boxcar in which 
he was riding and which he was required to 
slow down by applying a hand brake had been 
pushed too fast by the engine, making it 
impossible for him to adequately slow down 
the boxcar, which was to couple with a stan-
ding car. At trial, plaintiff was allowed to 
testify that although he had previously made 
twenty-five to thirty flying switches, none of 
them were made at a rate of speed as high as 
the one in which he was injured. On appeal, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it 
was error to have admitted the plaintiffs 
testimony. Said the court: 
No foundation was laid to show the 
circumstances, distance, grade or 
other conditions of such previous 
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operations. We believe the testi-
mony was improperly admitted. 
Several factors can affect the speed 
at the time of impact, variable 
under different operations, irresp-
ective of the initial speed given to 
the free rolling cars. It is a well-
established rule of evidence that 
circumstances under which other 
comparable conduct occurs should 
be substantially similar. Wigmore 
on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. II, 
§§459, 460 [and citing other 
cases]. 
Banning, 173 F.2d at 756. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced 
films of Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this 
opinion, we upheld the admissibility of those 
films because of the substantial similarity of 
the vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle in 
which plaintiffs were injured. However, plai-
ntiffs in presenting their case did not stop 
there. They produced several experts who 
repeatedly in their testimony drew compari-
sons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles 
to non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to 
show that the Jeep in which they were riding 
was of an unsafe design and had a tendency to 
roll much easier than other vehicles. For 
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testi-
fied: "There is no doubt that this vehicle is 
much more prone to roll over than some 
others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. 
Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to 
turn a passenger car over." Finally, Mr. 
Anderson, another of plaintiffs' experts, tes-
tified that Jeep vehicles have "a delay in the 
handling response" that is greater than S10 
Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule 
of law relied upon by the dissenting opinion, 
that evidence of the condition of other prod-
ucts is not admissible to establish a defect in a 
particular product, it may be questioned 
whether such comparisons should have been 
admitted because of the lack of similarity. 
However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts 
were allowed to draw the comparisons between 
the rollover propensities of Jeep and non-
Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants 
should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove 
the experience of plaintiffs* experts and to 
introduce into evidence the film showing non-
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rol-
lovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs' 
film. This situation is wholly different from 
the situations in the two above cases relied 
upon in the dissenting opinion where the pla-
intiff was not allowed to make comparisons 
when the circumstances were dissimilar. 
The third film that defendants claim was 
wrongfully excluded was offered as exhibit 
No. 174, a video produced by defendants' 
expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two parts: 
the first showed a 1972 Jeep Commando 
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conducting a drive-through of the accident 
scene, and the second showed the same vehicle 
with outriggers attached doing maneuvers in a 
parking lot. The trial court ruled that the first 
part of the film was not probative of any 
issue. We agree. The second part was excluded 
because the test was not made until after the 
trial had commenced, in violation of pretrial 
orders regarding discovery. Counsel for defe-
ndants stated that No. 174 was offered to 
show the handling characteristics of the 1972 
Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope 
of plaintiffs* interrogatories and was properly 
excluded for failure to respond to discovery. 
In conjunction with exhibit No. 174, the 
trial court viewed a film of a 1970 Ford in a 
rollover test (exhibit No. 175). Defendants 
offered No. 175 to demonstrate the movement 
of vehicle occupants during a rollover. The 
trial court determined that the film was not 
probative and excluded it. The film was diss-
imilar to the accident, was not necessary to 
rebut any evidence offered by plaintiffs, and 
was not probative of any disputed issue. There 
was therefore no error in the exclusion of 
defendants' exhibit No. 175. 
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warner, offered 
exhibit No. 130, a storyboard, to illustrate his 
testimony that the vehicle in question had been 
involved in a prior accident that compromised 
the structural integrity of the roof. Plaintiffs' 
counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit was 
not material. The trial court sustained the 
objection. Plaintiffs' experts had testified that 
the roof of the vehicle was defectively desi-
gned, thus contributing to plaintiffs' injuries. 
Evidence illustrating how the roof had been 
damaged in a prior accident was relevant to 
rebut this assertion. The trial court erred in 
sustaining plaintiffs* objection to exhibit No. 
130. 
Defendants also offered exhibit No. 164, a 
series of five photographs showing live models 
posed in a static vehicle to represent passenger 
movement in a rollover. This was offered to 
illustrate the testimony of Dr. Warner that the 
movement of the passengers, not the design of 
the vehicle, caused the injuries. The trial court 
initially admitted and then excluded the 
exhibit, stating: 
The probative value is limited at 
least because of the photographs 
not being representative of just 
what did happen to the vehicles ... 
or the people in them. 
While it is not clear whether the basis of the 
trial court's ruling was relevance, Utah R. 
Evid. 401, or that the probative value was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, etc., Utah R. Evid. 
403, we will uphold the trial court's ruling 
where there is any valid basis to do so. State 
v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
Here the trial court could have properly exd-
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uded the evidence under either theory; there-
fore, we find no error in the exclusion of 
exhibit No. 164. 
V. 
Defendants also contend that the trial court 
erred in excluding all references to the avail-
ability of seatbelts and plaintiffs' failure to 
use them. Plaintiffs made a motion in limine 
to exclude all evidence of seatbelts. The trial 
court excluded such evidence, stating: 
[T]o speculate what the seatbelt 
might have done in this type of 
situation is just something that the 
jury ought not to, and they will not 
have, under my ruling, the obliga-
tion to consider .... I want no more 
evidence in this case with regard to 
seatbelts. 
Defendants contend that the evidence of sea-
tbelts was relevant and necessary to show (1) 
that their presence was a factor the jury 
should consider when determining if the 
vehicle* was unsafe as designed, and (2) that 
plaintiffs' injuries could have been prevented 
or lessened by the use of seatbelts arid there-
fore the jury should be allowed to determine 
whether plaintiffs* duty of ordinary care or 
their duty to mitigate damages required them 
to wear seatbelts. 
We agree that evidence of how the presence 
of seatbelts affected the design safety of the 
vehicle should be admitted. However, the bulk 
of defendants' proffered evidence and the 
main thrust of their argument regarding seat-
belts was directed at plaintiffs' failure to use 
them as constituting contributory negligence or 
failure to mitigate, damages. The majority of 
the cases cited in the briefs submitted to this 
Court have rejected this approach. See Kopi-
schke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 
471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) (for citations to 
dther jurisdictions which have rejected this 
approach). More persuasively, the legislature 
has passed Utah Code Ann. §41-6-186 
(1988), which provides: 
The failure to wear a seat belt does 
not constitute contributory or 
comparative negligence and may not 
be introduced as evidence in any 
civil litigation on the issue of inju-
ries or on the issue of mitigation of 
damages. 
Although this statute was passed subsequent to 
the litigation sub judice and was therefore not 
controlling at trial, we nonetheless decline to 
place ourselves in the awkward position of 
adopting a stance that is in direct contraven-
tion of express legislation. We therefore find 
that the trial court did not err in excluding 
evidence that the failure to use seatbelts con-
stituted contributory negligence or failure to 
mitigate damages. 
VI. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
states that error may not.be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affe-
cted. In the instant case, the trial court erro-
neously excluded evidence offered by defend-
ants. That evidence was necessary to rebut the 
assertions that plaintiffs made to establish 
liability. This error was compounded by 
unduly restricting the scope of defendants* 
cross-examination. Given the conflicting 
testimony presented on this key issue, we 
cannot say that the substantial rights of defe-
ndants were not affected by the combined 
effects of the erroneous exclusion of the evi-
dence and the limitation of cross-
examination. While no one error by itself 
perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence that defendants were able to 
present to the jury their theory of the case and 
that a fair trial was had. 
We therefore reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. Variable Annuity Life Insurance has filed a sep-
arate appeal on the issue of vicarious liability. See 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 
101 Utah Adv. Rep 24, decided also today. 
2. Judge Sorensen, after hearing most of the pretrial 
matters, retired and did not preside at the trial. 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
After a two- and one-half-week trial 
which produced some 5,000 pages of transc-
ript, a verdict was returned for plaintiff 
Stephen Whitehead for damages produced by 
the tragic and permanent injuries suffered in 
the rollover of a Jeep Commando. The Court 
reverses the jury verdict and judgment on the 
basis of a few evidentiary rulings culled from 
a host of such rulings. The Court holds that 
the trial court erred in (1) limiting defendants* 
cross-examination, and (2) excluding defen-
dants' films. I submit that the trial court was 
clearly correct and that, in any event, the 
rulings fall within a trial judge's discretion. 
For these reasons, I dissent. 
I. LIMITATIONS OF DEFENDANTS* 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The majority holds that the trial court 
improperly limited defendants' cross-
examination of plaintiffs' experts. The maj-
ority cites three instances in which the trial 
court "cut o f f defendants* attempts to cross-
examine plaintiffs' experts and which preve-
nted defendants from probing the basis of 
opinions given by plaintiffs' experts. 
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This Court has long held that the trial court 
has considerable discretion in determining 
whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough v. 
Bcthers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). The 
judgment of the trial court in admitting or 
excluding evidence should not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion, and only when 
the error is prejudicial. State v. Miller, 727 
P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706 
P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); Terry v. Zion's Coop. 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
Generally, evidence of the condition of other 
products is irrelevant and not admissible to 
establish a defect in a particular product. See 
Detroit, T. & /. R.R. v. Banning, 173 F.2d 
752, 756 (6th Cir.), cerr. denied, 338 U.S. 815 
(1949); Clark v. Detroit & M. Ry., 197 Mich. 
489, 503, 163 N.W. 964, 968 (1917); 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d Evidence §302, at 348 (1967); 32 
C.J.S. Evidence §583, at 712 (1964). Thus, it 
is irrelevant whether the Jeep Commando was 
unreasonably dangerous compared with other 
makes or models of automobiles generally. 
The only relevant inquiry is the turnover 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando and 
other vehicles substantially similar to it."1 
In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion by ruling that the scope of cross-
examination would include only comparisons 
of vehicles with the same or similar characte-
ristics as the Jeep Commando. The court, 
during the course of the trial, reminded defe-
ndants' counsel that only evidence of similar 
vehicles would be admitted: 
The Court: I don't think Tve 
prohibited any kind of cross exa-
mination with reference to vehicles 
that had the same or similar char-
acteristics; to-wit: center of gravity 
and wheel width, that Jeep has. 
Mr. Mandlebaum [attorney for 
defendant AMC/JeepJ: -Well, I 
may be incorrect. But I believe you 
have, your Honor. 1 thought the 
Court's ruling was that we could 
not compare other vehicles. 
The Court: No. The only ruling 
that I have made with regard to 
that, at least, at least that's my 
intent, was that unless the vehicles 
were similar, that I wasn't going to 
permit you to compare them in 
order to show that other vehicles 
might be as dangerous as this 
vehicle. 
The majority now holds that the trial 
court's limitations on cross-examination 
interfered with defendants' ability to attack 
the foundation of the opinions of plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses. Defendant was allowed, 
however, to introduce such evidence when it 
was intended to go to credibility, as shown 
below. 
The majority cites three examples of the 
i Motors Sales Corp, „ 
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trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination. The examples cited do not prove 
that there was a limitation of cross-
examination as to any "critical aspect of pla-
intiffs' proof." In light of the trial court's 
ruling that only evidence of vehicles with the 
same or substantially similar characteristics 
would be admissible, evidence of other non-
similar types of vehicles was inadmissible 
absent some special relevancy. 
Every ruling criticized by the majority was 
in fact required by the court's pretrial ruling, 
yet the majority does not even discuss the 
validity of that ruling. Indeed, the majority's 
view of this case would allow defendants to 
delve into the rollover characteristics of every 
single type of four-wheeled passenger vehicle 
on the road. Such a ruling would have made it 
virtually impossible to try this case. It is, of 
course, self-evident that all four-wheeled 
vehicles can be rolled over. Whether a vehicle 
is defectively designed depends upon whether 
the vehicle is dangerous when used under the 
ordinary conditions of its intended use. That 
should be determined by examining vehicles 
that are designed for similar purposes, i.e., 
utility vehicles in this case, as the trial judge 
ruled. In my view, the majority undermines 
the trial judge's ability to manage a case such 
as this by permitting defendant to explore on 
cross-examination matters of highly attenu-
ated relevancy. 
The majority's first example of limitation 
of cross-examination arises out of plaintiffs' 
expert's testimony on direct examination 
concerning the "handling characteristics of 
Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s." On 
direct examination, the expert stated: 
Q: And what type of handling 
and maneuvering tests did you 
perform last week? 
A: Well, I had some instrument 
tests that I performed on four dif-
ferent vehicles. I had a CJ-5, a CJ-
7, a small Blazer, the new F10 [sic] 
size Blazer, and the Chevy Chev-. 
ette. 
Q: And what did the results show 
in regard to your tests on the Jeep 
itself? 
A: Well, all the results are preli-
minary. I don't have all the data 
reduced yet. But my preliminary 
quick look at that data indicates 
that the Jeep vehicles both overturn 
at speeds of 20 to 25 miles an hour, 
and they both have a delay in the 
handling response that's in the 
magnitude of a half a second before 
the vehicle is stabilized to turn. 
The other vehicles I tested, the 
S10 Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, 
they did not have delays of that 
magnitude. They were much less. 
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The majority cites the following, which occu-
rred in the context of the above testimony, as 
a limitation of cross-examination: 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
have the same track width-
Mr. Howard (plaintiffs* counsel]: 
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained on the grounds 
it's.irrelevant. 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
have about the same center of 
gravity? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: If you drive a three-quarter-
ton pickup, is it the same as driving 
a Honda Accord; handling, stee-
ring? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: (T]ake another vehicle that 
has wider track width and lower 
[center of gravity], can it be rolled 
on a level surface with driver 
[steering] input? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Defendants' attempted cross-examination of 
plaintiffs* expert went far beyond the scope of 
the trial judge's order limiting the evidence 
and also beyond the scope of direct examina-
tion. There was no testimony on direct conc-
erning the rollover propensities, track width, 
or center of gravity of "other vehicles" in 
general. The only testimony given on direct 
examination related to the "handling resp-
onse" time of the CJ-5, CJ-7, S10 Blazer, 
and Chevy Chevette, all of which are utility 
vehicles having general characteristics substa-
ntially similar to the Jeep Commando. I 
submit that the trial court did not err in limi-
ting cross-examination. 
The second example cited by the majority of 
improper limitation of cross-examination 
occurred in the following exchange on defen-
dants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' 
expert: 
Q: What experience have you had 
in trying to roll over a passenger 
vehicle? 
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object on the basis of relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into 
testing all other kinds of vehicles, 
because we've got enough problems 
with the one. So, I'm going to 
sustain the objection. 
C O D E • Co 
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The cross-examination question above was 
based on an assumption made by plaintiffs* 
expert and found in the following direct exa-
mination: 
Q: When you started out with 
this particular test, did you know 
exactly what speeds and what input 
it would take to turn the CJ-5 
over? 
A: No, absolutely. It was just the 
opposite. That the belief was, that 
since it was very difficult to turn a 
passenger car over, especially on a 
flat surface at low speeds, that it 
would be difficult to do this with a 
Jeep, too. 
As is evident from the above, plaintiffs* 
expert did not purport to have experience in 
testing or researching the rollover propensities 
of "passenger cars," nor did he claim to have 
experience in rolling vehicles other than the CJ-
5. He clearly stated that he started with the 
belief that since it was difficult to roll a pas-
senger car, it would also be difficult to roll a 
CJ-5. The testimony on direct examination 
only made passing reference to "passenger 
cars." The focus of the examination clearly 
was not on the rollover propensity of passe-
nger cars, and the trial judge was clearly 
within the ambit of reasonable discretion in 
sustaining the objection on cross-
examination. 
Nevertheless, after sustaining the objection 
as to "passenger cars," the court allowed 
defendant AMC to cross-examine about 
"utility vehicles" because of their substantial 
similarity to the CJ-5 and the Jeep Comm-
ando: 
Mr. Jensen [attorney for defend-
ants]: 
What about the vehicles similar 
to the CJ-5; that is utility vehi-
cles? The Scout, Landcruiser, and 
that class of vehicles? The small 
pickups, narrow and with equiva-
lent center of gravity? 
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object on the basis of relevance and 
foundation. Outside the scope of 
direct. 
The Court: What is the relev-
ance? 
Mr. Jensen: Similar vehicles, 
Your Honor. 
The Court: The same width, the 
same -
Mr. Jensen: Similar track width 
and center of gravity i 
The Court: You may answer. 
Thus, there was no limitation on cross-
examination about substantially similar vehi-
cles. 
The majority's third example of an impr-
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oper limitation of cross-examination, if read 
in context, reveals that the judge sustained an 
objection that went only to the form of the 
question. Since a question that is barred 
because of its form may always be rephrased, 
and since defendants' question was not reph-
rased, it simply is not true that the trial court 
limited cross-examination in this instance. In 
the following testimony, the focus of cross-
examination was on a direct, straight-on rear-
end collision to a vehicle without any lateral 
forces: 
Q: So would you expect that 
vehicle to stay on the road? 
A: Again, under a hypothetical 
thing where you just have an impact 
from the rear, no lateral forces are 
put in, yes, it will stay right on the 
road. 
Q: No problem at all staying on 
the road? 
A: No problem at all. 
Q: The driver just rides it out and 
no problem? 
A: Under those conditions I 
described, yes. If you have no 
lateral forces acting on the vehicle, 
[no] side forces, the vehicle isn't 
going to turn over. 
Q: All right. That would apply 
whether it's a Commando or some 
other vehicle? 
A: In my opinion, that's correct. 
Q: All right. And what distance 
would it take for a driver to get 
that vehicle under control, and 
could he do it within the width of 
three lanes of the freeway? 
Mr. Johnson: Outside the scope, 
Your Honor. We object to it. Sec-
ondly, the facts of this case are 
clearly lateral force. The evidence at 
this point is uncontroverted that six 
inches, the Oldsmobile hit six inches 
of the Jeep on a specific corner. We 
don't have a direct back input. 
The Court: I'm going to take an 
afternoon recess at this time. I'll 
overrule your objection with respect 
to it not being within the scope of 
the direct examination. But I will 
sustain it with regard to the form of 
the question. And when we come 
back you may go from there. 
Q [By Mr. Jensen): Thank you, 
Your Honor. 
I think we were talking about 
what you would expect to happen 
to the Commando or any vehicle 
that's hit under the circumstances 
that you have been describing? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you feel like any 
i Motors Sales Corp. <*c 
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vehicle would come out of that sit-
uation unscathed, basically? 
Mr. Johnson: Your Honor, the 
Court sustained the objection as to 
the form of the question. 
The Court: And I'll sustain the 
objection to that question. 
Besides asking about the effect of a direct rear 
impact without lateral forces, the question was 
ambiguous and too broad and, at the least, 
should have been restated. The trial court 
acted well within its discretion, and in any 
event, the incident is unimportant to the 
outcome of the trial. 
In fact, full cross-examination of plaint-
iffs' experts' qualifications and experience 
was allowed.2 For example, Mr. Jensen, 
counsel for AMC/Jeep, cross-examined Mr. 
Noettl, plaintiffs' expert, on his knowledge of 
vehicle rollover literature. Mr. Noettl identi-
fied various tests, reports, and studies conce-
rning vehicle rollover thresholds and vehicle 
characteristics. Overruling plaintiffs' objection 
to a question concerning the rollover propen-
sity of big trucks, the court stated: 
Overruled. It may or may not be. 
I have not changed my ruling with 
respect to other matters, in permi-
tting him to go into this. This may 
have something to do with credibi-
lity, veracity, accuracy, or what-
ever. 
The cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, 
another of plaintiffs* experts, also demonstr-
ates that defendants were not prevented from 
questioning an expert about his experience and 
qualifications. . 
This Court has ruled that counsel should 
make clear to the trial judge the relevance of 
cross-examination questions when an objec-
tion is sustained on relevancy grounds. State 
v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). See 
also State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 
1986). In none of the present instances where 
the majority rules that the trial court impro-
perly sustained plaintiffs* objections to ques-
tions regarding other vehicles did defense 
counsel state the relevance of those questions. 
Absent an explanation of the relevance of the 
line of inquiry, exclusion was properly called 
for under the pretrial ruling, which certainly 
was within the discretion of the court. If, 
indeed, the point was to attack the foundation 
of the expert's opinion-and not to confuse 
the substantive issue of determining whether 
the Commando was defective-that should 
have been explained to the trial court. Other-
wise, the trial court was certainly entitled to 
assume that defendants sought to circumvent 
the judge's ruling on relevancy. 
II. EXCLUSION OF FILMS 
The trial court's decision to exclude defen-
dants' test films was also clearly within its 
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discretion. One film portrayed non-Jeep 
vehicles performing mechanically induced 
rollovers in a manner somewhat similar to 
those shown in plaintiffs' film. The court 
ruled: 
Pit's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant 
because they involve other vehicles 
which the jury would have to take 
into consideration as to how it was 
done, the comparisons, the whole 
works. 
And the other witnesses have seen 
the Jeep film. And I've let him 
testify with regard to his version of 
those tests with regard to the Jeep. 
I kept out the other because I 
thought they were irrelevant on the 
issue as to whether or not the Jeep 
was defectively designed, and I still 
think it is. 
Because each of those tests are -
they have a — they're not all 
exactly the same. You don't even 
have the same vehicle. And we'd 
t have to determine the reliability of 
' the tests for each individual car or 
automobile. And I'm not going to 
lctthejurydothat. 
Defendants argued before the trial court that 
plaihtiffs had at least three different tests or 
films in evidence showing different vehicles 
making different maneuvers, all of which 
involved different steering inputs at different 
speeds. The judge responded that those tests 
and films were admitted because expert testi-
mony established that the vehicles depicted in 
the films were substantially the same as the 
Jeep Commando involved in this case: 
The Court: That's the only reason. 
The rest of them were out. And 
- I'm going to keep them all out. 
The majority holds that because plaintiffs* 
experts were allowed to draw the comparisons 
between the rollover propensities of Jeep and 
non-Jeep vehicles, defendants should also 
have been allowed to introduce a film of non-
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rol-
lovers. As stated earlier, evidence of the con-
dition of* other products is generally not 
admissible to prove a defect in a particular 
product. See Banning, 173 F.2d at 756; Clark, 
197 Mich, at 503, 163 N.W. at 968; 29 Am. 
Jur. Evidence §302; 32 C.J.S. Evidence 
§583. Such evidence is admissible, however, 
when the products are substantially similar. 
There is no evidence that defendants' film 
showed vehicles which were substantially 
similar. Plaintiffs' film, however, was of 
vehicles substantially similar to the Jeep 
Commando. 
In addition, the majority rules that the trial 
CODE•Co 
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court erred in excluding defendants' film of a 
Jeep CJ-5 on the basis that it violated a 
discovery order directing defendants to answer 
an interrogatory that would have disclosed the 
existence of the film. The majority stales: 
"[Defendants point out that the discovery 
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep 
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep 
CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the 
language of the interrogatory." I submit the 
majority is simply in error in stating that the 
interrogatory did not cover the film. The int-
errogatory directed defendants to "state 
whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep 
Corporation tested for or otherwise determ-
ined the handling characteristics and qualities 
of said automobiles [Commandos] both during 
the development and subsequently to the 
initial production...." 
The interrogatory specifically requested 
information as to all tests, even those subse-
quent to production, to determine the hand-
ling characteristics and qualities of the Com-
mando. Defendants' tests of the Jeep CJ-5 
were, in fact,.used to determine the handling 
characteristics and qualities of the Jeep 
Commando, contrary to the assertion of the 
majority that the films were not offered for 
the purpose of showing the handling of the 
'66-73. Commando. The CJ-5 was shown 
by foundational testimony to be substantially 
similar to the Jeep Commando. A vehicle is 
substantially similar only if it has substantially 
the same characteristics and qualities. The 
interrogatory requested information concer-
ning not only the subsequent testing of Com-
mandos, but also the testing for, or otherwise 
determining, the characteristics or qualities of 
the Commando. Such testing included the CJ-
5 because it had,many of the same character-
istics and qualities of a Commando. Other-
wise, the CJ-5 film would have been irrele-
vant to defendants' case and inadmissible.3 
The majority claims, however, that defen-
dants were forced to "divine the scope of the. 
requests by a trial court ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence which came much later." 
Defendants were instructed, weeks before trial, 
that they could cross-examine but were "not 
to bring up new facts which were not given 
plaintiffs' counsel in their response to interr-
ogatories." Given the' purpose of submitting 
the CJ-5 film-to show the characteristics 
of the Commando—defendants had prior 
notice and should not be able to influence the 
outcome of this long and difficult case by 
surprise. The tests of the CJ-5 clearly fell 
within the scope of the interrogatory in ques-
tion. The trial court properly excluded the test 
film on the ground that defendants failed to 
comply with discovery orders based on that 
interrogatory. Sec Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284-85 (Wyo. 
1983) (exclusion of defendants' rollover film 
for violation of discovery order was within 
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broad discretion of trial court). 
Finally, the majority opinion states that it 
was improper for the trial court to exclude 
exhibit No. 130, a story board illustrating 
defendants' expert's testimony "that the 
vehicle in question had been involved in a 
prior accident that compromised the structural 
integrity of the roof/ This question goes more 
to damages rather than liability. Its admissi-
bility turned on a whole host of variables. 
Determination of admissibility is in the trial 
judge's discretion. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart. 
1. The majority opinion concedes that only films 
showing accidents of a similar nature are admissible 
and that the trial court correctly excluded one of 
defendants' films on this basis. However, the maj-
ority appears to reject the proposition that the scope 
of both direct and cross-examination may be pro-
perly limited to similar vehicles. 
2. On a related point, the majority accepts AMCs 
contention that 
not allowing them to cross-examine 
Anderson with regard to characteristics 
of other vehicles and .how they would 
react under the conditions depicted in 
plaintiffs* film left unchallenged the 
assertions that track width and center of 
gravity were the essential characteristics 
in determining a vehicle's rollover sus-
ceptibility and that Jeeps were more 
dangerous than other vehicles because 
their track width was narrower and their 
center of gravity higher. 
That is not correct. Defendants elicited such evid-
ence from its own expert witness, Edward Heit-
zman. Heitzman testified at length concerning the 
factors that determine the susceptibility to rollover 
of vehicles in general. Heitzman testified about 
numerous other vehicles (including both utility 
vehicles and passenger cars) which have a center of 
gravity equal to or higher than the Jeep Commando. 
Heitzman also testified extensively about the static 
stability ratio, which was relied on by plaintiffs' 
experts, to determine a vehicle's propensity to roll 
over. In fact, Heitzman had a list of vehicles with 
their static stability ratios which formed the basis 
for his testimony regarding the comparison of the 
Jeep with other vehicles. After extensive discussion, 
the list itsdf was admitted into evidence. 
3. Defendants claim now on appeal that "(i]t was a 
film made in 1983 of a Jeep CJ-S and had nothing 
to do with the 1972 Commando." (Emphasis in 
original.) If that is true, we should affirm the trial 
court's order on grounds of irrelevancy. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Julie Verde appeals from her 
conviction, following a jury trial, of the 
offense of the sale of a child. See Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203 (1978). She daims, that 
certain evidence was improperly admitted, that 
the jury was improperly instructed, and that 
there was insufficient evidence on one dement 
of the crime. We affirm. 
We recite the facts from the record on 
appeal in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. Cf., e.g., State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,769 (Utah 1985); Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985); Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433, 
436, 315 P.2d 867, 864 (1957) (all addressing 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence). 
Verde met the State's chief witness, Tammy 
Watson, at the physician's office where 
Watson worked and. Verde was being treated. ^ 
After hearing that Watson had recently suff-
ered a miscarriage, Verde approached her 
about the possibility of arranging for the 
private adoption of a third party's child. 
Verde and Watson continued discussing the 
proposed adoption on a regular basis from 
Septemberof 1984 until February of 19&5, -: 
In these discussions, Verde indicated that 
Watson should expect to incur medical, legal; 
and other costs incident to the adoption 
ranging between $2,500 and $5,000. During, 
this period, Watson arranged to pay $80 to 
$90 of Verde's medical care costs in return for 
Verde's commitment to give her a "discount* 
on the adoption expenses. Verde claimed that 
she was in the process of setting up a private, 
adoption agency and was working with a local 
attorney. However, Verde presented no cocr-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants, Case No. 19645 
and 
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION 
and JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained 
by plaintiffs on October 1G, 1979, when the vehicle in which 
they were riding, a Jeep Commando, manufactured eight years 
earlier in 1971, was struck from behind by defendant Larry 
Anderson, causing plaintiffs' vehicle to roll over. 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Anderson was negligent and 
that he was in the course and scope of his employment with 
defendant Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company at the time 
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of the accident. Plaintiffs later joined defendants Jeep 
Corporation and American Motors Sales Corporation, claiming 
that their vehicle, manufactured by defendant Jeep 
Corporation in 1971 and originally marketed by defendant 
American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, 
was defectively designed and therefore unreasonably dangerous 
at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer. See 
Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts; Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following trial to a jury, the Fourth Judicial 
Dis-crict Court in and for Utah County, Utah, J. Robert 
Bullock, District Judge, presiding, entered judgment on the 
jury verdict for the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead and against 
all defendants in the total amount of $1,638,125.00. 
Liability on the judgiaent was apportioned pursuant to further 
findings by the jury that defendants Jeep Corporation and 
American Motors Sales Corporation were 70% responsible for 
the injuries sustained by Mr. Whitehead and that defendants 
Anderson and Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company were 30% 
responsible. The claim of plaintiff Deborah Whitehead has 
been dismissed with prejudice and is not an issue in this 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep") seek 
- 2 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reversal of the trial court's judgment against them on the 
grounds that the trial court made incorrect and prejudicial 
rulings on questions of law and with respect to the admis-
sibility of certain evidence. Indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that 
the trial court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during 
the course of the trial and that the jury was permitted to 
hear only one side of this case. Specifically, the trial 
court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs to introduce ir-
relevant and inflammatory evidence, (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's 
fundamental right: to cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses; (c) 
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by 
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence; 
(d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based on im-
proper closing arguments by opposing counsel; (e) in refusing 
to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to 
include a statute of limitations defense; (f) in refusing to 
direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of their 
statute of limitations defense; and (g) in excluding all 
evidence relating to the presence of and plaintiffs' failure 
to utilize available seat belts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background Facts. 
Sometime prior to 1966, the Kaiser-Jeep Corporation 
designed and began to manufacture a vehicle called the Jeep 
Commando. In 1970, American Motors Corporation purchased all 
outstanding shares of capital stock of Kaiser-Jeep 
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Corporation from Kaiser Industries Corporation, and the name 
Kaiser-Jeep Corporation was changed to Jeep Corporation. (R. 
219, 671). This litigation revolves around a particular Jeep 
Commando manufactured by Jeep Corporation in December, 1971, 
(T., 10/25/83, at 930; R. 2710), nearly eight years before 
plaintiffs' accident, for sale by appellant American Motors 
Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, at least seven 
years before plaintiffs' accident. 
The Commando at issue in this case was purchased in 
"used" condition by George Mollner of Orem, Utah in 1975 or 
1976, (T., 10/19/83, at 336; R. 2105), Mr. Mollner made 
several repairs and alterations to the Commando, (i-d./ at 
336-338, 343, 347-355; R. 2105-2107, 2112, 2116-2124), and on 
October 16, 1979, permitted his daughter, plaintiff Deborah 
Whitehead, to use the Commando to move some household items. 
(Id.., at 338; R. 2107). Deborah Whitehead picked up her 
husband, plaintiff Steven Whitehead, in American Fork, Utah, 
and proceeded to drive him on Interstate 15 towards 
Springville. (.Id., at 375-376; R. 2144-2145). After plain-
tiffs had been on the freeway for several miles, and while 
they were traveling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour, 
the Commando was struck from behind by another vehicle, an 
Oldsmobile, driven by defendant Larry Anderson. (rd., at 
377-382; R. 2146-2147). At the time it struck plaintiffs' 
Commando, defendant Anderson's Oldsmobile was traveling at 
the rate of 65 to 70 miles per hour; 15 miles per hour faster 
_ 4 -
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than plaintiffs. (T., 10/20/83, at 552; R. 2327). The 
Oldsmobile struck the Commando on its left rear corner, 
causing it to spin in a clockwise manner (Id., at 556; R. 
2329). The Commando went out of control (T., 10/19/83, at 
382; R. 2151), and eventually rolled over and came to rest in 
the median. (jCd., at 383; R. 2152). During the course of 
the accident, Deborah and Steven Whitehead sustained various 
injuries, the most serious of which was a spinal chord injury 
sustained by Steven Whitehead resulting in paraplegia. (Id., 
at 447; R. 2216). 
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint herein on 
October 11, 1979, naming only Larry Anderson, the driver of 
the car that struck the Commando from behind, as a defendant:. 
(R. 7-8). Plaintiffs subsequently added Anderson's employer, 
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company as a defendant, and 
finally filed their Second Amended Complaint naming AMC/Jeep 
on July 31, 1980. (R. 84-07). Jeep Corporation answered the 
Second Amended Complaint on November 11, 1900. (R. 113-114). 
American Motors Sales Corporation answered the Second Amended 
Complaint on September 12, 1983. (k. 993-995). 
B. Pre-Trial Rulings. 
Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1983. One 
day prior to that date, however, the trial couri made the 
first in a series of crucial, erroneous and prejudicial 
evidentiary rulings which were to dictate the entire 
three-week trial which followed. On October 17, 1983, the 
- 5 -
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trial court considered plaintiffs' Motion In Limine "to allow 
the admissibility of a certain pictorial movie developed by 
Dynamic Science, Inc. for the Insurance Institute of Highway 
Safety", purporting to depict automobiles rolling over during 
"normal" highway maneuvers. (R. 1128-1129). AMC/Jeep ob-
jected to the motion (R. 1200-1224) and to the admission of 
the film on the grounds that: (1) the Dynamic Science film 
showed Jeep CJ5s and CJ7s rolling over, not Commandos; (2) 
the tests reflected in the film were conducted under condi-
tions wholly dissimilar to the off-center rear-end collision 
which led to plaintiffs' accident; and (3) plaintiffs offered 
no foundation to show that the maneuvers depicted in the film 
were in any way relevant to the issue before the court and 
jury in this case. AMC/Jeep further objected to the film on 
the ground that it had been selectively edited to dramatize 
the rollovers and to enhance the visual impact, destroying 
the value of the film as demonstrative evidence. For 
example, the film showed anthropomorphic dummies, fully 
dressed, being tossed about violently during a rollover. 
There was no evidence that plaintiffs experienced similar 
movement during their accident. Finally, AMC/Jeep argued 
The evidence showed that CJ5s have a wheel base 20 inches 
shorter than the wheel base of a Commando. (T., 10/24/83, at 
659, 672; R. 2436, 2449.) It was also clear that a longer 
wheel base makes a vehicle more resistant to rollover. (Id., 
at 674-675; R. 2451-2452). 
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that if plaintiffs were allowed to show the film raising the 
inference that the non-Commando vehicles depicted in it were 
"comparable" to a Commando, AMC/Jeep should similarly be 
allowed to introduce evidence showing that, in fact, the 
Commando's handling characteristics and resistance to 
rollover compared favorably to other automobiles. (T., 
Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 53-59; R. 
4856-4861). The trial court nevertheless rejected AMC/Jeep's 
arguments against the Insurance Institute film and ruled that 
any difference between the tests depicted in that film and 
the actual events of plaintiffs' accident would go "to the 
weight of it and not to the admissibility." (I_d*/ ^t 60; R. 
4863; see also j_d., at 62; R. 4365). 
On the morning of October 18, 1983, just before the 
trial began, the trial court also addressed plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine "to preclude the defendants or their 
witnesses or attorneys from mentioning the subject of seat 
belts or the use or nonuse of seatbelts at the trial of this 
case." (R. 1274-1294). AMC/Jeep opposed the motion arguing 
that (1) the failure of plaintiffs to utilize their seat 
belts was relevant to the issues of comparative fault and 
mitigation of damages, and (2) the presence of seat belts in 
the Commando was relevant to the question whether the 
Commando was defectively designed. Here, as throughout the 
trial, the trial court barred any comment on the presence of 
or plaintiffs' failure to utilize the Commando's seat belts. 
- 7 -
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(See also T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, 
at 88, 156? R. 4891, 4959). (T., 10/18/83, at 12; R. 
1763) . 
C. Plaintiffs' Case in Chief. 
During the presentation of plaintiffs' case-in-
chief, Newell Knight was called as a witness for plaintiffs 
to express an opinion as to the allegedly "defective" nature 
of the accident vehicle- (T., 10/20/83, at 541; R. 2314). 
AMC/Jeep, anxious to assure that all such testimony would be 
related to Commandos and that the jury not be misled into 
believing that "a Jeep is a Jeep," attempted to limit the 
testimony to the relevant characteristics of the Commando. 
Beginning with Mr. Knight, however, the trial court embarked 
on an erroneous course of permitting plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses to lump all Jeep vehicles into the same evidentiary 
ball, (id., at 559-560; R. 2327-2328; see especially id., 
at 559-559; R. 2331-2332; id^, at 560; R. 2333), thus 
obscuring the unique characteristics of the Commando. 
Plaintiffs then called LeRoy Maurice Shaw, a con-
sultant in automotive safety. (T., 10/24/83, at 631; R. 
2408). As plaintiffs' counsel began to delve into Mr. Shaw's 
opinion about the Commando's handling characteristics, 
AMC/Jeep elicited by way of voir dire that one of his basic 
exhibits — a mathematical prediction of the so-called "roll-
over threshold" of a Commando (Exhibit 56) — was actually 
based on information and data with respect to the Jeep CJ5 
- 8 -
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and CJ7 -- not the Commando. (Id^i at 672-679; R. 2450-
2457). The trial court, nevertheless, admitted the evidence 
over the objection of AMC/Jeep, (id., at 678; R. 2456), and 
then exacerbated the error by unduly restricting the right of 
AMC/Jeep to test Mr. Shaw's credibility by repeatedly sus-
taining objections to cross-examination into Mr. Shaw's 
knowledge of the design period of the accident vehicle. 
(Id., at 782-783; R. 2561-2562). 
Similarly, through their "star" witness, Robert 
Lloyd Anderson, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce two 
additional films prepared at Dynamic Science showing Jeep 
CJ5s, not Commandos, rolling over when subjected to extraor-
dinary tests never encountered under normal driving condi-
tions and certainly not encountered by plaintiffs during the 
course of their accident. AMC/oeep objected to the admission 
of these films on the ground that they showed CJ5s, not 
Commandos, rolling over as the result of mechanically-induced 
maneuvers that bore no relation to the circumstances of 
plaintiffs' accident. One of the tests, for example, showed 
a CJ5 undergoing a maneuver in which 240 degrees of steer is 
mechanically input into the vehicle in the span of 1.8 
seconds while the speed of the vehicle is being artificially 
maintained. (T., 10/25/83, at 910; R. 2690)." No attempt 
2 
Other maneuvers depicted in the films included a "test at 
25 miles an hour and 180 degrees on the steering wheel. Then 
we go up to 270 degrees. And the next turn is 360 degrees." 
(T., 10/25/03, at 915-916; R. 2695-2700). 
- 9 -
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was made to show any connection between the maneuvers 
depicted in the film to the actual events of plaintiffs' 
accident. In fact, Mr. Anderson admitted that he had "no way 
of knowing" what type of steering maneuvers were undertaken 
by Mrs. Whitehead during the course of the accident. (Id., 
at 957; R. 2737). The trial court nevertheless overruled 
AMC/Jeep's objection to the films, stating that "I'll let you 
get at it any way you v/ant to by cross examination or 
whatever. But I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your 
objection with respect to those films." (j^ d., at 109; R. 
4912) . 
The objectionable films were then shown to the jury 
as exemplary of the handling characteristics of "CJ 
vehicles." (T., 10/25/33, at 906; R. 2676). The plain and 
intended implication was that the vehicles shown in those 
films were similar to the Commando and that they demonstrated 
the circumstances experienced by plaintiffs and the accident 
vehicle at the time of the accident even though Mr. Anderson 
admitted that he, in fact, had no way of knowing what 
steering movements were made by plaintiffs immediately prior 
to and during plaintiffs' accident. (j^*/ a t 956-957; R. 
2736-2737). . 
The ultimate point made by Mr. Anderson was that 
the handling characteristics of "Jeeps", coupled with their 
"rollover propensities", rendered the Commando involved in 
this case unreasonably dangerous. (JL^ *' a t 897; R. 2677). 
- 10 -
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Mr. Anderson also testified that other vehicles lie had 
tested, the SIO Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, did not have 
delays in handling response similar to those of a "Jeep", 
(Icl., at 896; R. 2676), and that "most vehicles" would main-
tain control in situations similar to those experienced by 
plaintiffs at the time of the accident. (^ Id., at 1039-1040; 
R. 2818-2819). 
In its cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, AMC/Jeep 
attempted to rebut Mr. Anderson's characterization and im-
plication that "Jeeps" are more dangerous than other 
automobiles on the road by asking him: (1) whether other 
vehicles would have gone out of control if subjected to 
circumstances like those which caused plaintiffs' accident 
(ici., at 963; R. 2743); (2) whether he thought that other 
vehicles with similar track widths were also defective (id. , 
at 1001; R. 2780); (3) whether he thought other vehicles were 
defective (_id. ) ; (4) whether other vehicles have the same 
center of gravity as a Commando, (Id., at 1003; R. 2782); (5) 
whether all convertibles are defective if they do not have 
rollbars (id., at 1004; R. 2783); (6) whether he knows what 
other vehicles will do when subjected to the tests shown in 
the films (id., at 1005, 1018; R. 2784, 2797); and (7) 
whether CJ5s have different suspensions than a Commando. 
(.Id-/ at 1047; R. 2826). In spite of previous assurances by 
the trial court that AMC/Jeep would be permitted to cross-
examine Mr. Anderson on these issues, (T., 10/25/83, 
- 11 -
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Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, at 109; R. 4912), 
however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objections to 
these questions and precluded AMC/Jeep from pursuing its 
cross-examination of plaintiffs' key expert witness. 
The trial court's decision to admit films of CJ5s 
to demonstrate the characteristics of a Commando combined 
with the trial court's rigid restriction of AMC/Jeep's 
cross-examination of Mr. Anderson led to AMC/Jeep's first 
Motion for*Mistrial on October 26, 1983. (T., Abstracts from 
Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 123; R. 4926). The grounds 
for the Motion were that plaintiffs' experts had been al-
lowed, without foundation, to declare the Commando un-
reasonably dangerous based (1) upon comparisons to other 
vehicles undergoing maneuvers in no way related to the sub-
ject accident, (2) upon certain calculations derived from 
tests of the CJ5, and (3) upon opinion testimony that "Jeeps" 
roll over more easily than "other vehicles," while AMC/Jeep 
had been barred from showing that the relevant 
characteristics of Jeeps, in fact, compared favorably with 
other vehicles. (Icl. , at 117-123; R. 4920-4926). The trial 
court, nevertheless, denied the Motion for Mistrial stating 
that "under the circumstances as they exist at this time in 
this lawsuit, the evidence of what other vehicles do is 
irrelevant." (_Id., at 130; R. 4933). The trial court later 
attempted to justify its erroneous ruling as prohibiting 
AMC/Jeep "from attempting to show that the subject Jeep in 
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this case was safe by evidence which shows that other 
vehicles not manufactured by Jeep are also unsafe." (T., 
10/26/33, at 1171; R. 2949). The trial court had, of course, 
permitted plaintiffs' experts to compare "Jeeps" with 
vehicles manufactured by others. It was only when AMC/Jeep 
sought to inquire further into that very comparative 
testimony that the trial court concluded it was irrelevant. 
In so ruling, the trial court did not even suggest to the 
jury that the comparisons adduced by plaintiffs should not be 
considered. (Icl., at 60; R. 4863; see also JLd. at 62; R. 
4865). 
Plaintiffs' next expert witness was John N. Noettl. 
Mr. Noettl, like Mr. Anderson, brought along a film showing 
CJ5s rolling over. Mr. Noettl's film, however, also showed 
fully clothed anthropomorphic "dummies" being tossed about 
during the testing. AMC/'Jeep objected to this film on the 
basis of its lack of relevance and its inflammatory nature, 
(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 131-
133; R. 4934-4936), but after being shown in chambers on 
October 26, 1983, (T., 10/26/83, at 1205; R. 2982), the trial 
court ruled that it could be admitted. As with all of plain-
tiffs' films, there was absolutely no foundation for the 
implicit proposition that the maneuvers exhibited in the film 
were related to the maneuvers experienced by the accident 
vehicle during the accident. Mr. Noettl was then permitted 
to testify that the "Jeep" is easier to overturn than a 
- 13 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"passenger car." (_I_d., at 1262; R. 3039). As was the case 
with Mr. Anderson, however, AMC/Jeep's efforts to cross ex-
amine on this point were blocked by the trial court. (Id., 
at 1266; R. 3043). 
D. AMC/Jeep's Case. 
AMC/Jeep began its case on October 27, 1983. 
Before AMC/Jeep called its chief expert, however, the trial 
court heard plaintiffs' objections to two films to be intro-
duced through that expert. One film was of a CJ5 and was 
intended to rebut plaintiffs' evidence purporting to prove 
that CJ5s roll over under certain emergency situations. The 
film demonstrated the CJ5's stability when subjected to 
extreme emergency situations. (T., 10/27/83, at 1561, 1565-
1566; R. 3343, 3347-3343). The second film was similarly 
intended to rebut plaintiffs' theory that Jeeps roll more 
often than other cars, or that Jeeps are the only vehicles 
that would have rolled under the circumstances of the plain-
tiffs' accident. Unlike plaintiffs, however, AMC/Jeep was 
precluded from presenting its evidence, the court ruling that 
neither film was admissible. (I^»# a t 1571, 1576; R. 3353, 
3358). 
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to call Edward Heitzman, a 
mechanical engineer with extensive experience in the field of 
automobile safety. (id./ at 1577-1587; R. 3359-3369). 
Through Mr. Heitzman, AMC/Jeep attempted to introduce a film 
showing non-Jeep vehicles undergoing certain maneuvers with 
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"outriggers" attached,0 for the purpose of rebutting plain-
tiffs' film which had shown a Commando equipped with 
"outriggers". Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, had tes-
tified that but for the outriggers the Commando in his film 
would have rolled over. (T., 10/25/83, at 913-926; R. 2698-
2706). Mr. Heitzman testified, however, that, in his 
opinion, Mr. Anderson's film did not illustrate situations in 
which the Commando would have rolled. (T., 10/28/83, at 
1674-1676; R. 3457-3459). Mr. Heitzman would then have 
utilized his film to illustrate to the jury the difference 
between a vehicle with outriggers "rolling" and a similarly 
equipped car not rolling. The film would also have rebutted 
plaintiffs' testimony that only Jeeps, as opposed to more 
common vehicles, would roll over in emergency situations. 
AMC\Jeep needed these films in order to illustrate Mr. 
Heitzman's point that many types of vehicles — not just 
Jeeps and certainly not just Commandos — subjected to the 
conditions illustrated in plaintiffs' films will roll over. 
The films would have shown that, in fact, other vehicles 
subjected to the same type of tests would have rolled over. 
(T., 10/28/33, at 1746-1750; R. 3529-3533). The court, 
however, refused to permit the introduction of appellants' 
Outriggers are attached to a test vehicle in order to 
restrain it from rolling over completely. An expert's eye 
and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers 
would have rolled over but for the outriggers. (T., 
10/23/83, at 1744; R. 3527). 
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film "because it's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because 
they involve other vehicles which the jury would have to take 
into consideration as to how it was done, the comparisons, 
the whole works " (Id., at 1746-1747, 1750; R, 3529-
3530, 3533). 
AMC/Jeep then called Dr. Charles Warner, a 
mechanical engineer and automobile accident consultant, to 
reconstruct the accident and to give his opinion that the 
characteristics of the Commando had nothing to do with the 
extent of plaintiffs1 injuries, that virtually any automobile 
would have roiled under the circumstances presented in this 
case, and that the injuries suffered by plaintiffs were not 
caused by the fact that the accident vehicle happened to be a 
Commando. A crucial aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his 
study and reconstruction of the probable movements of 
plaintiffs inside the vehicle during the course of the 
accident. (T., 10/31/83, at 1956-1961; R. 3743-3748). In 
support of this testimony Dr. Warner had prepared a series of 
photographs demonstrating his opinion. (.Id-/ at 1961; R. 
3748). The trial court, however, sustained plaintiffs' 
objection to this demonstrative exhibit on the ground "that 
the probative value is limited at least because of the 
photographs not being representative of just what did happen 
to the vehicles." (Id., at 1967; R. 3754). AMC/Jeep had, of 
course, based many of its objections to plaintiffs' evidence 
on precisely this ground. The only difference was that the 
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trial court overruled AMC/Jeep's objections but sustained 
those made by plaintiffs. 
Dr. Warner was next to testify with respect to 
certain tests he performed on an exemplar vehicle — a 
Commando. The film showed a Commando undergoing certain 
emergency maneuvers with outriggers attached and would have 
demonstrated that the Commando is a stable vehicle. The film 
would also have demonstrated Dr. Warner's opinion that the 
Commando will remain upright when subjected to realistic 
emergency situations. AMC/Jeep also intended to introduce a 
film, through Dr. Warner, demonstrating rollover and the type 
of damage that typically occurs during rollover. (lj3.-# at 
1976; 3764). The two films were shown in chambers (icl. , at 
1979-1983; R. 3767-3771), plaintiffs objected to both, and 
the trial court ruled that both were inadmissible on the 
grounds that they were "not probative of any issues except 
perhaps the test which was made ...." (.Id- at 1986; R. 
3774). Again, no explanation was offered by the court as to 
why plaintiffs' film — which showed a Commando performing 
certain extreme raaneuvers that one could reasonably expect to 
encounter, but of course showed roll overs whereas the Warner 
film showed none — presented probative evidence while the 
Warner film did not. 
Dr. Warner was also asked to testify as to his 
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs inside the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commando during the course of the accident to rebut plain-
tiffs' contention that the Commando's roof was defective and 
that it had crushed during the course of the accident causing 
plaintiff Steven Whitehead's back injury. (See, e.g., T., 
10/24/83, at 663-664; R. 2441-2442). The trial court, 
however, excluded each and every exhibit offered to 
demonstrate this testimony. (T., 10/31/33, at 2009-2011; R. 
3797-3799). 
AMC/Jeep then made a proffer, in chambers, of Dr. 
Warner's testimony with respect to plaintiffs' failure to use 
seat belts. Dr. Warner would have testified that had plain-
tiff Steven Whitehead "been using the seat belt in all prob-
ability he would not have received the spinal injury that he 
did receive." (I_d., at 2018; R. 3806). The trial court 
again ruled, however, that no evidence of seat belts would be 
admitted. As the trial court put it: "to speculate what the 
seat belt might have done in this type of situation is just 
something that the jury ought not do, and they will not have, 
under my ruling, the obligation to consider. ... Therefore, 
there will be no more evidence in this case with regard to 
seat belts. I want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll go 
from there." (id.., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808). 
Dr. Warner was next asked to express his opinion 
with respect to the "buckling" experienced by the Commando 
during the course of the accident. Dr. Warner had examined 
the actual accident vehicle and had prepared an exhibit that 
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demonstrated his opinion that the Commando had been in a 
prior accident. It was Dr. Warner's opinion that the prior 
accident had caused damage to the Commando which resulted in 
a weakening of its structural integrity. This weakening, he 
concluded, in turn contributed to the damage suffered in the 
accident. (JCd., at 2024; R. 3812). The trial court 
sustained plaintiffs' objection to this demonstrative exhibit 
as well, (id., at 2026; R. 3814), even though Dr. Warner had 
actually testified without objection to all of the informa-
tion in the exhibit. 
E. Closing Argument. 
Finally, after a three-week trial during which the 
record reflects plaintiffs were unrestrained in their presen-
tation of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, AMC/Jeep was 
severely restricted by the court's rulings limiting their 
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses, virtually all of 
AMC/Jeep's' demonstrative evidence had been excluded and 
their witnesses hamstrung by the court's rulings limiting 
their testimony, the ultimate effects of the trial court's 
rulings were noted in closing argument: 
(1) Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue (a) 
that AMC/Jeep had offered "No positive proof. None at all."; 
(T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582); (b) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring 
no evidence, none at all," (jLd., at 33; R. 4583); and (c) 
that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce of en-
gineering data" (id., at 35; R. 4585); and 
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(2) Counsel for defendant Variable Annuity Life 
made the following flatly incorrect statement to the jury: 
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test 
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing 
exactly what they had done, even to the 
height of the outriggers off the ground; 
why didn't they go out and get a 
Commando, put some outriggers on there 
and go do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 
'We have done the same kind of tests that 
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same 
number of degrees of steer in on a 
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn 
over'; why didn't they do that? I'll 
tell you why: They were afraid to do it. 
They didn't dare do it. Because they 
knew that Commando would turn over. 
(Id., at 109; R. 4659). 
AMC/Jeep had, of course, done precisely what coun-
sel asserted had not been done. AMC/Jeep had obtained an 
exemplar vehicle, a Commando, had tested it in the very 
respects stated in the above quotation, and proffered 
evidence of the results of those tests, both in the form of 
testimony and in the form of demonstrative motion pictures, 
but the tests were systematically and erroneously excluded by 
the trial court. AMC/Jeep's motion for a mistrial based upon 
the subsequent false, misleading and prejudicial arguments of 
opposing counsel was nevertheless denied. (^ Id., at 193, 197; 
R. 4743, 4747). 
Following these arguments the jury returned a 
Special Verdict finding: (1) that the Commando was defective 
to the extent that it was unreasonably dangerous to the 
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purchaser or user; (2) that the defective condition of the 
Commando was a proximate cause of plaintiff Steven 
Whitehead's injuries; (3) that AMC/Jeep was 70% at fault for 
the injuries sustained by plaintiff Steven Whitehead; and (4) 
that general and special damages totalled $1,638,125.00. (R. 
1359-1361). The trial court then entered judgment in accord-
ance with the Special Verdict, (R. 1362-1364), and denied 
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial (R. 1569-1574, 1642-
1644). This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated 
upon the theory of strict products liability set out in 
Section 402A, Restatement: (Second) of Torts, as adopted by 
this Court in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P. 
2d 152 (Utah 1979). The elements which a plaintiff must 
prove under Section 402A are: 
(1) That defendant sold the product at issue in the 
case — Section 402A(1); 
(2) That such product was in a defective condition; 
that is, a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer — Section 402A(1), and Comment (g); 
(3) That such product was unreasonably dangerous; 
that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with 
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the ordinary knowledge common in the community as to its 
characteristics; Section 402A(1), and Comment (i); 
(4) That the product was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous at the time it left the seller's hands — Section 
402A, Comment (g); 
(5) That the plaintiff is the ultimate consumer or 
user of the allegedly defective product; Section 402A(1); 
(6) That the product's defective and unreasonably 
dangerous condition caused the plaintiff physical harm — 
Section 402A(1); 
(7) That the defendant is engaged in the business 
of selling the allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product — Section 402A(l)(a); and 
(8) That the allegedly defective and unreasonably 
dangerous product is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which 
it is sold — Section 402A(l)(b). 
Instead or requiring plaintiffs to prove the 
elements listed above, however, the trial court permitted 
plaintiffs, over AMC/Jeep's objections, to proceed against 
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and expert 
testimony wholly unrelated to the sole issue raised by 
plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep: Whether plaintiffs' 
Commando was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time 
it left the hands of AMC/Jeep because it rolled over while 
traveling on an interstate highway at 55 miles per hour when 
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struck off-center from behind by a station wagon traveling 70 
miles per hour. In fact, the only things proved by 
plaintiffs at trial were: 
(1) That "Jeeps/1 as a class of vehicles including 
Commandos/ will roll over under certain mechanically 
controlled conditions not normally encountered even under 
emergency conditions; and 
(2) That when "Jeeps" do roll over, an unre-
strained passenger in such a vehicle will be injured. 
These facts are as irrelevant to this lawsuit as 
they are undisputed. What plaintiffs failed to show v/as: 
(1) That Jeeps in general, and the Commando in 
particular, are any different in their resistance to roll 
over than the vast majority of vehicles on the road; 
(2) That the "ordinary consumer" had any reason to 
expect that the Commando or any other vehicle would not roll 
over under the particular circumstances of the accident made 
the basis of this lawsuit; and 
(3) That plaintiffs had any reason to expect that 
they could escape serious injury in che event of a roll over 
absent the use of available seat belts to protect them. 
As AMC/Jeep's evidence would have demonstrated (had 
it not been excluded by the trial court) and as AMC/Jeep's 
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses would have 
revealed (had that cross-examination been permitted): 
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(1) Most vehicles subjected to the tests reflected 
in plaintiffs1 films would have rolled over under those 
conditions; 
(2) Virtually any vehicle subjected to the 
collision made the subject of this lawsuit would have rolled 
over under those circumstances; and 
(3) That an unrestrained passenger in any vehicle 
which rolls over will suffer serious injuries, whether or not 
the roof collapses, because the occupants of a vehicle in 
motion tend to remain in motion after a collision until they 
are stopped by something — whether the roof, the road or the 
windshield. 
In order to prove that a product is "in a condition 
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer" and "unreasonably 
dangerous", the plaintiff in a design defect case will 
normally present evidence comparing the allegedly defective 
product to other products placed on the market at 
approximately the same time to show that the allegedly 
defective product does not meet the standards reflected in 
the industry in general. Such comparisons are generally 
referred to as "state-of-the-art" or "industry standards" 
evidence. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442, 
447 (10th Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs in this case, however, 
offered no such evidence. Instead, they offered and were 
permitted to display to the jury one film after another 
showing "Jeeps", and only "Jeeps", rolling over and over and 
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over in response to mechanically-induced test programs• 
Plaintiffs1 experts were then permitted to testify, without 
any foundation whatsoever, that "other vehicles" would not 
have rolled over under the circumstances presented, and 
AMC/Jeep was precluded from either cross-examining 
plaintiffs' witness on that subject or from presenting their 
own "industry standards" evidence to rebut it. As a result, 
the case was submitted to the jury, and the jury was 
permitted and, indeed, required to decide it based upon 
evidence in a vacuum. 
The trial court's errors which require reversal of 
the judgment on the verdict can be broken down into the 
following categories: (i) the trial court permitted 
plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence; 
(ii) the trial court limited improperly AMC/Jeep's cross 
examination of plaintiffs' experts; (iii) the trial court 
excluded substantial portions of AMC/Jeep1s evidence; (iv) 
the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based 
on improper closing arguments made by opposing counsel; (v) 
the trial court excluded ail evidence relating to the 
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seatbelts; and 
(vi) the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for directed 
verdict based on its statute of limitations defense. Each 
point will be addressed in turn. 
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POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE IRRELEVANT AND 
INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE. 
The issue in this case is not whether, in the 
abstract, Jeeps in general or even Commandos in particular 
roll over too easily. This is not an administrative proceed-
ing to determine whether AMC/Jeep should be required to 
recall and modify its utility vehicles based upon such an 
alleged defect even if it were found to exist. The sole 
issues in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep were (a) whether 
the plaintiffs' 1972 Commando was defectively designed and 
unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of the 
manufacturer because it rolled over when struck from behind, 
on an interstate highway, by a vehicle traveling 
approximately 70 miles per hour, and (b) whether the alleged 
design defect was one proximate cause of plaintiffs' 
injuries. 
Products liability under Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, does not remove the requirement of 
causation from a lawsuit. See Section 402A(1), Restatement 
(Second) of Torts; Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d 
1301, 1303 (Utah 1981). Even plaintiffs' own expert noted 
that while the Jeep may have a defect, the defect "may not 
have anything to do with this particular accident." (T., 
10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714). Plaintiffs in this case were, 
nevertheless, allowed to "prove" their case against AMC/Jeep 
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by introducing evidence that was wholly irrelevant to the 
issues presented. 
Plaintiffs1 evidence primarily showed Jeep CJ5s, 
not Commandos, overturning under conditions wholly dissimilar 
to the conditions of plaintiffs' accident. The conditions 
and maneuvers depicted in the films were never shown to bear 
any relation to the conditions and maneuvers experienced by 
plaintiffs and their Commando during the accident and this 
evidence was almost certainly misunderstood by the jury and 
given extraordinary weight since it was the only evidence 
they were permitted to hear. Under the circumstances of this 
case, the admission of such evidence is reversible error. 
Plaintiffs' absolute reliance on irrelevant 
demonstrative evidence is clear. Even before trial began, 
plaintiffs moved the trial court to allow them to exhibit "a 
certain pictorial movie developed by Dynamic Science, Inc. 
for the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety." (R. 1128). 
AMC/Jeep opposed plaintiffs' motion, noting: (1) that the 
testing represented in the film bore no relation to the 
circumstances of plaintiffs' accident; (2) that the Dynamic 
Science testing had involved 400 test runs while the film 
showed only six of them; (3) that the film's use of slow 
motion effects was misleading; (4) that the film showed only 
CJ5s and not Commandos; (5) that the CJ5s in the film were 
"manned" with anthropomorphic dummies which portrayed 
unrealistically and violently the movement of humans during a 
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rollover; and (6) that on the whole the film's prejudicial 
impact outweighed its value as demonstrative evidence. (R. 
1207-1220). The trial court brushed aside appellants' 
objections, however, taking the view that any problems with 
the film went to its "weight" rather than its admissibility. 
(T., Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 60, 
62; R. 4863, 4865). 
The Insurance Institute Film was shown to the jury 
in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Noettl. Although 
Mr. Noettl had never tested a Commando and had experience 
primarily with other "Jeep vehicles" he was, nevertheless, 
permitted to express the opinion that the "Jeep" is easier to 
overturn than a "passenger car." (Id., at 1262; R. 3039). 
(T., 10/26/83, at 1132-1183, R. 2960-2961). In fact, Mr. 
Noettl's opinion with respect to the Commando was based 
almost entirely on his experience with the CJ5 and other non-
Commando vehicles. (id., at 1189; R. 2966). AMC/Jeep 
interposed a continuing objection to this testimony based on 
the fact that a CJ5 was a different vehicle than a Commando 
and that Mr. Noettl was incompetent to express an opinion as 
to the Commando. (jEd., at 1191; R. 2963). Indeed, 
plaintiffs' own witness had admitted earlier in the trial, 
for instance, that the CJ5' s v/heel base was 20 inches shorter 
than the Commando's wheel base and that a longer wheel base 
makes it more difficult to roll a vehicle. (T., 10/24/33, 
at 672-675; R. 2450-2453). Moreover, a longer wheel base 
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means that more and faster steer must be "dialed into" a 
vehicle in order for it to negotiate the same turn as a 
vehicle with a shorter wheel base. The objections were, 
nevertheless, overruled and Mr. Noettl continued to testify, 
without foundation, that the CJ5 and the Commando were 
identical for purposes of discussing their handling 
characteristics. 
In addition, at the time the trial court viewed Mr. 
Noettl's Insurance Institute film in chambers before it was 
shown to the jury (.id., at 1206; R. 2983), plaintiffs' 
counsel stipulated that: the film did not simulate the 
conditions prevailing at the time of the accident. (jCd./ at 
1207; R. 2984). 
Mr. Noettl subsequently described the maneuvers 
shown on the film as "J-Turns" and "obstacle avoidance 
maneuvers," (jLd., at 1195; R. 2972), neither of which were 
shown, even remotely, to simulate the conditions of 
plaintiffs' accident. In fact, the tests themselves were run 
with mechanical input into the CJ5 — there was no human 
driver at all. Mr. Noettl also described the ignition 
interrupt system that was installed in the test CJ5 in order 
"to maintain the vehicle at constant speed" throughout a 
particular test run. (_Id., at 1231; R. 3008). Of course, 
there was no evidence that plaintiff Deborah Whitehead, the 
driver of the Commando in this case, kept her foot on the 
accelerator throughout the course of the accident. In fact 
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there was testimony that a vehicle making a turn like those 
depicted in the film would normally slow down. (T. 10/28/83, 
at 1693-1694; R. 3476-3477). The steering commands that were 
mechanically induced for the tests were on the order of 588 
degrees of steering input at a rate of 1562 degrees per 
second. (Id., at 1233-1234; R. 3010-3011). There was 
testimony that, due to the Commando's longer wheel base, 736 
degrees (or two complete revolutions of the steering wheel) 
would have to be dialed into a Commando in order to induce 
the same type of maneuver, (T., 10/27/33, at 1657-1659; R. 
3439-3441), and that steering input rates of 1300 to 1600 
degrees per second are "beyond human capabilities." (T., 
10/28/83, at 1689; R. 3472). There was no evidence that 
Deborah Whitehead negotiated anything resembling two complete 
revolutions of the Commando's steering wheel during the 
course of the accident, or even that the Commando's steering 
wheel was mechanically capable of two complete revolutions. 
Indeed, plaintiffs' experts had previously admitted that they 
had "no way of knowing" what steering movements were made by 
Deborah Whitehead during the course of the accident. (T., 
10/25/33, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737). 
There was also testimony that the CJ5 shown in the 
film had been modified substantially in an attempt to 
compensate for the removal of instrumentation and the 
placement of test equipment in the vehicle, (T., 10/26/83, at 
1257-1258; R. 3034-3035), that the tires on the test CJ5 were 
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"specially prepared" to accentuate rollover, and that the 
tests were "completely unrealistic." (T., 10/28/83, at 1694-
1698; R. 3477-3481; T., 11/1/83, at 2216-2217; R. 4008-4009). 
It was also clear that the film had been edited and 
manipulated to highlight the instances in which a CJ5 
actually rolled over. Mr. Noettl would later admit, for 
example, that 400 "runs" of the CJ5 were made by Dynamic 
Science but that only six would be shown in the film (^ id., at 
1214; R. 2991), and that the tests were run with mechanical 
input into the Jeep (i.e., there was no human driver). 
Another witness familiar with the Insurance Institute test 
depicted in the film testified that five hundred runs of the 
CJ5 were made by Dynamic Science and that there were only 
eight roll overs in those five hundred runs. (T., 10/28/83, 
at 1682; R. 3465). AMC/Jeep's objections to the film were 
nevertheless overruled and the film was shown to the jury. 
(Id.). 
Two other films of CJ5s rolling over were presented 
to the jury in connection with the testimony of Mr. Anderson. 
AMC/Jeep's strenuous objection to these films was identical 
to its objection to Mr. Noettl*s film. (T., 10/25/83, at 
106-107; R. 4909-4910). The trial court overruled these 
objections, however, stating only that: "I'll let you get at 
it any way you want to by cross examination or whatever. But 
I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your objection with 
respect to those films." (Id., at 109; R. 4912). 
— ~> ± — 
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In addition to the films of CJ5s rolling over, the 
trial court permitted plaintiffs' automotive safety 
consultant, Mr. Shaw, to introduce and testify regarding a 
chart purporting to show the so-called "roll over threshold" 
of a Commando, AMC/Jeep objected to the chart for the reason 
that it was based entirely on information Mr. Shaw had 
obtained in testing CJ5s. (T., 10/24/83, at 671-679; R. 
2449-2457). The trial court overruled the objection and Mr. 
Shaw was permitted to utilize the exhibit to bolster his 
opinion as to the "roll over threshold" of the Commando. 
(•Id., at 687-694; R. 2466-2472). 
As even this brief overview of plaintiffs' 
demonstrative and expert testimony reveals, the sum and 
substance of plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep was dependent 
upon the following syllogism: (1) Jeeps are unreasonably 
dangerous because they roll over too easily; (2) the Commando 
is a Jeep; (3) therefore, the Commando is unreasonably 
dangerous. The trial court committed reversible error in 
permitting plaintiffs to present this theory to the jury 
because, as the record reflects: (a) the Commando is 
materially different from other Jeeps, particularly the CJ5, 
and (b) even assuming material similarity between the 
Commando and other Jeeps, the maneuvers depicted in 
plaintiffs' films bore no relation to the circumstances of 
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plaintiffs' accident, and were so extraordinary in character 
that most vehicles would have rolled over under the 
conditions presented. The only thing demonstrated by 
plaintiffs' films was that some of the CJ5s tested rolled 
over under the conditions depicted in the films — a fact 
that was not an issue in this lawsuit. 
The utilization of experimental evidence in a trial 
of this nature is fraught with danger. As one court recently 
put it: "The problem presented by the use of experiments is 
the danger of misleading the members of the jury who may 
attach exaggerated significance to the test. See generally, 
The fact that plaintiffs' films bear no relation to the 
circumstances of plaintiffs' accident is shown most clearly 
in the following colloquy between plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson, 
who exhibited most of the films, and counsel for AMC/Jeep: 
Q. Is there any way you can help us 
as to what steering movements Mrs. 
Whitehead may have put into that vehicle 
at any point that we're talking about? 
A. No. ... 
Q. And is there anything that would 
say Mrs. Whitehead didn't put turning 
movement of more than 180 degrees into 
her steering, more or less? 
A. ... I couldn't say. 
Q. So whether the vehicle took an 
erratic path and was skidding, or what in 
the world it was doing through there, you 
can't help us, as far as your opinion? 
A. No. ... 
(T., 10/25/83, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737). In short, 
plaintiffs' films were exhibited purely for the purpose of 
showing that "Jeeps" rolled over under the conditions 
depicted in the films — a fact that was not in issue in this 
lawsuit. 
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McCormick on Evidence, Section 202 (2d Ed. 1972)." Barnes 
v. General Motors Corp., 547 F. 2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Because of this special danger, courts have developed a 
strict rule under which the use of experiments, like those 
offered by plaintiffs in this case, is limited to those 
situations where there is "a foundational showing ... that 
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to actual conditions." Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 
558 F. 2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1977). Courts consistently 
place "the burden ... upon the partiy offering evidence of 
out-of-court experiments ... to lay a proper foundation 
demonstrating a similarity of circumstances and conditions." 
Barnes, 547 F. 2d, at 277. See also Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. 
v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F. 2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 
1977) (applying North Carolina law); Weaver v. Ford Motor 
Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1974) affd. 515 F. 2d 
506 (3rd Cir. 1975); Jones v. Stemco Manufacturing Co., Inc., 
624 P. 2d 1044, 1047 (Okla. 1981); Sanchez v. Haddix, 95 
Wash. 2d 593, 627 P. 2d 1312, 1314 (1981); Goodman v. Carson, 
84 Ariz. 177, 325 P. 2d 819, 821 (1958). 
Haynes v. American Motors Corporation, 691 F. 2d 
1268 (8th Cir. 1982)(applying Arkansas law), illustrates the 
trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs' evidence of 
experiments performed on non-Coramando vehicles in situations 
admittedly different from those which led to plaintiffs' 
accident. The plaintiff in Haynes sued the defendant for 
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injuries suffered when her Jeep CJ5 overturned on a rain-
slick highway. The jury returned a judgment in favor of the 
defendant and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the 
trial court erred in refusing to allow her to introduce 
several television commercials depicting several models of 
"Jeeps" in off-road situations. It was the plaintiff's 
contention that these commercials constituted actionable 
misrepresentation because they led her to believe that her 
CJ5 would not roll over when subjected to the conditions of 
the accident. The Court of Appeals held that the films were 
properly excluded by the trial court, stating: 
A number of the commercials dealt with 
the Jeep Cherokee, and thus had no 
relevance in this case, which involves a -
Jeep CJ-5. Those commercials dealing 
with the CJ-5 also had little relevance 
since they depicted the CJ-5 in off-the-
road settings, climbing steep hills and 
traversing rough terrain. In contrast, 
[the plaintiff's] accident occurred when 
her CJ-5 skidded off rain slick pavement 
and into a ditch. ... The trial court 
properly excluded these commercials, 
which would have served merely to confuse 
the issues before the jury and the court 
properly refused to allow plaintiffs' 
expert to comment on the commercials. 
691 F. 2d, at 1271. 
Plaintiffs' films in this case suffered from 
precisely the same defects as plaintiffs' films in Haynes ~ 
interestingly enough, plaintiffs' expert in Haynes was the 
same Robert Anderson who testified for plaintiffs in this 
case. Here, as in Haynes, the trial court should have 
- 35 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
excluded plaintiffs' irrelevant films because they "served 
merely to confuse the issues before the jury." See also 
Barnes v. General Motors Corp./ 547 F. 2d, at 277. 
These cases highlight the trial court's error in 
this case in permitting plaintiffs to make their case against 
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and 
testimony. As in the cases discussed above, plaintiffs' 
evidence merely demonstrated the correctness of a fact not in 
dispute, i.e., that "Jeeps," in general, roll over in certain 
situations having no bearing on the particular circumstances 
of plaintiffs' accident. The films and opinions offered by 
plaintiffs' experts related to different vehicles subjected 
to artificial testing and should have been excluded because 
they bore no "substantial relation" to the actual vehicle and 
conditions involved in plaintiffs' accident, and were likely 
to be misunderstood by the jury and given exaggerated weight 
when the evidence was, in fact, of no probative value 
whatsoever. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BLOCKING 
AMC/JEEP'S EFFORT TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS. 
The trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs' 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence alone would support this 
Court's reversal of the judgment in this case. This error 
was compounded, however, by the trial court's consistent 
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refusal to allow AMC/Jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs1 ex-
perts in any meaningful way. 
The explicit point repeatedly made by plaintiffs' 
experts was that "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles, overturned 
much more readily than other vehicles, and that non-Jeep 
vehicles would not have overturned under the circumstances of 
plaintiffs' accident. (T., 10/20/83, at 558-560; 10/24/83, 
at 672-679, 688; 10/25/83, at 106-108, 894, 896, 897, 1039-
1040; R. 2331-2333, 2450-2457, 2466, 4909-4911, 2674, 2676, 
2813-2819). "Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, were 
consistently and explicitly represented as being unreasonably 
dangerous because of their alleged tendency to overturn "as 
distinguished from some other car." (jCd*# at 558-559; R. 
2331-2332). Specifically, plaintiffs' automotive safety 
expert, Mr. Shaw, was allowed to testify, without foundation, 
that "there's no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone 
to roll over than some others." (T., 10/24/83, at 717; R. 
2495). Similarly, plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson testified without 
foundation that "Jeeps" handled more poorly as compared to 
other vehicles, (T., 10/25/83, at 896; R. 2676), and 
plaintiffs' Mr. Noettl testified that "it was very difficult 
to turn a passenger car over." (T., 10/26/03, at 1262; R. 
3039). There can be no doubt that plaintiffs' case depended 
on convincing the jury that the Commando, as a "Jeep," over-
turned in circumstances in which "some other car" would not 
have overturned. The trial court erred, however, in blocking 
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AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' 
experts regarding the foundation for those opinions and to 
explore the relationship of that evidence to the circum-
stances of plaintiffs' accident. 
Examples of the trial court's improper restriction 
of AMC/Jeep's right to cross examine plaintiffs1 witnesses 
occur throughout the trial transcript. On cross-examination, 
AMC/Jeep inquired of plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson whether he had 
"had occasion to investigate any accident where something 
besides a Jeep rolled over and hurt somebody." (.Id., at 
1001; R. 2730). After the witness responded that he had, 
however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objection when 
AMC/Jeep attempted to inquire into such occasions. (Id.). 
The trial court also sustained plaintiffs' objections to 
questions regarding what other vehicles would do if subjected 
to the circumstances depicted in the films introduced through 
Mr. Anderson, (.id., at 1001-1005; R. 2780-2784), and whether 
other vehicles can be rolled on a level surface with driver 
input. (jEd./ at 1018; R. 2797). In each instance, the trial 
court ruled that the question was irrelevant; consequently, 
plaintiffs' theory that "Jeeps" are unreasonably dangerous 
when compared to "other vehicles" was allowed to go 
unchallenged because AMC/Jeep was not permitted to inquire 
how "other vehicles" would perform under the circumstances of 
plaintiffs' accident or under the CJ5 tests shown in Mr. 
Anderson's films. 
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AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiffs1 Mr. 
Noettl was similarly restricted by the trial court. Mr. 
Noettl testified, on direct examination by plaintiffs' 
counsel, that "it was very difficult to turn a passenger car 
over." (T., 10/26/83, at 1262; R. 3039). To test Mr. 
Noettl's knowledge about rolling passenger cars, AMC/Jeep 
asked him: "What experience have you had in trying to roll 
over a passenger vehicle." Plaintiffs objected and the trial 
court stated: "I don't want to get into testing all other 
kinds of vehicles, because we've got enough problems with 
one. So, I'm going to sustain the objection." (Id., at 
1266; R. 3043)(emphasis added). AMC/Jeep also asked Mr. 
Noettl whether he thought some other vehicle would have come 
out of plaintiffs' accident unscathed, but the trial court 
sustained plaintiffs' objection to that question as well. 
(I_d. , at 1275; R. 3052) . 
The practical effect of the trial court's restric-
tion of appellants' right of cross-examination was to allow 
plaintiffs' theory of the case to go unchallenged. 
Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify repeatedly and 
without foundation that "Jeeps" performed poorly in 
comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was prohibited 
from exploring the basis for that comparison. The trial 
court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' experts v/as, therefore, reversible error. 
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In State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 
(1953), this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court 
based, in part, on the trial court's erroneous limitation on 
cross-examination, stating that "[t]here is no other 
instrument so well adapted to discovery of the truth as 
cross-examination, and so long as it tends to disclose the 
truth it should never be curtailed or limited." 265 P. 2d, 
at 637. "It is fundamental that once a witness testifies as 
an expert, he subjects himself to the most rigid kind of 
cross-examination, including searching questions concerning 
his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge, and the 
basis of his opinion", Ross v. Colorado National Bank of 
Denver, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P. 2d 882, 887 (1969), and "unduly 
harsh limitation on cross-examination can amount to 
prejudicial error." N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele 
Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F. 2d 415, 421 (2nd Cir. 
1978). Accord In re Compensation of Bales, 294 Or. 224, 656 
P. 2d 300, 306 n.4 (1982); Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 277 Or. 
239, 560 P. 2d 636, 639 (1977); Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan. 
212, 453 P. 2d 100 (1969); Hope v. Arrowhead and Puritas 
Waters, Inc., 344 P. 2d- 428, 433 (Cal. App. 1959); Brazee v. 
Morris, 65 Ariz. 291, 179 P. 2d 442, 444 (1947). 
•The recent case of Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 
580 P. 2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), has particular significance when 
compared to the facts in this case. The plaintiff in 
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Todorovich was injured while driving an automobile manufac-
tured by the defendant and the plaintiff's theory was that he 
was injured due to a defectively designed seat in the 
automobile. At trial, the plaintiff's expert testified with 
respect to the failure of the automobile seat and to alterna-
tive safer designs and methods of construction. When the 
defendant attempted to inquire on cross-examination about 
federal seat design standards, however, the line of questions 
was blocked by the trial court. On appeal, the V7yoming 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, in 
part on the basis of the trial court's limitation of the 
defendant's cross-examination, stating: 
At this point in the trial counsel for 
Chrysler was confronted with the problem 
of cross-examination of an expert witness 
for the plaintiff who had stated his 
opinion as to the proper method of 
designing and manufacturing the part that 
failed. ... Fairness to Chrysler in such 
a situation demands that it be afforded 
reasonable opportunity to test by search-
ing questions the knowledge, competency 
and qualifications of such an expert 
witness. ... Having offered his expert 
opinion the expert witness exposes him-
self to interrogation which ordinarily 
would have no place in the cross-examina-
tion of a factuaT witness, but the expert 
exposes himself to the most searching 
kind of investigation into his qualifica-
tions, the extent of his knowledge and 
the reasons for his opinion, including 
the facts and other matter upon which it 
is based. 
580 P.2d, at 1133 (emphasis added). 
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The facts in this case closely parallel the facts 
in Todorovich. Plaintiffs' experts repeatedly expressed 
their opinion that "Jeeps" rolled over in situations where 
other automobiles would not• Yet, in virtually every 
instance where AMC/Jeep attempted to cross-examine on this 
point, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objections. 
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts was 
erroneously curtailed by the trial court and its judgment 
should accordingly be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF 
AMC/JEEP'S EVIDENCE. 
The first two Points in this brief illustrate the 
unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by the trial court in 
permitting them to introduce irrelevant and unduly prejudi-
cial evidence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's cross-examination 
with respect to that evidence. Compounding those errors and 
removing any vestige of fundamental fairness from the procee-
dings, however, the trial court then systematically barred 
the introduction by AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its 
demonstrative evidence offered to rebut the unfounded im-
plications raised by plaintiffs' experts. 
The trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's evidence 
is as startling as it is unprecedented. Before AMC/Jeep even 
called its first engineering expert, the trial court heard, 
in chambers, plaintiffs' objections to two films that would 
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be offered in conjunction with that expert's testimony. 
AMC/Jeep*s expert, Edward Heitzman, whose extensive ex-
perience in the field of automotive safety and design made 
him singularly qualified to testify regarding the comparisons 
and tests relied upon so heavily by plaintiffs, intended to 
rebut plaintiffs1 evidence, suggesting that the Commando is 
unsafe because CJ5s rolled over in plaintiffs' films, by 
exhibiting films of a Jeep CJ5 undergoing certain maneuvers 
and remaining upright. The purpose of the films was to 
illustrate Mr. Heitzman's testimony: (1) that the tests 
depicted in plaintiffs' films did not represent realistic 
emergency driving conditions; (2) that the mechanically 
induced conditions reflected in plaintiffs' films would not 
be duplicated by a human driver; and (3) that the CJ5 is in 
fact a stable vehicle which can successfully negotiate 
realistic emergency conditions. When questioned by the trial 
court as to the materiality of the films, counsel for 
AMC/Jeep responded: 
The materiality, your Honor, is that in 
the course of this trial, the plaintiffs 
have challenged the handling qualities of 
the Jeep CJ5. And they say that it's an 
unstable vehicle. And we think that this 
test demonstrates graphically to the jury 
that it's not an unstable vehicle, it can 
do very vigorous maneuvers and do that 
maneuver successfully. 
(I_d., at 1565; R. 3347). AMC/Jeep explained that it was not 
admitting that tests of the CJ5 were relevant to the issue of 
the Commando's characteristics, but rather offered the tests 
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to rebut evidence suggesting that the CJ5 was an unstable 
5 
vehicle. (Id., at 1566; R. 3348). The trial court 
ruled that defendants' films of the CJ5 were not admissible, 
however. (Id../ at 1571; R. 3353). Mr. Heitzman's second 
film demonstrated that virtually any vehicle will roll over 
when subjected to the conditions depicted in plaintiffs' 
films. 
Stripped of his demonstrative evidence, Mr. 
Heitzman nevertheless took the witness stand, (id.., at 1577; 
R. 3359), and through his testimony attempted to rebut plain-
tiffs' films. Mr. Heitzman's testimony was severely and 
unquestionably undermined, however, by his inability to 
demonstrate his opinions with his own CJ5 films. 
AMC/Jeep next attempted to rebut the testimony of 
plaintiffs' expert with respect to plaintiffs' film showing a 
Commando, equipped with "outriggers", undergoing certain 
tests, and Mr. Anderson's testimony for the plaintiffs that, 
but for the outriggers, the Commando in the film would have 
rolled over. (T., 10/28/33, 918-926; R. 2698-2706). Mr. 
Heitzman testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Anderson's film 
5 
If one party is permitted to introduce irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible evidence, the general rule "is that 
the opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is 
needed for removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise 
have ensued from the original evidence." Wigmore on 
Evidence, Section 15, pp. 304-307. See also, Dewey v. Funk, 
211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722, 724-726 (1973); Wynn v. Sundquist, 
485 P.2d 1085, 1090-1091 (Or. 1971); Mills v. Memphis Sales 
Manufacturing Co. , 251 F. Supp. 458, 460 TN.D/Miss". 1966) . 
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of the specially equipped Commando did not illustrate situa-
tions in which the Commando would have rolled. An expert's 
eye and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outrig-
gers would have rolled over but for the outriggers, (id., 
1744; R. 3527), and Mr. Heitzman testified that, in fact, the 
Commando shown in Mr. Anderson's film would not have rolled 
over had the outriggers not been attached. (T., 10/28/83, 
1674-1676; R. 3457-3459). 
The basis for Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard 
was the fact that the outriggers on plaintiffs' Commando were 
set too low, preventing that vehicle from even approaching a 
situation in which actual roll-over would have occurred. To 
demonstrate Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard, AMC/Jeep 
attempted to introduce a film of its own showing certain 
vehicles undergoing test maneuvers with outriggers attached, 
more appropriately, far enough off the ground so that when 
the roll-over was induced the viewer could see quite clearly 
the point at which the outriggers actually prevented the 
roll-over from occurring. The introduction of this film was 
likewise blocked by the trial court, however, in spite of the 
fact that Mr. Heitzman was later cross-examined extensively 
with respect to his judgment that plaintiffs' film did not 
demonstrate a Commando rolling over, (Ld.# 1824; R. 3607), 
and Mr. Heitzman's ability to respond to such cross-
examination was seriously undermined by the trial court's 
exclusion of the outrigger film. 
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AMC/Jeep also intended to utilize the outrigger 
film to rebut plaintiffs' evidence that "Jeeps11 are more 
likely to roll over in emergency situations than "other 
vehicles." AMC/Jeep especially needed this film to 
illustrate Mr. Heitzman's point that many vehicles will roll 
over when subjected to the mechanically induced tests 
illustrated in plaintiffs' films. Indeed, it was absolutely 
essential to AMC/Jeep's defense of plaintiffs' products 
liability claim that it be permitted to show that the 
Commando, in fact, compared favorably to other vehicles. The 
film was excluded by the trial court, however, "because it's 
irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because they involve other 
vehicles which the jury would have to take into consideration 
as to how it was done, the comparisons, the whole works." 
(.Id., 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-3530, 3533). The trial court 
thus refused to permit Mr. Heitzman to rebut the testimony of 
plaintiffs' experts with his own films even though 
plaintiffs' experts had been allowed to illustrate their 
opinions with extremely graphic and prejudicial films showing 
clothed dummies being thrown from vehicles during 
mechanically induced maneuvers incapable of being duplicated 
by human beings in realistic emergency situations. The 
distinct impression left with the jury, later capitalized on 
by opposing counsel during closing argument, was that 
AMC/Jeep did not have any demonstrative evidence to rebut or 
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even answer the several films presented by plaintiffs' 
experts, 
AMC/Jeep made one last attempt to present its case 
by calling Dr. Charles Warner, a mechanical engineer and 
consultant, to testify about the motion of the accident 
vehicle and of plaintiffs therein during the course of the 
accident made the basis of this lawsuit, and to give an 
opinion regarding the design of the Commando. (T., 10/28/83, 
1829; R. 3612). Specifically, it was Dr. Warner's opinion 
that the Commando was not defective and that its design did 
not cause plaintiffs' accident or injuries. (j[d., a t 1873-
1874; R. 3656-3657). 
Dr. Wa-rner had studied the actual accident vehicle 
and the accident scene extensively and offered his opinion as 
to the probable movement of the Commando during the course of 
plaintiffs' accident. (T., 10/31/83, 1941-1954; R. 3728-
3741). In addition, Dr. Warner had also obtained exemplar 
vehicles —• a Commando and an Oldsmobile similar to the 
automobile driven by defendant Larry Anderson which struck 
plaintiffs' Commando from the rear — and had performed 
certain tests with those vehicles in an attempt to 
reconstruct plaintiffs' accident. (J^ l*' ^t 1937-1938; R. 
3724-3725). 
A critical aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his 
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs* bodies during 
the course of the accident. It was Dr. Warner's opinion that 
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plaintiffs' movement within the vehicle during the course of 
the accident, rather than the fact that the vehicle happened 
to be a Commando, actually caused plaintiff Steven 
Whitehead's injury. (.Id., 1957-1967; R. 3744-3754). Dr. 
Warner had taken a series of photographs depicting human 
beings sitting in the exemplar vehicle, a Commando, and 
positioning themselves as Dr. Warner testified plaintiffs 
were most probably positioned during the course of the 
accident. The photographs were essential to the jury's 
understanding of Dr. Warner's testimony. The trial court 
nevertheless excluded the photographs on the basis "that they 
have no probative value, that the probative value is limited 
at least because of the photographs not being representative 
of just what did happen to the vehicles." (I_d., at 1967; R. 
3754). Of course, this was the same objection made by 
AMC/Jeep with respect to virtually all of plaintiffs' 
demonstrative evidence, but it was only when AMC/Jeep at-
tempted to present its own case that the trial court suddenly 
became concerned that the demonstrative evidence represent 
"just what did happen to the vehicles." (See also Id., at 
2009-2011; R. 3797-3799). 
Dr. Warner was also prepared to demonstrate his 
testimony regarding occupant movement and damage during a 
rollover with a film showing several vehicles rolling over. 
(.Id., at 1985; R. 3773). The trial court excluded this film 
as well. (Id., at 1986; R. 3774). 
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Dr. Warner also testified that plaintiffs' injuries 
were due, in part, to the fact that their Commando had been 
involved in a prior accident which had compromised the in-
tegrity of the Commando's passenger compartment and had 
aggravated the injuries suffered by plaintiffs. (I_d., at 
2024; R. 3812). Dr. Warner had personally examined the 
accident vehicle before reaching this conclusion and had, 
thereafter, prepared an exhibit to demonstrate his testimony 
in this regard. The trial court sustained plaintiffs' objec-
tion to this exhibit as well. (jEd., at 2026; R. 3814). 
AMC/Jeep's final attempt to present demonstrative 
evidence to the jury was in the form of a film prepared by 
Dr. Warner of an exemplar vehicle, a Commando, undergoing 
certain tests and maneuvers with outriggers attached. The 
film had obvious probative value and would have been used to 
rebut the testimony elicited by plaintiffs in connection with 
the film of their exemplar. (I_d. , at 1973; R. 3781). The 
trial court excluded the defendants' film, however, stating 
only that "I believe that [it] is not probative of any issues 
except perhaps the test which was made . . . . " (_Id«/ 1986; R. 
3774). The trial court's statement is simply inexplicable in 
light of the fact that plaintiffs had previously been allowed 
to introduce a film of their own exemplar Commando. 
The foregoing catalogue of the trial court's exclu-
sion of virtually all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence 
illustrates plainly the unfair advantage granted by the trial 
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court to the plaintiffs in this case. Not only were plain-
tiffs permitted to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory 
demonstrative evidence, not only was AMC/Jeep precluded by 
the trial court from cross-examining plaintiffs1 witnesses 
with respect to that evidence, but also when AMC/Jeep at-
tempted to rebut plaintiffs' case it was forced to do so 
without the aid of its films and other demonstrative 
evidence. 
^• AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence Should have 
been Admitted to Rebut Plaintiffs' Irrelevant 
Evidence. 
The limitations imposed by the trial court on the 
testimony of AMC/Jeep's experts was prejudicial error requir-
ing reversal of the judgment against AMC/Jeep. Virtually all 
of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence would have been used to 
rebut the theory, never proven, but so graphically implied by 
plaintiffs' films and the trial court's erroneous admission 
thereof: that all "Jeeps" are the same, that "Jeeps," as a 
generic type of vehicle, roll over much more frequently than 
other vehicles, and that the Commando is consequently a 
defective vehicle. AMC/Jeep's films would have shown (1) 
that Jeeps remain upright when subjected to realistic 
emergency situations; (2) that plaintiffs' film of their 
exemplar Commando did not illustrate a roll-over of that 
vehicle; and (3) that plaintiffs* tests of CJ5s undergoing 
mechanically induced maneuvers were unrealistic and 
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misleading in that they demonstrated test maneuvers few 
vehicles could perform successfully. The admission of 
AMC/Jeep's films was essential if AMC/Jeep was to have any 
hope of rebutting the evidence that had erroneously been 
admitted by the trial court during plaintiffs' case in chief. 
AMC/Jeep's rebuttal evidence was admissible under 
the rule, stated at note 5, supra, that if one party is 
permitted to introduce irrelevant and, therefore, inadmis-
sible evidence, his opponent may reply with similar evidence 
to remove any prejudice which might have ensued from the 
original evidence. The exclusion of defendants' films was, 
therefore, reversible error. 
In Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Company, Inc., 487 
F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974), 
the plaintiff sued the defendant, on a strict liability 
theory, for an injury incurred when her hand was crushed in a 
machine manufactured by the defendant. As in this case, the 
plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant's machine was 
more dangerous than other such machines and the defendant 
presented contrary evidence that its machine met the stan-
dards of the industry. On appeal the Seventh Circuit found 
the admission of the defendant's evidence proper on the 
ground that "[t]he plaintiff opened this matter during the 
presentation of her case in chief. Having done so, she 
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cannot complain of [defendant's] attempt at rebuttal." 487 
P. 2d, at 600. 
The settled rule that "[a] party eliciting evidence 
cannot object to the same kind of evidence introduced on 
behalf of the other party," Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71, 
559 P. 2d 1275 (1977), has been expressed in many contexts 
substantially similar to this case. The plaintiff in C.F. 
Church v. Golden, 429 P. 2d 771 (Okla. 1967), for example, 
was burned when his toilet seat, manufactured by the defen-
dant, caught on fire. It was the plaintiff's theory that the 
toilet seat was defectively designed making it highly flam-
mable and the plaintiff's experts testified regarding experi-
ments performed on similar toilet seats. The defendant's 
experts then testified about similar experiments which they 
had performed and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the 
experiments performed by the defendants' experts should not 
have been admitted. The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, 
however, stating: 
Plaintiffs entire case was predicated on 
the theory that the covering on the 
toilet in question contained a highly 
inflammable chemical known as cellulose 
nitrate. He offered testimony of experts 
regarding experiments made in substan-
tially the same manner as those made by 
defendant's experts. Under such cir-
cumstances it was not error to admit the 
evidence of defendant's experts on the 
point. 
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429 P. 2d, at 775. See also Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling 
and Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P. 2d 619 (1969); 
Leger Construction, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P. 2d 212, 
214-215 (Utah 1976). 
In each of the cases cited above, as in this case, 
the plaintiff introduced expert testimony and demonstrative 
evidence tending to prove his theory that the defendant's 
product was defective, and in each of these cases the appel-
late court found that the defendant must be permitted to 
rebut such evidence by introducing similar tests of his own. 
The common sense rule enunciated in these cases underscores 
AMC/Jeep's argument that its tests of CJ5s and of the ex-
emplar Commando, as well as all of its other demonstrative 
evidence, should not have been excluded by the trial court 
once plaintiffs had opened the door to such testimony in 
their own case in chief. 
B
• AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence was Relevant 
to Show the State-of-the-Art. 
Even had plaintiffs not "opened the door" to the 
issue of industry standards with respect to roil-over charac-
teristics, AMC/Jeep's evidence was admissible under settled 
principles of products liability law. As the Court stated in 
Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 
1976): "[T]here is 'general1 agreement that to prove 
liability under Section 402A [Restatement (Second) of Torts] 
the plaintiff must show that the product was dangerous beyond 
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the expectation of the ordinary customer. State-of-art 
evidence helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary 
consumer. A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the 
safety features which are incorporated in automobiles today." 
This Court adopted Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel 
Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979), and courts in other states 
that have adopted this standard agree that "state-of-the-art" 
or "industry standards" evidence is relevant in design defect 
6 
cases like this one. The court in Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. 
v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 (Alaska 1979) cert, denied 454 U.S. 894 
(1981), stated, for example, that "[wjhile not, strictly 
speaking, a defense in a products liability action, state of 
the art may be considered in determining whether a product is 
defective." 594 P. 2d, at 45. See Traynor, The Ways and 
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 363, 367, 370 (1967). 
Similarly, in Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 
F. 2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982), a products liability case 
Some courts exclude evidence of the state of the art in 
manufacturing defect cases because the plaintiff in such 
cases need only show that the product does not conform to the 
manufacturer's specifications to prove it is defective. See 
Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F. 2d 112, 115 
(4th Cir. 1981). When the issue is a defect in design, 
however, state of the art evidence is generally held to be 
admissible. Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F. 2d 
1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1982); Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F. 
2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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under Section 402A, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries 
when their mobile home, manufactured by the defendant, burst 
into flames. The plaintiffs in Reed, like plaintiffs in this 
case, offered evidence that their motor home was more 
dangerous than motor homes manufactured by other companies. 
The defendant then sought to rebut this evidence, as AMC/Jeep 
did in this case, by offering evidence that its motor home 
was as safe as other motor homes. The defendant's state-of-
the-art evidence was admitted by the trial court, and the 
plaintiffs appealed after the jury returned a verdict against 
them. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's state-
of-the-art evidence was properly admitted stating: 
[T]he majority rule is that state of the 
art evidence is admissible in design 
defect cases. ... Section 402A and the 
South Carolina Courts require the plain-
tiff to show both that the product is 
defective and that it is 'unreasonably 
dangerous to the consumer or user given 
the conditions and circumstances that 
foreseeably attend use of the product.1 
The majority of courts have found in 
design defect cases, as opposed to 
manufacturing defect cases, that state of 
the art and industry standards are 
relevant to show both the reasonableness 
of the design and that the product was 
dangerous beyond the expectations of the 
ordinary consumer. 
697 F. 2d, at 1196 (citations omitted). See Porter v. 
American Optical Corp., 641 F. 2d 1123, 1140 (5th Cir. 1931) 
(applying Louisiana law), cert, denied 454 U.S. 1109 (1931); 
Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 134 Ariz. 208, 655 P. 
2d 32, 36 (1932). 
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This case, like the cases cited above, is a design 
defect case. This Court, like the courts quoted above, has 
adopted Section 402A requiring the plaintiff to prove that 
the product in question is both defective and unreasonably 
dangerous. The rule stated in these cases is, therefore, 
persuasive, and the trial court's exclusion of all AMC/Jeep 
evidence relating to the state-of-the-art was erroneous both 
because such evidence would have rebutted similar evidence 
presented by plaintiffs and because such evidence was inde-
pendently relevant to AMC/Jeep's' defense that the Commando 
in question was neither defectively designed nor unreasonably 
dangerous. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER 
A MISTRIAL BASED ON IMPROPER CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING COUNSEL. 
As reflected in the preceding sections of this 
Brief, the trial court blocked virtually every attempt by 
AMC/Jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts and to rebut 
the evidence offered by those experts tending to suggest that 
the Commando in this case was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous resulting in the injuries sustained by plaintiffs. 
Without doubt, AMC/Jeep possessed and offered the demonstra-
tive evidence to rebut the testimony of plaintiffs' experts, 
but the trial court excluded virtually all that evidence on 
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the objection of opposing counsel. It was, therefore, im-
proper and prejudicial for opposing counsel to argue during 
closing arguments to the jury: (1) that AMC/Jeep had "No 
positive proof. None at all." (T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4532); 
(2) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all," 
(ijd., at 33; R. 4583), and (3) that AMC/Jeep's experts failed 
to bring "an ounce of engineering data." (^ Id./ at 35; R. 
4585). Opposing counsel (in this instance, counsel for Larry 
Anderson, building upon the improper arguments of plaintiffs' 
counsel) reached the height of impropriety when he made the 
following statement to the jury: 
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test 
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing 
exactly what they had done, even to the 
height of the outriggers off the ground; 
why didn't they go out and test a 
Commando, put some outriggers on there 
and go do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 
'We have done the same kind of tests that 
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same 
number of degrees of steer in on a 
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn 
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell 
you why: They are afraid to do it. They 
didn't dare do it. Because they knew 
that Commando would turn over. 
(Id.., at 109; R. 4659). Of course, AMC/Jeep had put outrig-
gers on a Commando and offered films of the tests conducted 
on that Commando, but those films were excluded by the trial 
court on the basis of objections from opposing counsel. 
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It requires no authority to establish that lawyers 
have a duty to present their case to a jury without misstat-
ing material facts or relying on facts not in evidence. 
Professional conduct, as well as fundamental notions of fair 
play and justice, require that counsel refrain from the type 
of misrepresentation made by opposing counsel in this case. 
The court in State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P. 2d 277, 
280 (Idaho App. 1983), recently quoted with approval the 
following statement of the rule from the American Bar 
Association Standards, The Defense Function Section 7.8(a) 
(1971): 
In closing argument to the jury the 
lawyer may argue all reasonable in-
ferences from the evidence in the record. 
It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer 
intentionally to misstate the evidence or 
mislead the jury as to the inferences it 
may draw. 
There are often circumstances in which 
counsel may be entitled to argue to the 
jury that they should draw an inference 
adverse to the prosecution as the result 
of its failure to bring forth some par-
ticular item of evidence or to call as a 
witness someone who has a special rela-
tion to the facts of the case. But it is 
a form of misrepresentation, and there-
fore improper, for counsel to argue that 
the evidence was not presented because it 
had been excluded by the court or is 
inadmissible. A lawyer who has success-
fully urged the court to exclude evidence 
should not be allowed to point to the 
absence of that evidence to create an 
inference that it does not exist. 
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(Emphasis added); see also Pritchard v. State, 673 P. 2d 291, 
294 n.l (Alaska App. 1983) (Singleton, J., dissenting); Rizzo 
v. United States, 304 F. 2d 810, 829 (8th Cir. 1962). 
That rule is directly applicable here. Opposing 
counsel knew that AMC/Jeep had offered a film showing a 
Commando undergoing extreme turning maneuvers and not rolling 
over. Counsel also knew that AMC/Jeep had offered extensive 
additional demonstrative evidence to support its case. 
Counsel knew this because they had viewed such evidence in 
chambers at the time it was excluded by the trial court at 
their instance. It was, therefore, misleading and plainly 
improper to argue that AMC/Jeep failed to bring "an ounce of 
engineering data" or that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to offer such 
evidence. 
In the context of this trial, opposing counsels' 
closing arguments were extremely prejudicial. As this Court 
recently stated: "The proper remedy for prejudicial attorney 
misconduct is to order a new trial." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 
P. 2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982). This is precisely the remedy 
sought by AMC/Jeep in this appeal. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL 
EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE PRESENCE OF 
AND PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO UTILIZE 
AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS." 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' Commando was 
equipped with seat belts and that plaintiffs were not wearing 
their seat belts at the time of the accident. Prior to 
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trial, however, plaintiffs submitted a Motion in Limine "to 
preclude the defendants or their witnesses or attorneys from 
mentioning the subject of seat belts or the use or nonuse of 
seatbelts at the trial of this case." (R. 1274-1294). 
AMC/Jeep submitted an opposing memorandum, (R. 1425-1464), 
and the trial court heard argument on the question of the 
admissibility of seat belt evidence, in various contexts, 
throughout the trial. In each instance, however, AMC/Jeep 
was precluded from introducing evidence on the availability 
and plaintiffs' non-use of their seat belts. 
Initially, the trial court ruled that, at least for 
opening statements, neither party could refer "to 'seat 
belts' or the availability, or the lack thereof, or the lack 
of use thereof." (T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 
10/18/83, at 156; R. 4959). Later that same day, and in the 
face of plaintiffs' basic theory that the Commando was defec-
tively designed by MAC/Jeep and was, therefore, unreasonably 
dangerous, the trial court ruled that the fact that plain-
tiffs had access to seat belts would not be admitted to show 
that the Commando was properly designed. (T., 10/18/83, at 
12; R. 1763). 
The trial court subsequently compounded its er-
roneous exclusion of seat belt evidence, however, when it 
ruled that AMC/Jeep could not cross-examine plaintiffs' 
experts with respect to the presence of seat belts in the 
accident vehicle, even though those experts were testifying 
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that the Commando was an unsafe vehicle. (T., Abstracts from 
Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, at 38; R. 4891). Finally, a 
proffer was made to the trial court by AMC/Jeep's expert 
witness, Dr. Warner, that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead 
"been using the seat belt in all probability he would not 
have received the spinal injury that he did receive." (T., 
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806). The trial court, nevertheless, 
ruled that no evidence regarding seat belts would be admitted 
in the trial, summarizing the basis for its ruling as 
follows: 
"[T]o speculate what the seat belt might 
have done in this type of situation is 
just something that the jury ought not 
to, and they will not have, under my 
ruling, the obligation to consider. ... 
Therefore, there will be no more evidence 
in this case with regard to seat belts. 
I want everybody to leave it alone, and 
we'll go from there." 
(Id., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808). The trial court's exclu-
sion of all evidence relating to the presence of and plain-
tiffs' failure to utilize seat belts was prejudicial error. 
^' Plaintiffs' Failure to Utilize Available Seat 
Belts Contributed to their Injuries, and 
Constituted a Failure to Mitigate their 
Damages. 
The trial court's exclusion of any evidence relat-
ing to plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts 
was error. Although this Court has yet to rule on the issue, 
the so-called "seat belt defense" has been accepted in a 
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substantial number of jurisdictions that have addressed the 
question. 
In Utah, it is proper for the jury to consider the 
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they "have united 
as concurrent proximate causes of an injury" in strict 
liability cases. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d 
1301, 1303 (1981). AMC/Jeep's experts were prepared to 
testify that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead been wearing his 
seat belt at the time of the accident "he would not have 
received the spinal injury that he did receive." (T., 
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806). AMC/Jeep would have offered 
further evidence that plaintiffs' failure to utilize the 
available seat belts was a breach of plaintiffs' duty "to use 
the degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent 
person would have observed for his own safety under the 
circumstances." Lindquist v. Kennecott Copper Company, Inc., 
30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P. 2d 1182, 1185 (1973). 
It is difficult to deny that, in the current 
climate of consumer awareness and in light of repeated 
government and industry-sponsored campaigns urging citizens 
to "buckle up for safety," a reasonably prudent person acts 
unreasonably when he fails to use an available seat belt 
before venturing onto the highways. One commentator has 
noted the objective fact that "the use of seat belts would 
reduce serious injuries resulting from automobile accidents 
by thirty-three percent, and could save up to twelve thousand 
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lives annually," Note, The Seat Belt Defense; A 
Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested 
Approach for the Courts, 56 Notre Dame Lawyer 272, 281 
(1980). The court in the seminal case of Bentzler v. Braun, 
34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 640 (1967), put it this way: 
"On the basis of ... experience, and as a matter of common 
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or 
should know of the additional safety factor produced by the 
use of seat belts." 
From the common sense proposition that it may be 
unreasonable for one to fail -co use available seat belts, it 
is properly within the jury's purview to determine whether 
the plaintiff in a particular case has met his" duty of due 
care. As the court noted in Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill.App. 
2d 1, 234 N.E. 2d 329, 331 (1968): 
The use, or non-use of seat belts, and 
expert testimony, if any, in relation 
thereto, is a circumstance which the 
trier of facts may consider, together 
with all other facts in evidence, in 
arriving at its conclusion as to whether 
the plaintiff has exercised due care, not 
only to avoid injury to himself, but to 
mitigate any injury he would likely 
sustain. 
See also Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444, 323 N.E. 2d 164, 
167 (1974)-. Under these settled principles, and under the 
rule announced by this Court in Mulherin, the trial court 
should have admitted AMC/Jeep's evidence and expert testimony 
to prove that plaintiff Steven Whitehead's failure to utilize 
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his seat belt "united" with any fault of AMC/Jeep "as concur-
rent and proximate causes of" his injury. 
Courts which do not subscribe to this Court's view, 
as expressed in Mulherin, that comparative fault principles 
may apply to a strict products liability case, prefer to 
classify a plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts as a 
breach of the duty to mitigate damages. The language most 
often quoted in this regard is as follows: 
As Prosser has indicated, the plaintiff's 
duty to mitigate his damages is equiv-
alent to the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences, which precludes recovery for any 
damages which could have been eliminated 
by reasonable conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff (Prosser, Torts [4th ed.], 
Section 65, pp. 422-424). Traditionally 
both of these concepts have been applied 
only to postaccident conduct, such as a 
plaintiff's failure to obtain medical 
treatment after he has sustained an 
injury. To do otherwise, it has been 
argued, would impose a preaccident 
obligation upon the plaintiff and would 
deny him the right to assume the due care 
of others (Kleist, Seat Belt Defense — 
An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings 
L.J. 613, 616). We concede that the 
opportunity to mitigate damages prior to 
the occurrence of an accident does not 
ordinarily arise, and that the 
chronological distinction, on which the 
concept of mitigation of damages rests, 
is justified in most cases. However, in 
our opinion, the seat belt affords the 
automobile occupant an unusual and or-
dinarily unavailable means by which he or 
she may minimize his or her damages prior 
to the accident. Highway safety has 
become a national concern; we are told to 
drive defensively and to 'watch out for 
the other driver'. When an automobile 
occupant may readily protect himself, at 
- 64 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
least partially, from the consequences of 
a collision, we think that the burden of 
buckling an available seat belt may, 
under the facts of the particular case, 
be found by the jury to be less than the 
likelihood of injury when multiplied by 
its accompanying severity. 
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168, This view is supported 
by Section 465, comment c, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
dealing with the causal relation between harm and plaintiff's 
fault, which states that damages may be apportioned 
where the antecedent negligence of the 
plaintiff is found not to contribute in 
any way to the original accident or 
injury, but to be a substantial con-
tributing factor in increasing the harm 
which ensues. There must of course be 
satisfactory evidence to support such a 
finding, and the court may properly 
refuse to permit the apportionment on the 
basis of mere speculation. 
Pursuant to this rule, courts will admit evidence 
of nonuse of seatbelts when the defendant can demonstrate, by 
competent and satisfactory evidence, the extent that the 
plaintiff's injuries could have been avoided by wearing a 
seat belt. Garrett v. Desa Industries, Incl; 705 F. 2d 721, 
725 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
445 F. Supp 1368, 1372-1373 (£.D. Va. 1978); Insurance 
Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 52 U.S.L.W. 2598 
(Florida Supreme Court; April 12, 1984); Spier v. Barker, 
363 N.E. 2d, at 166. 
Whether viewed as a species of comparative fault 
under Mulherin or as a failure to mitigate damages, the jury 
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in this case should have been permitted to consider the fact 
of plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts. 
Acceptance of the so-called "seat belt defense" will not 
undermine in any way the rights of plaintiffs to recover for 
injuries caused them by others. The defense is not a bar to 
recovery in and of itself. The burden remains on the 
defendant to prove, first, that it was unreasonable for the 
plaintiff not to use a seat belt, and, second, that the 
plaintiff would not have received some or all of his injuries 
had he used the seat belt. Only if AMC/Jeep were able to 
convince the jury of both prongs of its defense would the 
jury have reduced plaintiff Steven Whitehead's recovery by an 
appropriate amount. 
B. The Jury Should have been Permitted to 
Consider the Fact that the Commando was 
Equipped with Seat Belts. 
AMC/Jeep was also denied any opportunity to present 
evidence of the simple fact that the Commando in this case 
was equipped with seat belts. Such evidence would have been 
presented separately from evidence of plaintiffs' nonuse of 
the seat belts and would have been utilized to show that the 
Commando was designed safely and properly. 
The case of Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978), is directly on point. As 
in this case, the plaintiff in Wilson was injured when his 
vehicle overturned during an accident. As in this case, the 
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plaintiff asserted that his vehicle was defective in design 
because the roof collapsed during the rollover causing a com-
pression fracture of his spine. As in this case, the defen-
dant sought to introduce evidence that the vehicle was 
equipped with seat belts in order to defend the "whole 
automobile." 
The court in Wilson, however, admitted the defen-
dant's evidence that the accident vehicle had been equipped 
with seat belts for the purpose of determining whether the 
automobile was defectively designed, relying upon the simple 
and logical proposition that the jury would have to determine 
"whether the auto as a whole was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous", 445 F. Supp. at 1371, and that the jury could 
not properly fulfill its function in this regard if it was 
not permitted to take into consideration the presence of a 
safety device, seat belts, that were designed to restrain the 
plaintiff and prevent, or at least minimize, injury. 
As in Wilson, the trial court in this case should 
have permitted the jury to consider the presence of seat 
belts in the Commando. As in Wilson, plaintiffs in this case 
claim that the Commando, the "whole vehicle," is defective 
because it rolled over and collapsed upon them. MAC/Jeep1s 
evidence would have shown that the seat belts were installed 
to guard against this type of injury, among others, and that 
the Commando was rendered safer by the presence of the seat 
belts. ' 
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The relevance of evidence of the availability of 
seat belts to the issue of the Commando's design cannot be 
doubted• The trial court's ruling in this case, however, 
restricted the jury unduly and permitted it to consider only 
a part of the Commando in deciding whether the Commando/ as a 
"whole vehicle," was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
The result was absurd and prejudicially erroneous for it is 
impossible to design a "crashworthy" vehicle which will 
protect its occupants from serious injury in the event of an 
accident without including in that design the most fundamen-
tal safety feature of all — seat belts. The judgment of the 
trial court must therefore be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
JEEP CORPORATION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO 
INCLUDE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
AND IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF AMC/JEEP BASED ON SUCH DEFENSE. 
Plaintiffs named American Motors Sales Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation as defendants in their Second Amended 
Complaint filed July 31, 1980. (R. 84-37). Defendant Jeep 
Corporation answered on November 11, 1980 (113-114). 
Defendant American Motors Sales Corporation answered on 
September 12, 1983. (R. 993-995). The critical difference 
between the two answers was that the answer of American 
Motors Sales Corporation contained the following defense: 
"The complaint is barred by Section 78-15-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended." (R. 994). On September 12, 1983, 
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the same day the Answer of American Motors Sales Corporation 
was filed, Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for leave 
to amend its answer to include a defense based on Section 78-
15-3 (R. 983-989). The trial court denied the motion "on the 
basis that the motion was not timely made, the amendment of 
the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs 
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of 
the trial date which the Court feels is unjustified under the 
facts and circumstances." (R. 1271-1272). After trial had 
been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved for a directed verdict based 
on Section 73-15-3. It was pointed out to the trial court 
that this defense had been pleaded by American Motors Sales 
Corporation in its initial pleading, but the trial court 
denied the motion. (T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775). 
A. The Trial Court Should Have Granted Jeep 
Corporation's Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule 
15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for permis-
sion to amend its answer to assert a defense based on Section 
78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated. That section provides that 
products liability actions are barred if brought "more than 
six years after the date of initial purchase for use or 
consumption...." 
Plaintiffs1 Commando was manufactured by Jeep 
Corporation in December, 1971 (T., 10/25/83, at 930; 
R. 2710), for sale by American Motors Sales Corporation 
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during the 1972 model year. Plaintiffs' accident occurred on 
October 6, 1979 — more than six years after the date the 
Commando was initially purchased. AMC/Jeep contends that 
plaintiffs' accident occurred "more than six years after the 
date of initial purchase for use or consumption" and their 
claims are thus barred by the terms of Section 78-15-3. This 
defense raises a purely legal question based on undisputed 
facts and was raised contemporaneously by the Answer of 
American Motors Saleg Corporation. The trial court should 
have granted Jeep Corporation's Motion to Amend under the 
liberal standards of Rule 15(a). 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party in the cir-
cumstances presented by this case, and that "leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." In Lewis v. 
Moultree, 627 P. 2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that 
"[t]he rule in this state has always been to allow amendments 
freely where justice requires, and especially is this true 
before trial." (Quoting Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 
486 P. 2d 1045, (1971) (emphasis in original)). In the 
same case, this Court clarified the "justice" which the 
liberal amendment rule is meant to further: 
Some tempest has been raised about the 
court allowing the plaintiff to make 
tardy amendments to pleadings. In doing 
so, he [the trial judge] wisely and 
properly stated: 'the pleadings are 
never more important than the cause that 
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is before the court ...• There can be no 
prejudice in this case because we'll give 
ample time to answer . . . . ' This is in 
harmony with what we regard as the cor-
rect policy: of recognizing the 
desirability of the pleadings setting 
forth definitely framed issues, but also 
of permitting amendment where the inter-
est of justice so requires, and the 
adverse party is given a fair opportunity 
to meet it, 
627 P. 2d, at 98 (emphasis added), quoting Thomas J. Peck & 
Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 137, 515 P. 
2d 446 (1973) . 
The trial court's denial of Jeep Corporation's 
Motion to Amend ignores this Court's liberal construction of 
Rule 15(a). Most importantly, the trial court's statement, 
in its order denying the Motion to Amend, that "the amendment 
of the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs 
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of 
the trial date" is plainly belied by the fact that American 
Motors Sales Corporation interposed precisely the same 
defense in its Answer. (R. 994). It can hardly be said that 
any party would have been prejudiced by Jeep Corporation's 
interposing a defense that was properly and contemporaneously 
interposed in the answer of American Motors Sales 
Corporation. The issue was before the trial court and 
"justice required" that Jeep Corporation be allowed to amend 
its answer so that it might accord with the answer of its 
affiliated corporation. 
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Eastridge v. Fruehauf Corporation, 52 F.R.D. 129 
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (applying Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure which is identical to the Utah rule), demonstrates 
the proper approach to a motion to amend an answer to add a 
statute of limitations defense. The plaintiff in Eastridge 
sued the defendant for personal injuries allegedly incurred 
on account of the defendant's negligence. Sometime after he 
had filed his original answer, the defendant moved the trial 
court for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) so that he 
might add a defense based on a statute of limitations. The 
trial court granted the Motion to Amend, and noted the 
following: 
Statute of limitations are designed 
primarily to assure fairness to 
defendants; they promote justice by 
preventing surprises through revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until the evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared; in other words the defense 
was designed to protect citizens from 
stale and vexatious claims. 
The merits of this defense in the instant 
action are unimportant at this time; 
however, the purpose and legislative 
intent involved in the enactment of this 
affirmative defense have a very worthy 
objective and accordingly, depending on 
the surrounding circumstances, such 
purpose should not be treated with 
indifference. 
Where no prejudice results to the adverse 
party, the Statute of Limitations can be 
subsequently pleaded in an amended 
answer, and there is no waiver of such 
defense if the answer is properly amended 
to include it. 
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52 F.R.D., at 131. See also Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F. 
2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1977); American Air Filter Company, 
Inc. v. Industrial Decking and Roofing Corp., 82 F.R.D. 681 
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) . 
The sound reasoning of the court in Eastridge is 
directly applicable to this case. Utah's interests in 
protecting manufacturers against "stale and vexatious claims" 
is given voice in Section 78-15-3 and should not have been 
"treated with indifference" by the trial court. Particularly 
in light of the fact that the issue was properly before the 
trial court in the Answer of American Motors Sales 
Corporation, there was no justification for the trial court's 
denial of Jeep Corporation's Rule 15(a) motion. Such denial 
was an abuse of discretion which deprived Jeep Corporation of 
the possible protection of Section 78-15-3 and v/hich requires 
that the trial court's judgment be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court Should have Granted 
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Directed Verdict 
Based on the Statute of Limitations. 
After the trial had been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved 
for a directed verdict based on the limitations period con-
tained in Section 78-15-3. As has been noted above, this 
issue was squarely presented in the Answer of American Motors 
Sales Corporation. The motion was denied without comment by 
the trial court. (T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775). The 
- 73 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court's action in this regard is in derogation of 
Section 78-15-3. 
As quoted above, the limitations period in the Utah 
Product Liability Act bars actions brought "more than six 
years after the date of initial purchase for use or 
consumption..•." Plaintiffs' Commando was manufactured in 
1971 for sale in the 1972 model year. The accident occurred 
more than six years later, in 1979. Under the plain language 
of Section 78-15-3, plaintiffs' action against AMC/Jeep was 
time barred. The trial court's failure to direct a verdict 
on this ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment 
should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be 
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry 
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for six independently suffi-
cient reasons: 
First, a new trial is required because the trial 
court erred in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant 
and inflammatory evidence; 
Second, a new trial is required because the trial 
court compounded its first error by blocking AMC/Jeep's 
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts; 
Third, a new trial is required because the trial 
court capped its evidentiary errors by excluding virtually 
all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence; 
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Fourth, a new trial is required because the trial 
court erred in failing to grant AMC/Jeep's motion for a 
mistrial based upon opposing counsels' closing arguments 
which stated that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to produce the very 
demonstrative evidence that had been previously excluded by 
the trial court; 
Fifth, a new trial is required because the trial 
court erroneously excluded all evidence relating to the 
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seat belts; 
and 
Sixth, entry of judgment in favor of AMC/Jeep is 
required because the trial court erred in failing to direct a 
verdict based on AMC/Jeep's statute of limitations defense. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants, 
and : Case No. 196 95 
AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION 
and JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and STEPHEN WHITEHEAD 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Stephen and Deborah Whitehead brought action to re-
cover damages for severe injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent occurring October 16, 1979, on Interstate 15 within Utah 
County. At the time of the accident, Deborah Whitehead was driving 
a Jeep Commando manufactured and sold by American Motors Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation. Stephen Whitehead was a passenger in the Jeep 
Commando which was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsnobile driven 
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by Larry Anderson who was employed by Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Company. Named as defendants were American Motors Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) on the theory of strict product 
liability; Larry Anderson on a negligence theory; and Variable 
Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) on the theory of vicarious 
liability. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The action came to trial on October 17, 1983, before the Hon* 
J. Robert Bullock sitting with a jury. During the course of trial, 
plaintiff Deborah Whitehead settled her case against all the defen-
dants and the Court dismissed her complaint with prejudice. After 
three weeks of trial, the issues of liability and damages related 
to plaintiff Stephen Whitehead were submitted to the jury. On 
November 4, 1983, the jury found that the Jeep Commando, as manu-
factured by defendant AMC/Jeep, was defective to the extent that 
it was unreasonably dangerous to the purchaser or user, and that 
the defective condition of the Jeep as manufactured by the defendant 
was a proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff Stephen Whitehead 
upon rollover of the vehicle on October 16, 1979. Judgment was 
entered on the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Stephen Whitehead 
and against all defendants in the total amount of 51,638,125.00. 
Based upon the answers of the jury apportioning the fault among the 
defendants, for purposes of contribution and claims and cross-claims 
between the defendants, AMC/Jeep was deemed 70% at fault, Larry 
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Anderson and VALIC were deemed 30% at fault, and no fault whatso-
ever was attributed to Deborah Whitehead. Judgment was entered 
November 8, 1983. (R. 1362-1364), Upon considering extensive argu-
ment and submitted briefsf the court denied AMC/Jeep's Motion for 
Judgment n.o.v., or in the Alternative for a New Trial. (R. 1642-
1644). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment of the 
lower court against defendants American Motors Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Set forth below is a concise statement of facts giving rise 
to the cause of action heard by the lower court. Respondent em-
phatically refutes the material purported to be a Statement of 
Facts within Appellant AMC/Jeep's brief for the reason that it is 
not in actuality a "statement of facts" but is an extremely argu-
mentative, lengthy and repetitious presentation of AMC/Jeep's ver-
sion of the trial proceedings. 
The facts are these. On October 16, 1979, on a clear after-
noon, Stephen Whitehead and his wife of one year Deborah Whitehead 
were driving a Jeep Commando south on Interstate 15 near Orem, 
Utah County, Utah. Although the vehicle was borrowed, Deborah 
Whitehead had driven it several times before. Stephen Whitehead 
had just completed his working day and the couple had arranged to 
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meet at a commuter parking area along the freeway. Because Deborah 
had prepared Stephen's dinner for him, she drove the vehicle while 
Stephen rode as a passenger in the right front seat. (R. 2145-2147, 
2155). 
While driving approximately 50-55 miles per hour, the Whitehead's 
vehicle was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsmobile driven by Larry 
Anderson. (R. 2147, 2151). The Oldsmobile was moving at a speed 
of approximately 65-70 miles per hour. The right front of the 
Oldsmobile contacted the left rear of the Whitehead vehicle. The 
Commando went out of control and rolled over. (R. 2151, 2152). 
As a result of the collision and roll-over, Deborah Whitehead 
received multiple head and limb lacerations as well as various 
bruises and abrasions. (R. 2152). 
Stephen Whitehead was severely injured. He sustained injury to 
his spinal chord at the thorasic level of T-ll, (approximately 
four inches above the belt level), abrasions over his shoulders and 
upper portion of his back, associated tenderness over the left 
shoulder, abrasions on his hands and shins, and a severely broken 
leg (femur bone). The injury to the spinal chord rend.ered Stephen 
Whitehead paralyzed from the waist down, permanently a paraplegic. 
(R. 2254-2257). Testimony related to the extent of Stephen 
Whitehead's injuries comprised nearly an entire day a trial and 
over 100 transcript pages. (R. 2195-2249, 2254-2313). 
Naming Larry Anderson as defendant, plaintiffs filed their 
original complaint on November 21, 1979, and through amended com-
plaint, subsequently added Anderson's employer VALIC and AMC/Jeep. 
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(R. 7-8, 84-87)• Trial commenced on October 17, 1983, and judgment 
was entered November 8, 1983. (R. 1362-1364). The trial court 
denied AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial. (R. 1642-1644). 
POINT I 
AMC/JEEP'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PRE-TRIAL 
RULINGS EXPLAINS MANY OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS 
OF TRIAL ERROR. 
A. Many Of The Trial Court's Pre-Trial Rulings Were Based 
On AMC/Jeep's Failure To Make Discovery. 
Appellant AMC/Jeep assigned as error many of the trial 
court's rulings on the admissibility of AMC/Jeep's evidence. 
Appellant's complaint would be better made if it could cite to the 
record where it laid an adequate foundation for the admissibility 
of such claimed rejected testimony or evidence or if it would pro-
vide, by citation to the record, the relevant explanation made by 
the court or the objection of opposing counsel for the rejection 
of such evidence. Set forth below is a brief account of the 
court's pre-trial rulings and basis for those rulings. 
On March 5, 1981, plaintiff-respondent filed its first set of 
interrogatories. (R. 117-128). When AMC/Jeep failed to respond 
within thirty days as required, plaintiff contacted by phone and 
mail AMC/Jeep's attorneys requesting a response. No answers were 
filed. Thereafter, plaintiff submitted a Motion to Compel on July 
6, 1981. (R. 131-135). Plaintiff submitted, on September 16, 
1981, a First Set of Interrogatories to Jeep Corporation and an 
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identical set of Interrogatories to American Motors which consti-
tuted the second set of Interrogatories to American Motors. (R. 
238-256). No answers were received. Two months later, on November 
12, 1981, plaintiff again filed a Motion to Compel. (R. 257-
261). AMC/Jeep failed to respond. A full nine months later, on 
August 4, 1982, plaintiff filed a Third Motion For Order Compelling 
Discovery. (R. 584-588). One year and five months had elapsed 
since plaintiff originally submitted its interrogatories. Finally, 
on August 16, 1982, Jeep Corporation filed answers to interrogatories; 
however, the answers of Jeep Corporation were totally specious. 
In essence, only six of the 43 interrogatories were answered. 
(R. 614-636). Immediately, on August 20, 1982, plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Strike Answer, or in Alternative, Motion to Compel. 
(R. 641-644). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Motion For Protective 
Order on September 3, 1982, to bar other defendants from taking 
the deposition of plaintiff's experts before plaintiff was able 
to obtain answers to interrogatories or even the name of AMC/Jeep's 
expert. (R. 656-658). 
After exhausting all possibilities of getting cooperation 
from the defendant, and in utter exasperation, plaintiff obtained 
a hearing before Judge Allen B. Sorensen, the original trial 
judge assigned to the case. On October 29, 1982, Judge Sorensen 
heard the plaintiff's motions. (R. 5007). At the hearing, attorney 
for AMC/Jeep stated to the court that "they [the client] say they 
have nothing more than what they have given . . . " Judge Sorensen 
stated, 
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"All right. I will make an order. I will 
give you 90 days to get it. If it's not 
done — that is 90 days — if it's not 
done in that time I will sustain objections 
to any evidence from your client on the 
issue raised that the evidence touches 
upon." (R. 5011). 
Judge Sorensen and counsel present then proceeded to work 
through the interrogatories individually issuing an order with re-
spect to each one. (R. 5015). Judge Sorensen issued an order 
similar to that set forth above (90 days) regarding each question 
and in addition, stated, "I will have you give them all available 
information or reasonably retrievable information as regards the 
model 1972 only." (R. 5018). AMC/Jeep was ordered to answer many 
of the interrogatories within 30 days. (R. 5034, 5047, 5049). 
Setting forth one example, interrogatory number 12 requested 
information as to whether Jeep Corporation had determined the approx-
imate center of gravity for Jeep Commandos. Jeep Corporation re-
sponded: "Center of gravity figures for the Commando vehicle can 
no longer be found." Upon reviewing the question and answer, the 
court stated, "If they can't be found, I don't suppose he can in-
troduce it." Counsel for plaintiff interjected, "Your Honor, the 
only thing we ask there is if he has got an expert who's going to 
come in here at a later date and testify to the center of gravity, 
we want that precluded." The Court then stated, "[I]f that answer 
remains, he is not going to call a witness to answer that and put 
that stuff before the jury." Counsel for plaintiff urged the Court 
to appreciate the possibility that AMC/Jeep might bring in an ex-
pert to testify regarding the center of gravity, saying "well, we 
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computed it after the answers to interrogatories," To which the 
Court responded, "If he does that, I will order he give you that 
information 90 days before trial." (R. 5036). 
In essence, the Court ordered AMC/Jeep to answer some interroga-
tories within 30 days, some within 90 days, and in no case would 
AMC/Jeep be allowed to submit evidence related to the interroga-
tories asked not given to plaintiff 90 days before trial. 
On December 29, 1982, 60 days after the first hearing before 
Judge Sorensen, a hearing was held again. Counsel stated: 
Now we are now to December 29, 1982, 60 
days later, and we still do not have any 
of the information that the Court ordered 
Mr. Jensen to provide to us within 30 days. 
(R. 5059). 
The Court continued through each individual interrogatory not 
yet answered by AMC/Jeep. In addition, the Court ordered that no 
expert of AMC/Jeep could be allowed to testify unless the name and 
address were provided to opposing counsel within 30 days from hear-
ing, i.e. by January 29, 1983. (R. 5079, 5080). 
On October 7, 1983, ten days before trial, AMC/Jeep had still 
failed to comply with the Court's discovery orders and plaintiff, 
through a Motion In Limine, moved the Court to prohibit defendant 
AMC/Jeep from introducing any evidence pertaining to those certain 
interrogatories that defendant failed and purposely refused to answer 
in defiance of the Court's rulings. Plaintiff's Motion In Limine 
was comprised of 30 pages wherein plaintiff painstakingly set forth 
for Judge Bullock each of plaintiff's interrogatories, AMC/Jeep's 
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answer, Judge Sorensen's specific order, any supplemental answer 
by AMC/Jeepf and plaintiff's subsequent motion related to defendant's 
failure to substantively respond, (R. 1063-1093), [See Appendix 
for copy of Plaintiff's Motion In Limine]. 
In pre-trial conference that same day, October 7, 1983, Judge 
Bullock considered the plaintiff's motion that defendants be pre-
vented from raising matters to which they failed to respond in their 
answers to interrogatories. The matter was discussed at length 
between Court and counsel. The Court ruled that the defendant 
AMC/Jeep could cross-examine, but that based upon its failure to 
comply with discovery orders, AMC/Jeep was not to raise any new facts 
which had not been supplied to counsel through response to interrog-
atories. Judge Bullock conceded, however, that where the same facts 
were introduced by plaintiff's witnesses and defendant's witnesses 
arrived at a different conclusion, those opinions would be admis-
sible. (R, 1365). 
Plaintiff objects strenuously to defendant AMC/Jeep's total 
failure to inform the Supreme Court of these many and material pre-
trial motions and orders related to AMC/Jeep's case. It is impos-
sible for the Court to appreciate the rulings of the trial court 
without the benefit of knowledge of the entire proceedings. 
Briefly, the following subject areas were the objects of dis-
covery sanctions by the trial court, in that AMC/Jeep was precluded 
from introducing related evidence based upon its failure to provide 
information by way of claiming irrelevancy, vagueness, overbreadth, 
or by specifically answering in the negative that the requested infor-
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mation did not exist. In sum, through multiple court orders by two 
trial court judges, AMC/Jeep was precluded from introducing test 
results, testimony, or evidence related to: 
1) safety or lack of safety of the Commando as affected 
by (i) rollbars, (ii) roofs and doors, and (iii) general in-
stability causing rollovers; 
2) results of any AMC/Jeep's investigation into acci-
dents, injuries or fatalities related to the Commando; 
3) any plans, blueprints, drawings or specifications 
related to the 1972 Jeep Commando; 
4) information concerning the center of gravity of the 
Jeep Commando as it may relate to rollover propensity or any 
other driving or steering characteristic; 
5) testing related to the handling qualities and 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando; 
6) testing which may have been performed pertaining 
to directional stability or handling characteristics of the 
Jeep Commando for years 1966-73; 
7) operational directional stability or handling 
characteristics; 
8) the track width, wheelbase, suspension system and 
cab enclosure of the Jeep Commando; 
mando. 
9) any test driving done by AMC/Jeep of the Jeep Com-
1 
For specific questions, answers, motions, orders and supple-
mental orders, see Appendix, setting forth plaintiff's Motion In 
Limine, R. at 1063-1092, Transcript of Proceedings before J* 
Sorensen, December 29, 1982, R. at 5057-5072, and plaintifffs 
Interrogatories to defendant American Motors Corporation, R. at 
^oo^o/i/: 
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B. Sanctions Imposed By The Trial Court As A Result of 
AMC/Jeep's Failure To Make Discovery Were Entirely 
Appropriate And Supported By Statutory And Case Law, 
The trial court's authority to impose sanctions based upon a 
party's failure to comply with court orders pertaining to discovery 
is established through Rule 37(b)(2) and (d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure: 
RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE DISCOVERY: SANCTIONS 
(b) Failure to Comply with Order. 
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which 
Action is Pending. 
If a party . . . fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, 
. . . the court in which the action 
is pending may make such orders . . . 
as are just, and among others the 
following: 
* * * 
(B) An order refusing to 
allow the disobedient party to support 
or oppose designated claims or defenses, 
or prohibiting him from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
* * * 
The failure to act described in this 
subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is 
objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order 
as provided by Rule 26(c). (Emphasis 
added.) 
The trial court's authority to impose sanctions where there 
is a failure to cooperate in discovery proceedings is authority not 
only expressly conferred by statute but implicit in facilitating 
a trial court's duty to control proceedings. When a party demon-
strates a callous disregard of its responsibilities in discovery, 
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the trial court's choice of even extreme sanctions, such as dis-
missal of the action, is not an abuse of discretion. Discovery pro-
cedures are meaningless unless violation entails a penalty propor-
tionate to the gravity of the violation. Sanctions must be avail-
able to the trial court in appropriate cases where a party fails 
to comply with discovery orders, not merely to penalize those whose 
conduct may be deemed to warrant such sanction, but also to deter 
those who might be tempted to such conduct in absence of such a 
deterrent. When a party has displayed a bad faith approach to dis-
covery, it is not only proper, but imperative, that sanctions be 
imposed to preserve the integrity of judicial process and due pro-
cess for other litigants. 
In the instant case, the trial court imposed sanctions pur-
suant to subsection (B) of Rule 37(b)(2). 
Even more stringent sanctions imposed by the trial court have 
been upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park W. Village, 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the plaintiff 
served the defendant a first set of interrogatories. Eight months 
later and again one month later, plaintiff served a third set of 
interrogatories along with requests for production and a request 
for admission of facts. Defendant failed to respond and, there-
fore, plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment as a sanction 
pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
motion was noticed for September 20, 1976. On September 15, 
1976, defendant served its response to the first set of interroga-
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tories (10 months late), its response to the third set (one and a 
half months late) and its answers and objections to the request for 
admissions of facts (one and a half months late). The trial court 
found, inter alia, that defendant's failure to respond to discovery 
was without excuse or justification and that the failure to respond 
had caused delay in the prosecution of the case. The trial court, 
imposing the most severe sanction, ruled that pursuant to Rule 
37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment by default should 
be entered against the defendant on the ground of defendant's per-
sistent failure to respond timely or properly to discovery requests. 
The Utah Supreme Court, upon review, noted that in Utah, the 
rule allowing for dismissal permitted its invocation regardless of 
the reason for the failure to respond to discovery. The court fur-
ther held that the trial court had discretion as to which sanction 
should be imposed. It sustained the trial court's ruling. 
In G. M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 
P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling to dismiss the action based upon defendant's failure 
to adequately respond to interrogatories: 
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an 
order of court or for failure to respond 
are set out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are 
discretionary with the court. 
A discretionary determination may be "re-
viewed" only in the case of a "gross," "clear," 
"plain," "palpable," or "manifest" abuse 
of discretion. 
In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 306 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 
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1964), the offending party failed to comply with a pretrial discovery 
order to produce documents. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment against the offending party solely for disobeying that order. 
The Utah Supreme Court held: 
Whether the failure to comply with the 
court's order has been willful and whether 
the circumstances are so aggravated as to 
justify the action taken is primarily for 
the trial court to determine. Unless it is 
shown that his action is without support 
in the record, or is a plain abuse of dis-
cretion, it should not be disturbed. 
Court imposing even the most severe sanctions as a result of 
a party's failure to make discovery rely upon the United States 
Supreme Court decision in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan 
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 
(1976) (per curiam). There, respondents, plaintiffs in an anti-
trust action, failed for 17 months to respond to the satisfaction 
of the other parties or to the court to hundreds of interrogatories. 
In the face of stern admonishment by the trial court, further de-
lays occurred, yet the trial court refrained from imposing sanc-
tions since all parties were attempting to reach a settlement. 
Moreover, respondents, at whom the discovery was directed, changed 
counsel and claimed that the transition hindered their ability to 
comply. Finally, a frustrated trial judge dismissed their action 
finding "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" of their 
responsibility. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
dismissal, concluding that in view of extenuating circumstances, 
there was insufficient basis for the trial court's action. In re 
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Professional Hockey Anti-trust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188 (3rd Cir. 
1976) . 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, ruling that the imposition of sanctions was a discretion-
ary decision of the trial judge which must be left undisturbed in 
the absence of a flagrant abuse of discretion. The Court criti-
cized the traditional leniency of the judiciary as improperly 
founded on the principle that parties will, if given one more 
chance, comply with requests long ignored. In a major change of 
direction, the Court insisted that unconditional impositions of 
these sanctions are crucial in deterring "other parties to other 
lawsuits" from willingly flouting the "discovery orders of other 
district courts." 427 U.S. at 643. 
In Votour v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Case No. 79-4686 
CA (L) 01 B (Fla. 15th Judicial Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983), the court 
ultimately struck the defense pleadings and entered a default 
judgment. Over a two-year period, plaintiffs had sought pretrial 
discovery of crash tests and related material aimed at showing 
defendants' actual knowledge that the design safety features of 
crash bars and lower leg protection were available, desirable, and 
feasible. Defendants steadily blocked or sought to evade a series 
of orders by the trial court granting plaintiffs1 motions to compel 
and sanction orders to induce defendants to disclose the relevant 
information. 
Judge Wessel specifically singled out defendants1 failure to 
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respond to orders requiring them to produce crash tests and blue-
prints of engine guards. The Court held that although striking 
defendants1 pleadings and granting a default judgment was a drastic 
sanction, it was nonetheless appropriate for flagrant violations 
of the discovery mechanism. 
This court must conclude that the defendants1 
actions have been evasive and deceptive. 
They have been willful and deliberate and 
they have been in bad faith and their 
actions have been merely calculated to delay, 
obfuscate and avoid legitimate disclosures 
and to turn the process for discovery in 
these courts into an endurance contest, and 
a total waste of judicial time and effort. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has so held. In Adams v. 
J. W. Jones Construction, 703 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1983), the court, 
applying identical procedural rules, held that where a party will-
fully fails to comply with the rules of discovery, dismissal with 
prejudice is proper. 
Appellate courts routinely and properly uphold the sanctions 
imposed by trial courts as a result of one party's failure to dis-
close. See e.g. Binyon v. Nesseth, 231 Kan. 381, 646 P.2d 1043 
(1982); Independent Mfg. Co. v. McGraw-Edison, 6 Kan. App. 2d 982, 
637 P.2d 431 (1981); Owen v. F. A. Buttrey Co., 627 P.2d 1233 
(Mont. 1981); Drickerson v. Drickerson, 604 P.2d 1082 (Alaska 1972). 
It is axiomatic that the trial court is granted broad discre-
tion in dealing with the imposition of discovery sanctions. See 
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. App. 1982); 
JR Construction Co. v. Paddock Pool Const. Co., 128 Ariz. 343, 625 
-16-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P.2d 932 (Ariz. App. 1981); Wong v. City and County of Honolulu, 
665 P.2d 157 (Ha. 1983); State v. Mai, 54 Or. App. 334, 634 P.2d 
1367, aff'd 656 P.2d 315 (1981); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 
(Alaska 1970). 
In Matter of Estate of Mora, 611 P.2d 842 (Wyo. 1980), the trial 
court ordered that witnesses or exhibits not named or listed within 
specified time would not be admissible. The appellate court upheld 
exclusion of evidence since "after two years in which to prepare 
for trial, the time set by the court for submission of instructions 
cannot be said to be unreasonable. Mora failed to comply with the 
time table set forth in the court order. The order was not arbitrary 
nor an abuse of discretion. [citation omitted]." 
The restrictions placed on AMC/Jeep by the trial court were 
by no means the most severe sanctions available to the trial judges. 
Many trial courts, faced with a similar factual situation, have ruled 
just as the trial judge did in the instant case. 
In Fouche v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d 
1020, review granted 659 P.2d 766 (Idaho App. 1982), the appellate 
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the mechanic's accident reconstruction testimony where 
such expert testimony from the mechanic had not been timely dis-
closed in response to a continuing request for discovery. 
In Sequoia Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Halec Construction Co., 117 Ariz. 
11, 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. App. 1977), the appellate court held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, in a suit for injuries 
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sustained when a rollover protection structure on a leased tractor 
collapsed, in excluding testimony as to experiments performed 
with the tractor on the grounds that such testimony constituted a 
last minute surprise and would work a severe prejudice to other 
parties who had utilized every discovery procedure available to be 
fully prepared for every eventuality* 
The only question before this court related to the pretrial 
rulings restricting AMC/Jeep is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in making those rulings. As supported by Utah statute, 
Utah case law and opinions handed down by countless high courts from 
other jurisdictions, the trial court in the instant case did not 
as a matter of law, abuse its discretion in imposing moderate sanc-
tions as a result of AMC/Jeep1s continuous failure to comply with 
discovery orders. 
Upon appellate review, the function of the 
reviewing court is not to put itself in the 
place of the trial court and to determine 
with hindsight what sanction, if any would 
have been most appropriate; . . . [citations 
omitted]. In the case at Bar, the trial 
judge dealt with the counsel; he was in a 
position to assess the [defendant's] claim 
of abuse of discovery; and he was in a posi-
tion to better estimate whether the [de-
fendant's] improper conduct was prejudicing 
the [plaintiff's] efforts at trial. We 
cannot conclude as a matter of law, that 
the trial judge abused his discretion . . . 
Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 715 (Wyo. 1980). See also Kelly 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Sovereign Broadcasting, Inc., 606 P.2d 
1089 (Nev. 1980). 
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Finally, in the instant case is found the unique circumstance 
of having had two trial judges rule on AMC/Jeep's failure to make 
discovery. The pretrial rulings on October 29, 1982r and December 
29, 1982f were rendered by the Hon. Allen B. Sorensen and upon his 
retirement, the pretrial rulings related to discovery were rendered 
by the Hon. J. Robert Bullock just prior to trial. In both instances 
the trial judges felt it necessary to compel AMC/Jeep tc comply with 
discovery orders and upon its failure to do so, issued the appropriate 
sanction. This cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE 
PROPER. 
The appellants have criticized the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings under three points, generally stated as Point I, regarding 
the introduction of irrelevant and inflamatory evidence; Point II, 
claiming the trial court prevented the defendants AMC/Jeep from cross-
examining plaintiff's experts; and Point III, regarding claimed exclusior 
of substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence. The appellants' 
arguments are tainted by the failure of the appellants to give 
the foundational basis for the court's rulings in each instance 
and for taking substantial license with the record. The only way 
in which the respondents can address these blatant assertions of 
error is to take each specific contention and address it as it 
was raised in the appellant's brief. That we will do as follows: 
A. Appellant's Objections To The Admissibility Of The 
Dynamic Science Film. 
The first assertion of the appellants is that the Dynamic 
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Science film prepared for the Insurance Institute of Highway 
Safety was irrelevant and referred to conditions and maneuvers 
never shown to bear any relationship to the accident. The appellants 
fail to refer to the foundational background to the introduction 
of this film. The record will disclose that a Motion in Limine 
was made by the plaintiffs on October 7, 1983. The court and all 
of the parties were given an opportunity in advance of trial to 
review the movie developed by Dynamic Science. 
The appellants quote extensively from their own objections 
to the introduction of the film addressed to the plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine. The quotation from its own objection is misleading, 
since the manner in which the film was introduced in this case 
was vastly different than the commentary made in the appellants1 
objection, which it now quotes as authoritative. For example, a 
preview was held before the court with counsel and outside the 
presence of the jury, (R. 2982) and the portions of the film 
showing the movements of dummies in the machine were deleted and 
the film portrayal presented to the jury was drastically edited. 
Mr. Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated 
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in which 
the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and conditions 
prevalent in this accident. Mr. Noettl's qualifications regarding 
experience, his technical training, his knowledge of the jeep 
vehicle, and the creation of the film in question was thoroughly 
and carefully laid over fifteen pages of transcript (R. 2951 
through 2966). 
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In the course of that testimony Mr. Noettl was required to 
tell of the handling characteristics of the CJ-5, CJ-6 and CJ-7. 
This Court should bear in mind that the Commando vehicle in this 
case is basically a CJ-6 and there is no dispute as to that 
nomenclature. Mr. Noettl indicated that there was virtually no 
difference between the parameters effecting the rollover character! 
of the CJ vehicle shown in the film and the subject Jeep Commando. 
He testified, 
"there were* virtually no differences in my 
opinion between those parameters, that is 
the width of the track, the dimensions you 
would get when you measure the center line 
of one tire to the center line of the tire on 
the other side, the front and rear, and the 
height of the center of gravity of the vehicles." 
(R. 2962). 
He stated that in his opinion the rollover characteristics of the 
CJ-5 were the same as the rollover characteristics of the Jeep 
Commando. (R. 2964 and 2987) He indicated that many tests were 
made of the vehicle, but the tests that were appropriate for 
conditions basically similar to that giving rise to this litigation 
were the J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver. (R. 2972) 
Adequate foundation was laid to show that Mr. Noettl knew the 
circumstances and conditions of this accident, had visited the 
scene of the accident, had seen photographs of the vehicle taken 
shortly after the accident and he, himself, had been qualified as 
an expert accident reconstructionist and an expert on the jeep 
vehicle. The witness testified that the film was material, for 
it demonstrated the rollover threshhold of the Jeep Commando 
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under circumstances similar to that which occurred on the day and 
place of the accident. The handling characteristics of the Jeep 
in the film were further related to the accident by the testimony 
of Mrs. Whitehead and by the subsequent testimony of Messrs. Shaw 
and Anderson. 
Mr. Noettl said that of the four hundred test runs made of 
the jeep vehicle, seventy to eighty percent were to check out 
instrumentation. (R. 2991) Only six runs were made to develop 
its rollover characteristics and those runs, as edited to the re-
quirements of the court, were shown to the jury. (R. 2992) The 
jury was specifically instructed that the plaintiff did not 
contend that the dummy sitting in the vehicle in one portion of 
the film represented the movement of people in real life, nor the 
movement of passengers inside the vehicle. (R. 2993) The film 
demonstrated that the CJ-5 in a J-turn maneuver on a straight 
highway would roll over at 22 miles per hour. (R. 2994) In the 
obstacle avoidance maneuver, the machine rolled over at 31 and 32 
miles per hour. (R. 2994) Mr. Noettl testified that because of 
its handling and its rollover propensity, the 1972 Jeep Commando 
was defective at the date of manufacture. (R. 2995) He testified 
that the Jeep Commando vehicle would operate identically to the 
CJ-5 shown in the film. (R. 2968, 2969) Mr. Noettl testified 
upon cross examination regarding the J-turn and obstacle avoidance 
maneuvers and how they related to ordinary traffic circumstances 
one experienced every day and he stated, "I would say, based on 
our testing, all the testing I have done, that the likelihood of 
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the vehicle rolling over is veryf very high when doing those 
types of maneuvers." (R. 3010) Cross examination was intense 
and lengthy, but did nothing to shake the opinion of the expert 
that the Jeep Commando was defective when manufactured and his 
last statement to Mr. Jensen was, "If a vehicle has the same 
track width and the same height and center of gravity, it will 
exhibit very closely the rollover threshhold exhibited by the CJ 
vehicles-" (R. 3025) 
Mr. Noettl testified that if it weren't for the rollover 
propensities of the vehicle as demonstrated by the film, the jeep 
would not have rolled upon the relative speed impact of 15 miles 
an hour between the Oldsmobile of Mr. Anderson and the Jeep 
driven by Mrs. Whitehead. (R. 3030) The rollover propensity of 
the CJ vehicle shown in the film and which had been tied to the 
Jeep Commando in the accident had met the evidentiary foundational 
requirement. How the appellants can contend after reading the 
transcript of Mr. Noettl1s testimony that he was allowed to testify 
without foundation that the CJ-5 and Commando were identical for 
purposes of handling characteristics, is beyond belief. If ever 
there was an adequate foundation laid for the admission of this 
testimony and the presentation of the film, it was in this case. 
Not only is there an adequate foundation, it might be said that 
the foundation was overwhelming and it certainly went to the 
heart of the issue. Relevancy cannot be a factor. The objection 
of the appellants in this case is simply without merit. 
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The appellants would have the Court prefer the view of 
AMC/Jeep's expert Heitzman over the view of the plaintiff's 
experts, Noettl, Shaw and Anderson. Appellants presume that the 
jury and the Supreme Court are compelled to discard the plaintiff's 
expert testimony and believe that proffered by the appellants. 
If that were so, then, of course, the appellants would be entitled 
to judgment; however, the law is to the contrary: 
Where there is a discrepancy in the testimony 
rendered by witnesses the fact finder must 
decide which account is the most accurate and 
on appeal the Supreme Court must review the 
facts in a light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party. 
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979). 
In regard to the admission of evidence, such as the film in 
question, broad latitude is given to the trier of fact. All evi-
dentiary matters were contested and certainly those which went to 
the heart of the question upon which there is opposing expert 
opinion, were contested. It is for this reason that the trial 
court's view of the testimony is so distinctly superior and so 
highly valued at the appellate court level. Our Court has said: 
In situations where exercise of discretion is 
appropriate considerable weight should be 
given to determination of the trial court due 
to the trial court's close involvement with 
the parties, the witnesses and the total 
circumstance of the case. 
Barber v. Calder, 5 22 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
Our court is not alone in its interpretation of the rulings of 
the trial court. The position of the Utah court is the general 
rule which has been effectively stated as follows: 
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Considering the full record we do not have 
the definite confirmed conviction that the 
court below committed a clear error of judg-
ment in the conclusion it reached upon weigh-
ing of the relevant factors that is required 
to reverse the judgment, 
Wilson v. Volkswagen of America/ Inc./ 561 F.2d 506. 
All of the arguments made by appellants regarding the film are 
arguments to the weight of the testimony. The flaws in the film as 
viewed by the appellants were covered by the testimony of appellants' 
experts and, in fact/ most of the appellants' quotes to the record 
are not from the testimony of plaintiff's experts but from the 
testimony of the defendants' expert/ consequently, the jury had a 
full view of the relevance and materiality of the testimony and 
could attach such weight as it desired to the testimony of the 
plaintiff's expert/ vis-a-vis, the testimony of the defendants' 
expert. 
The repeated assertions that the film was "especially pre-
pared" to accentuate rollovers and that the tests were "completely 
unrealistic" is not testimony of the plaintiff's expert but is 
testimony of the defendants' expert, which the jury was free to 
believe or disbelieve and which would materially affect the be-
lievability of the plaintiff's experts and in particular Mr. Noettl. 
Arguments that four hundred "runs of the CJ-5 were made but only 
six were shown" is deceptive when the record shows that full 
revelation was made to the jury that 80% of the runs were made for 
the purpose of testing equipment and not for the purpose of testing 
the vehicle and that only six of the runs shown in this Dynamic 
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Science film were related to rollover propensities, (R. 2994) 
All of those rollover propensity film tests were shown to the jury 
as edited to meet the admissibility requirements laid down by the 
trial judge. 
The appellants rely heavily upon Haynes v. American Motors, 
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982). The difficulty with that reliance 
is that the view is inapropos to the issue in this case. In 
Haynes, Jeep T-V commercials were offered for the purpose of showing 
actionable misrepresentation, not for the purpose of showing handling 
characteristics. The commercials were of another vehicle which the 
plaintiff did not contend was similar. The key, of course, is the 
fact that the question of admissibility is based upon the founda-
tion that is laid, not upon the witness who is testifying. The 
court in Haynes was probably right in its ruling, but there can be 
no correlation of the facts in Haynes to the facts in this case 
regarding the foundation laid for the admissibility of the testi-
mony or the point to which the testimony was to be admitted. We 
simply say the Haynes case is not in point. 
To summarize the arguments of the plaintiff in regard to the 
defendants' Point I, it could be said that the motion for the 
introduction of the film was made in advance of trial, the film 
itself had been in the hands of AMC/Jeep prior to coming into the 
possession of the plaintiff, the film was shown to all counsel in 
advance of trial and was reviewed by the court, not only before 
trial but immediately prior to the exhibition to the jury. All 
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objections were made and appropriate rulings were made to avoid 
misleading or inflaming the jury, so that the film as seen by the 
jury was directly material and relevant. 
The arguments made by the appellants herein are primarily to 
the weight of the testimony, vis-a-vis the relevance and material-
ity of the testimony. Every issue which it contends affected the 
believability of the film was covered by the appellants1 experts 
who were given broad license by the court to interpret, criticize 
and impugn the film and its relationship to the issues involved in 
this litigation. The admission of the film was not error. 
B. Appellant's Contention That The Trial Court Failed To 
Allow AMC/Jeep To Cross-Examine Plaintifffs Experts. 
The theme of this point, as presented by the appellants, 
stretches the parameters of propriety. The appellants apparently 
believe, for a reason unexplained in the argument, that the trial 
court "consistently refused to allow AMC/Jeep to cross-examine 
plaintiff's experts in any meaningful way." (Appellants' Brief p. 
37) The appellants' denegration of the trial court is further ag-
gravated by their comment "indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that the trial 
court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during the course of 
the trial and the jury was permitted to hear only one side of this 
case." (Appellants' Brief p. 3) 
The court in this case was one of the state's most experienced 
and respected jurists. His position in legal circles and his 
prominence among his colleagues, both before and after appointment 
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to the bench, is known to every practicing lawyer and judge in the 
state. Does one assume by appellants1 comments that the judge was 
motivated by something other than facts and the law? 
On pages 36 and 37 of their brief, the appellants make a com-
plaint that plaintiff was allowed to make a comparison between the 
Jeep and another passenger car and that the appellants were denied 
a similar right. The appellants refer the court to R. 2331-2332 in 
support of this contention. The fact is that the reference is to a 
voir dire examination by the appellants1 counsel wherein any compar-
ison made was as a result of his questions. Furthermore, the issue 
in that particular scenerio was whether the collision between the 
Oldsmobile and Jeep would have a particular affect upon a Jeep and 
if so, why. The issue was not as suggested by the appellants, a 
hypothetical comparison between Jeeps and passenger cars in general. 
The appellants' Point II is disjointed, and topics are inter-
mingled, however, again on page 37 of appellants1 brief, they com-
plain of being "blocked" on cross-examination. 
The references shown on page 37 of appellants' brief are not 
to the record but apparently to the transcript pace numbers. A 
simple purview of the record cited by appellants will demonstrate 
that appellants' counsel was not blocked on voir cire and cross-
examination. 
AMC/Jeep was allowed to voir dire Officer Knight on three sep-
arate occasions during plaintiff's direct examination (R. 2327-2329; 
2332-2333; 2342-2343) and to cross-examine four times covering 19 
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pages (R. 2346-2352, 2357-2361, 2363-2370, 2373-2374). There was not 
one objection to appellants' cross-examination that was sustained. 
In regard to the plaintiff's expert Anderson, the appellants 
requested voir dire once (R. 2680-2681) and cross-examination covered 
101 pages of transcript. (R. 2709-2797, 2818-2827, 2832-2833). The 
court allowed the appellants great latitude in examination and 
nothing in the record could be considered a "block". 
We have heretofore referred to Mr. Noettl's testimony and have 
demonstrated the sizeable amount of examination afforded the appell-
ants. To put it in terms of specifics, however, the record shows 
that cross-examination covered 41 pages. (R. 2998-3025, 3043-3053, 
3057-3058). This cannot be considered a "block". Furthermore, it 
should be remembered that the other defendants were also allowed ex-
tensive cross-examination. 
In regard to the plaintiff's expert Shaw, the appellants were 
allowed to voir dire four times. Voir dire by AMC/Jeep covered 15 
transcript pages. AMC/Jeep's extensive cross-examination of Shaw 
resulted in over 114 transcript pages. (R. 2438-2439, 2449-2457, 
2471-2472, 2484; R. 2496-2565, 2591-2624, 2634-2643). 
To illustrate AMC/Jeep's contention of blockage of cross-
examination as it speficially relates to Mr. Shaw's testimony, AMC/Jeep 
refers the Court to the testimony between 672 and 679 (R. 2450-2457). 
The fact is, on 672 (R. 2449), Mr. Jensen commenced a voir dire ex-
amination authorized by the court and which ended voluntarily on page 
679 (R. 2457). The court was lenient and tolerant of the questions 
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asked. Plaintiff's only objection to the extensive voir dire examin-
ation now complained of by the appellants is registered on R. 2454. 
that objection was overruled. 
Unfortunately for AMC/Jeep the responses developed by this 
voir dire examination clearly developed that the CJ-5 and the CJ-6 
(Commando) were identical. How that constitutes a "block" is 
beyond comprehension. 
Taking up the appellants' next example of blocking cross-
examination, they cite to R. 4909 which refers to a preliminary 
hearing before trial wherein the admissibility of Noettl's film was 
discussed. The reference is properly under the appellants' Point 
I, but since it has been raised under Point II, suffice it to say 
that the colloquy is primarily regarding the appellants' objection 
to the admissibility of the Noettl film and to a great extent is 
between Mr. Hanni, counsel for Anderson, and Mr. Jensen. The court 
allowed extensive argument after which the court, having fairly 
considered the admissibility of the film, stated, "Well, I'll let 
you get at it any way you want to by cross-examination or whatever, 
but I'm going to admit it. I'll overrule your objection with 
respect to those films." How counsel can describe this as "blocking" 
meaningful cross-examination is likewise a mystery. 
Reference to page 894 of the transcript shows no objection 
whatever (R. 2674). Likewise, page 896 (R. 2676). Likewise page 
897 (R. 2677); pages 10, 1040 (R. 2818, 2819) is recross-examination 
by Mr. Jensen. The record as cited by the appellants shows total 
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latitude on the part of the court. 
The court allowed cross-examination to the edge of contempt. 
As hereinafter discussedf the court granted the respondent's pretrial 
motion ordering the litigants not to mention seat belts or restraints 
until certain foundation evidence was proffered to the court. The 
appellants now contend that the enforcement of that ruling was a 
"block" to cross-examination. On page 1040 (R. 2819), counsel for 
appellants purposely and in direct contravention of the order of 
the court granting the plaintiff's Motion in Limine, stated: 
MR. JENSEN: You mentioned restraints. What 
are you talking about?" 
MR. HOWARD: Now your Honor, I object to 
that. 
THE COURT SUSTAINED. 
MR. JENSEN: We'll make a proffer, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Counsel for appellants then recognizing the violation and catching 
the sensitivity of the court, proceeded no further along that line. 
He was given the opportunity to make a proffer, which he did not 
make. The examination violated the preliminary ruling of the court 
and any examination along this line before that jury would have 
been prejudicial error. All of the parties knew it and counsel for 
the appellants had to recognize that he was on dangerous ground. 
How does that constitute "blocking" the appellants from cross-
examining in a "meaningful way"? Does "meaningful way" mean to 
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violate the rulings of the court or to infuse reversible error into 
the record? 
The substance of the "explicit point" complained of by the 
appellants on page 37 cf their brief has shown that they all fit in 
the same category of testimony elicited by the appellants them-
selves or from objections sustained by the court because of vio-
lation of the court's rulings, but under no circumstance was an 
objection sustained that the appellants did not have adequate 
opportunity to address, given an opportunity to present contrary 
evidence or make a proffer of proof. A good many of the objections 
complained of occurred on appellants1 "voir dire" examination. 
None of the citations made by the appellants show any abuse of the 
appellants by the trial court, but to the contrary, demonstrate 
patience and tolerance with appellants' counsel by the trial court 
beyond that which the appellants deserved and which might have been 
reasonable. If there is any fault to be levied against the trial 
court it was its continued patience with appellants' counsel under 
circumstances that bordered on contempt. This cannot constitute a 
deprivation of a right to cross-examine. 
Counsel again refers to the record at 3043 as being indicative 
of the court's blocking meaningful cross-examination. Again we 
are back to the same area of the record referred to in appellants' 
Point I. Mr. Jensen is cross-examining the witness. It is he who 
wants to have the witness go into other vehicles, not the plain-
tiff. In his cross-examination he is asking questions such as "Is 
it difficult to roll over utility vehicles?" (R. 3043) Over ob-
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jections, the witness is allowed to state: 
Q. Mr. Noettl, you indicated that it was 
difficult to roll over a passenger vehicle? 
A. Yes, under the conditions I think I tried 
to describe, a flat surface, steering input, 
only, yes, 
Q. What experience have you had in trying to 
roll over a passenger vehicle? 
MR. JOHNSON: Object on the basis of rele-
vancy. 
THE COURT: I don't want to get into testing 
all other kinds of vehicles, because we've 
got enough problems with the one. So, I'm 
going to sustain the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to roll 
over utility vehicles? 
MR. JOHNSON: Object, without the same con-
ditions. If he wants to make a point as it 
relates to similar vehicles under the circum-
stances -
THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to require that 
you define the question -
MR. JENSEN: I don't know how I get through 
the credibility, Your Honor, of a man who 
says something about one vehicle and we can't 
look at anything he's done or knows about 
other vehicles. We'll submit it. 
• 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to permit it, and 
subject to a motion to strike if it doesn't 
go to credibility. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to turn 
over, roll over, utility vehicles? 
A. Well, in my opinion the difficulty would 
be increased, would be more than the CJ 
vehicles. Probably somewhat less than a 
passenger car, though. It would be somewhat 
less difficult than a passenger car. 
Q, In the same range? 
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A. As what? 
Q. As the CJ, same range of difficulty? 
A. I don't know if I understand your 
question. Maybe -
MR. JOHNSON: I might be totally oblivious to 
it, but if this goes to credibility, I cannot 
see it. 
THE COURT: All right. You'll have your 
opportunity for a motion to strike, but you 
may proceed. 
MR. JENSEN: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) You say it's more diffi-
cult to roll over some other utility vehicle 
comparing a CJ to another utility vehicle in 
its class? 
A. That would be my opinion, yes. 
Counsel goes on and continues to examine the witness through 
page 3052. The court overruled every objection made by the plaintiff 
but one, and that was to the question of an occupant protection 
standard that was not in effect at the time of the accident and to 
which Mr. Jensen was attempting to cross-examine. Except for that, 
the cross-examination was entirely in favor of the appellants and 
to the greatest part over the objection of the plaintiff. To now 
accuse the court of blocking the appellants' meaningful cross-
examination is incredible. 
In the interest of brevity, because the factual contentions 
have been addressed, be it said that arguments of the appellants in 
regard to this point are simply that. The appellants have failed 
to show by one reference to the record that there was any failure 
of the court to give fair treatment to the appellants. Rulings of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this court in this regard on evidentiary matters are adequately 
cited under Part A above; however', rulings of appellate courts in 
this area are legend to the effect that the trial court has broad 
discretion: 
The Supreme Court accepts the version of 
facts of a party in whose favor a jury 
verdict was rendered and reviews evidence and 
all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom 
in light most favorable to him. 
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344 (1965), 400 P.2d 570. 
The trial court has broad discretion in 
rulings admitting or rejecting evidence in 
the course of a long and difficult trial and 
those orders will not be disturbed unless 
clear abuse of discretion appears and pre-
judice results therefrom. 
Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halel Construction Co., 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. 
1977). 
Addressing the Todorovich case referred to on page 40 of the 
appellants' brief (Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 
(Wyo. 1978)) the respondent respectfully suggests that the case 
is not in point. Certainly one could not quarrel with the conclusion 
reached by the Wyoming Supreme Court, however, there is nothing 
in that case which is similar. The respondent respectfully suggests 
that in Todorovich, there was no violation of a previous ruling of 
the court by Chrysler's counsel. The Supreme Court of Wyoming simply 
said that the issue had been raised by the plaintiff and to which 
the respondent Chrysler had a right to cross-examine. Furthermore, 
the issue was a defectively designed seat which went directly to 
the question of causation, vis-a-vis the seat belt question which 
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the court in this case had determined not to be related to proximate 
cause or to mitigation of damages. See respondent's argument Point 
IV infra. 
In the cross-examination of Mr. Noettl by Mr. Jensen that we 
have already referred to and which is again referred to in 
appellants1 brief as R. 3043f Mr. Jensen is allowed to re-cross 
the witness, which he did for twelve pages of transcript and 
which he augmented by a re-re-re-cross-examination. He was 
allowed to ask every question related to his theory of the case 
except he was prevented from cross-examination of Mr. Noettl in 
regard to Federal Safety Standard 298. The reason that he was 
denied permission to go into Standard 208 is that it was outside 
of the scope of direct examination. The plaintiff had not referred 
to it in any of the questions asked of Mr. Noettl or of any other 
witness. Further, it was in contravention of the Pretrial Order 
pertaining to internal retention devices, e.g. safety belts. By 
a left-handed technique, counsel fcr the appellants was attempting 
to interject the failure of Mr. Whitehead to use a safety belt, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had been repeatedly warned by 
the court to stay away from that issue, in light of the court's 
ruling on the Motion in Limine. Knowing that Standard 208 related 
to restraint systems and seat belts and knowing further that the 
trial court did not understand that fact, the colloquy which appel-
lants claim as a blockage of meaningful cross-examination is as 
follows: 
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Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Well, you told Mr. Hanni 
that you thought there were practically no 
safety standards applicable, that may be 
overstating it, that there were relatively 
few federal standards that applied to utility 
vehicles and a lot or more that applied to 
passenger vehicles. Now, is there something 
besides brakes and roofs? 
A. Yes. A Standard 208, which covers 
occupant protection, doesn't apply to the 
utility vehicles, door retention standards. 
Q. 1972? 
A. It does not, yes, apply. 
Q. What are you talking about? 
A. Well, I am trying to tell you what 
standards that I can speak of from memory 
would not apply to the vehicle that we are 
talking about. 
Q. But I don't understand this last standard 
you are talking about. What was that per-
taining to? 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I object on the 
basis of relevancy. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: The standard I was talking 
about was the 208 Occupant Protection 
Standard, probably wasn't in effect in the 
form it is today, and it doesn't apply, to my 
knowledge, to utility vehicles, is all I am 
saying. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) The 208, what does that 
refer to? 
MR. JOHNSON: Objection. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: May we approach the bench? 
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THE COURT: All right. Just a minute. Hold 
your answer. And counsel/ approach the 
bench/ please. 
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 
held between counsel and the Court at the 
bench.) 
THE COURT: The objection to the last 
question is sustained, you may proceed. 
The court was informed at the bench conference that Standard 
208 related to seat belts and was obviously pursuaded that the 
intent of appellants' counsel in this regard was in direct contra-
vention of the previous ruling of the court and in contravention of 
the court's admonition to the lawyers in advance of the hearing, 
"Therefore there will no no more evidence in this case with regard 
to seat belts. I want everybody to leave it alone and we'll go 
from there." (R. 3807-3808) Notwithstanding this very clear 
admonition, appellants attempted to open the door to that very 
subject from which he was prohibited. 
In summary, the appellants' contention under this point is without| 
merit and the references made to the record are in substance specious 
The inference against the trial court is unprofessional and inaccur-
ate. Every citation made by the appellants supports the proposition 
that the trial court bent over backwards to give appellants' counsel 
every opportunity to expound his theory of the case, even to the ex- , ^  
tent of allowing him to extend the boundaries established as the 
law of the case. 
'3L 
v 
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C. Appellants' Contention That The Trial Court Erred In 
Excluding Certain Of AMC/Jeep's Evidence. 
The respondent takes some small umbrage against the bald 
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assertions made by appellants to the effect that the trial court 
was incompetent or corrupt, e.g. the following language from 
appellants' brief: 
The first two points in this brief illustrate 
the unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by 
the trial court in permitting them to intro-
duce irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evi-
dence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination with respect to that evidence. 
Compounding those errors and removing any 
vestage of fundamental fairness from the 
proceedings, however, the trial court then 
systematically barred the introduction by 
AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its demon-
strative evidence offered to rebut the un-
founded implications raised by plaintiffs' 
experts. Appellants' Brief p. 42. 
That paragraph is an unwarranted attack on the integrity of 
the trial court. 
Suffice it to say that Parts A and B have been adequately 
addressed and frailties of the respondent's arguments revealed. In 
Point III appellants take issue of the court's refusal to allow the 
Heitzman film. In doing so the appellants again fail to point out 
the court's pre-trial rulings relating to plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine. Those combination motions comprised some thirty pages and 
in effect pointed out the interrogatories propounded to the defen-
dants and the specious and evasive answers made by the defendants. 
Those motions also pointed out that three Motions to Compel had 
been made prior to the Motion in Limine and notwithstanding the 
fact that the court had ordered the defendants to answer all of the 
questions therein specified in the motion, defendants had failed 
and refused to do so. (See R. 1063 through 1093.) To the question 
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of the admissibility of films, most of which was covered by 
Heitzman's testimony, Judge Sorensen had previously specifically 
barred the admissibility of such testimony by reason of the failure 
of the appellants to respond to the interrogatories. These matters 
are addressed clearly in Point I above and have been set forth as 
the basis for the court's rulings. 
Were not Heitzman's film objectionable for other reasons, it 
was properly barred by the court for the reasons specified in Point 
I above, to-wit: that the plaintiff was never advised that Heitzman 
as the defendants' expert, nor of the tests that he had made for 
Jeep which it deemed apropos to the instant case. 
The colloquy concerning the offering of that film commences on 
Record page 3336 wherein Mr. Mandelbaum, co-counsel for the 
appellants AMC/Jeep, has called Mr. Heitzman and proposes to in-
troduce the film with that witness. The court excused the jury and 
the interchange between court and counsel takes place over some 
twenty pages of transcript. (R. 3339 through 3358) The substance 
of the objection made by the respondent and cross-claimants was 
that the film was not relevant to the questions involved in this 
case. It was not designed to demonstrate the handling characteristics 
of the 1972 Commando. In substance, it was a test made by Mr. 
Heitzman, presumably at the instance of Jeep, concerning the 
handling characteristics and qualities of numerous other vehicles 
whose handling characteristics AMC/Jeep contended was worse than 
the Commando. Presumably Mr. Heitzman was going to say that other 
vehicles were worse and he had some movie portrayals of vehicles 
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manufactured by other companies that failed to perform adequately 
to certain tests to which they were subjected by Mr. Heitzman. The 
film was totally objectionable for that reason alone, since the 
question of manufacturing or design defects in other vehicles was 
not at issue. Even if one conceded, arguendo, that all of the 
vehicles portrayed in Mr. Heitzman's film were defective, that 
would not relieve AMC/Jeep from liability to the plaintiff in this 
case. The question before the jury and the court was whether the 
Jeep Commando which was the subject of this litigation was de-
fective and whether such defect rendered it unreasonably dangerous. 
In the October, 1983 hearing before Judge Sorensen regarding 
the plaintiff's Motion to Compel, the following exchange took place 
involving questions propounded about tests of the vehicle conducted 
by AMC/Jeep: 
MR. JENSEN: I think that is what they try 
to say, "due to the fact that records relating 
to this subject would be quite old it is 
possible that some records relating to this 
subject had been destroyed." 
THE COURT: That is an equivocal answer. 
MR. JENSEN: Let's try again, let's try 
again, I agree. 
THE COURT: Don't equivocate. It's either 
a yes or no. 
MR. HOWARD: Is the court ordering him to 
answer the question? 
THE COURT: You have either got to answer them 
or you haven't got them. You should be able 
to take care of 17 in thirty days. 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, I will give you thirty days 
to respond to Interrogatory 17. Are we making 
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AMC/Jeep never answered Questions 17 or 18. In the pre-trial 
motion to Judge Bullock (R. 1084) plaintiffs moved the court that 
defendants be precluded from introducing any evidence regarding 
testing on the Jeep Commando and further be restricted from in-
troducing any testimony or evidence with respect to the handling 
qualities and characteristics of the Jeep and the applicable safety 
standards and criteria used by Jeep in the design of the Commando. 
When the matter of the test came up Mr. Mandelbaum said they 
didn't answer the questions concerning the tests conducted by Mr. 
Heitzman because they were not made at the instance of AMC/Jeep but 
rather at the request of the law firm of Joslin and Treat, who had 
the work done at the request of the general counsel of American 
Motors Corporation. (R. 3341) After that evasive reply and after 
additional colloquy the court said: 
What was the reason for not letting them know 
that you had it prior to this time and furnish 
them a copy or permitting them to see it? 
Mr. Mandelbaum: There hasn't been any discovery 
that we haven't seen any of the things their 
experts have, (sic) We haven't shown them 
anything our experts have. It wasn't requested 
until.interrogatories, your Honor. 
It appears that because AMC/Jeep did not submit even one 
interrogatory to the plaintiff and, therefore, did not get 
corresponding answers that fact is somehow an excuse for not 
answering the interrogatories of the plaintiff and complying 
with the court's order. That type of reasoning is irrational. 
The plaintiff pointed out that while the plaintiff had sub-
mitted to the defendants AMC/Jeep three sets of interrogatories, 
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two had been evasively answered, which had been the subject of 
three Motions to Compel, and one whole set of interrogatories were, 
at the time of trial, still unanswered. (R. 3343) At the time 
that Judge Sorensen ruled on this subject in October of 1983 and at 
a time when everyone knew the gravity of the questions being asked 
of AMC/Jeep, there could be no question regarding the importance of 
these tests and the results that were obtained. At the time of the 
original argument which was set forth in the plaintiffs' Motion in 
Limine, it was reiterated. (R. 1081 through 1084, R. 3344) Earlier, 
in October, 1983, counsel for the plaintiffs asked Judge Sorensen 
concerning the questions which he had ordered them to answer, 
including this one, "Judge, what happens if they don't provide it?" 
(The answers to the question.) Judge Sorensen said, "I'll sustain 
the objection to the introduction of it." (R. 3341) The matter 
was further complicated because Interrogatory 18 went to the same 
issue. Interrogatory 18 said, "State whether Jeep Corporation or 
Kaiser Jeep Corporation ever tested or evaluated the directional 
stability or handling chacteristics of the Jeep Conmandc automobile 
for the model year 66 to 73 under impact conditions•" The response 
of Jeep was, "Defendant is uncertain as to what type of testing 
plaintiff is requesting." In arguing that point to Judge Sorensen, 
the court said, "That is a weasling answer, Mr. Jensen." However, 
the plaintiffs never got a better answer from AMC/Jeep despite the 
court's ruling that better answers be provided. In light of the 
extensive argument made, both to Judge Sorensen at che time of the 
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various Motions To Compel Answers and the Motion in Limine made 
prior to the commencement of trial and in light of the more than 
twenty page argument made to the court at the time the Heitzman 
film was marked, the court was certainly within its right to make 
the ruling it did in regard to the admissibility of the said film. 
The court stated: 
The Court: (R. 3353) I'm ready to rule and 
I think in the context of all the circum-
stances and with respect to discovery pro-
. cedures which have heretofore been taken in 
this case, I think the plaintiffs were en-
titled to have or to see the films and test 
results before the trial pursuant to the 
discovery interrogatories and in accordance 
with the rules of civil procedure and con-
sistent with the prior rulings of this court 
and another division of this court, the films 
are not admissible. 
Mr. Mandelbaum: Your Honor, does that apply 
to both films? 
The Court: That applies to the one with the 
CJ-5. Now the other one rests on a different 
principle, I think, and the question that I 
have there is, the relevancy of it. 
(R. 3353). 
In the second film the question of relevancy concerned the 
numerous portrayals of vehicles other than AMC/Jeep vehicles. The 
court found that film to be irrelevant and certainly immaterial. 
The court's ruling provoked additional argument by appellants' 
counsel, to which the court generously and patiently listened. 
Reading of the transcript shows Job-like patience on the part of 
the court under strident protestations of the appellants' counsel. 
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At the conclusion of additional argumentf which comprises almost 
six pages of transcript, the court said, "Well, I think that my 
ruling applies to both films. Okay, we'll call the jury back and 
get on with the trial." (R. 3358) 
The films offered by Heitzman were simply inadmissible because 
of appellants' violation of the orders of the court. In addition, 
the court determined that the films were not relevant. The persuasive 
effect of the film cannot be demonstrated or argued without its 
admission in evidence. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered on 
appeal before the Supreme Court. 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983); In re Estate of Kropf, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); Corbett v. 
Corbett, 24 Utah 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 
The appellants are simply hoisted with their own petard, and 
rightfully so. They should not now be heard to complain about what 
they deem the trial court's "systematically" barring the intro-
duction of the appellants' demonstrative evidence. The mischief of 
the appellants' argument is that it fails to cite those portions of 
the record giving rise to the court's ruling. You would think from 
reading the appellants' brief that the court willy-nilly ruled that 
the plaintiffs' evidence was admissible and AMC/Jeepfs evidence was 
not. No contention could be further from the truth. 
The second film which AMC/Jeep contends was erroneously re-
jected was that made by Dr. Charles Warner during the trial. 
Warner's film was rejected for the same reasons applicable -o the 
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Heitzman filn. The film was first presented on October 31, 1983, 
some thirteen days after the commencement of the trial. After 
viewing the film, in camera, the plaintiffs registered the 
following objections: 
1. The film was within the purview of interrogatories 17 and 
13 and had never been specified to the plaintiffs. Discovery had 
been cut off by rulings of the court. The appellants AMC/Jeep were 
to have furnished all of said material within thirty days of Judge 
Sorensen's ruling in October of 1983 and certainly no later than 
ninety days prior to trial. 
2. The film was not illustrative of any of the issues in the 
case, for it simply portrayed Dr. Warner driving the vehicle in and 
out of a shed, taking it to the scene of the accident with a movie 
camera fixed in place somewhere near the middle of the driver's 
seat, ptesumably to reflect the scene that would have been visualize 
by the driver. One aspect shows the vehicle on a parking lot 
maneuvering and coming to a stop. On the fourth test he has outrigc 
on, but there is no showing that the maneuvers in the parking lot 
with the outriggers on were in any way illustrative of what had 
taken place on the highway on the day of the accident. There was 
no testimony concerning it. Dr. Warner did not know at what speeds 
the turns were made and one could not tell by looking at the film. 
(R. 3762) The substance of the objection is reiterated again but 
the colloquy between court and counsel regarding the Warner film is 
indicative of the problem confronting the court related to the 
offer of two films through Warner. (R. 3763) The films were 
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Exhibits 174 and 175: 
THE COURT: And when were these films made, 
the 174? 
MR. JENSEN: 174 has been made within the last 
two days. 
MR. JOHNSON: Saturday? 
MR. HOWARD: Saturday. 
MR. HANNI: October 29, 1983. 
The film (Exhibit 174) made by the appellants with a 1972 
Jeep Commando Exemplar was made on the Saturday thirteen days 
after trial commenced and two days before Warner was offered as a 
witness. After seeing the film, the court ruled that it did not 
have probative value and further said: "I believe the test was not 
timely made and is precluded under the rules that we have hereto-
fore established," (R« 3774) 
The other film (Exhibit 175) was made in 1969, but was of a 
Ford vehicle showing people being thrown about as it was rolled 
off of a ramp. (R. 3765 through 3775) The court viewed the film, 
listened with patient understanding to the arguments of counsel and 
ruled that Exhibit-175 was not relevant, had no probative value and 
was, therefore, inadmissible. (R. 3774) 
It is not sufficient for the appellants to say the court 
allowed the plaintiff's films but did not allow the appellants1 
films. There was a vast difference between the foundations laid by 
the plaintiff for the admissibility of his film and that offered by 
the appellants. It is hardly in good taste to levy the blame for 
the appellants' failure of proof by taking one of the comments of 
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the court out of context and labeling it as "simply inexplicable in 
light of the fact that plaintiff had previously been allowed to 
introduce a film of their own Exemplar Commando." Reading of 
Record 3761 through 3775 demonstrates that the court's ruling was 
nothing but explicable. 
The Supreme Court will not assume from appellants' argument 
that the trial court has abused its discretion in its rulings on 
admitting or rejecting evidence. See Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halec Con-
struction Co., supra; Wilson v. Volkswagen of America; Inc., 561 
F.2d 506; Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
Appellants cite Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487 
F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973) cert denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974), for the 
proposition that if the plaintiff offers evidence on a point, the 
defendant has the right to rebut the testimony. Contrary to the 
commentary of appellant, the court in Walker, supra, acknowledged 
that "state of the art" has no relevance to the defense of an action 
founded on strict liability. Walker, supra, at 600. Further Walker 
did not involve a failure of a party to comply with discovery orders 
and did not involve tests conducted during trial. 
Concluding, one cannot answer the assertions of the appellants 
regarding what it deems to be the unfairness of the trial court, 
except to say that arguments should be made on the basis of the 
record not by characterizations impugning the motives of the trial 
judge. The plaintiff respectfully represents that the record 
totally and fully supports the conclusions reached by the trial 
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court on evidentiary matters, including those argued under this 
point of the appellants' brief• 
POINT III 
ARGUMENTS MADE BY COUNSEL OPPOSED TO AMC/JEEP 
DID SOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
AMC/Jeep contends that statements by counsel at closing argu-
ment constitute reversible error. The plaintiff does not quarrel 
with the fact that counsel should, at all timesf conduct themselves 
consistent with standards of professional conduct, however, one has 
to take the argument of counsel for the defendants in light of all 
of the facts that were presented to the court and to the jury. 
Giving regard to the information available to opposing counsel 
before this trial commenced, none of them had any knowledge of 
tests or evidentiary data developed by Jeep that would in any way 
explain Jeep's theory of defense• Because the evidence proffered 
by Jeep during the course of the trial regarding tests and the 
results of tests was inadmissible, primarily because of the nefar-
ious strategy and tactics of AMC/Jeep regarding their own antici-
pated evidence, appellants' counsel had a right to address the jury on 
the basis of the state of the record, not on the basis of what 
AMC/Jeep thought the record ought to be or on the basis of what the 
record might have been had AMC/Jeep complied with the rules. This 
Court has said that matters not admitted in evidence before the trier 
of fact will not be considered on appeal before this Court. Pilcher 
v. State Dept. of Social Security, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). 
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Appellants label Mr. Hannifs argument as misconduct. The answers 
of the appellants to the interrogatories submitted by the plain-
tiff are absolutely consistent with Mr. Hanni's arcument and he had 
a total right to make that argument. It was not his duty to point 
out the inconsistency between the appellants' responses to the in-
terrogatories and their later claims of tests made during the course 
of trial or closely thereto. 
The mischief of AMC/Jeep's argument is its attempt by its 
own methods, i.e. its failure to comply with discovery orders, to 
control the scope of the plaintiff's argument. By making proffers 
of inadmissible evidence, AMC/Jeep deems itself authorized to 
control the plaintiff's argument related to the weight of the 
evidence. In fact, it is clearly appropriate for counsel to 
argue the weight of the evidence based upon the state of the re-
cord. The best evidence offered by AMC/Jeep is found in that 
introduced by them at trial and in the assertions set forth in their 
answers to interrogatories that no such evidence was available. 
Counsel was not compelled to rely upon appellant's assertions that 
it possessed persuasive evidence; instead, counsel argued and the 
jury reached its verdict relying upon the evidence presented at 
trial. It was entirely appropriate for counsel to present argument 
related to the weight of the evidence. 
The most that AMC/Jeep can say about Mr. Hanni's argument is 
that it was vigorous. Even so, the court's instruction to the 
jury that arguments are not evidence and that they should rely 
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upon the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence received 
rather than upon the arguments of counsel, does all that is 
necessary to put the argument of Mr. Hanni into proper context. 
That admonition of the court is further amplified by Instruc-
tion Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 15. In addition, the court/ at the outset 
of the trial before the opening statements, advised the jury that 
statements of counsel were not evidence in the case and not to be 
considered as such. At the beginning of the plaintiff's opening 
statement, counsel for the plaintiff stated (R. 1768): 
As the court instructed you yesterday, the 
statements of counsel are not evidence in the 
case and they are not to be deemed by you as 
such. The lawyers are allowed tc make an 
opening statement to aid and assist the jury 
in understanding the case. 
That statement, augmented by the instructions themselves, clearly 
told the jury that the statements of counsel were nothing more than 
argument. 
Furthermore, AMC/Jeep is precluded from now claiming reversible 
error as a result of counsel's closing argument by way of its failure 
to timely object to the alleged prejudicial statements. It is 
fundamental that a party who objects to arcument must allow the court 
an opportunity to cure the defect before the jury deliberates. 
The court in Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank and Equipment Co., 9 3 
N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (N.M. App. 1979), held that alleged error, 
with respect to plaintiff's attorney's remark during closing argu-
ment, was not preserved for review where defendant die not object 
to such remark or request the judge to caution the jury. 
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Defendant did not object to the above portion 
of oral argument nor was the judge requested 
to cauticn the jury. . . • The objection 
to alleged improper argument must be speci-
fied and made known to the court so that 
the court may intelligently rule thereon. 
When that is not done, the proposition is 
not properly reviewable on appeal. In any 
event, the trial court has wide discretion 
in controlling argument of lawyers in addres-
sing the jury and absent a clear abuse of 
discretion, it is not for us to interfere. 
Grammer, 604 P.2d at 831; Unified School District No. 490 v. 
Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 629 P.2d 196 (Kan. App. 1981); 
Ingrum v. Tuscon Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ariz. 523, 642 P.2d 868 (Ariz. 
App. 1981); Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 502 P.2d 362 (Wyo. 1972). 
In Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 
(1976), the court held that the defendant had failed to preserve 
his claim of error in regard to statements made by plaintiff's 
counsel during closing argument where, although defendant objected 
to such statements, the defendant failed to request a corrective 
instruction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has so held. In Hill v. Cloward, 14 
Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the court held that a party must 
promptly object and move for a mistrial or ask for cautionary in-
structions where something occurs which that party deems prejudicial 
The court further held that where the complaining party fails to 
so object, he waives whatever rights may have existed to do so. 
[CJounsel let the incident pass without 
objection and without a request to rectify 
any harm he thought had been done. Fair 
play and good conscience required that he do 
so at the earliest opportunity. It would 
be manifestly unjust to permit a party to sit 
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silently by, believing that prejudicial 
error had been committed, proceed with the 
trial to its completion, and allow the jury 
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see 
if he wins, then if he loses, come forward 
with a claim that such an error rendered 
the verdict a nullity. . • . The court 
will not countenance any such mockery of its 
proceedings* If something occurs which the 
party thinks is wrong and so prejudicial 
to him that he thereafter cannot have a fair 
trial, he must make his objection promptly 
and seek redress by moving for a mistrial, 
or by having cautionary instructions given, 
if that is deemed adequate, of be held to 
waive whatever rights may have existed to 
do so* 
Counsel for AMC/Jeep failed to timely object to any statements 
made during closing arguments; therefore, AMC/Jeep is now precluded 
from raising such an objection* Notwithstanding, closing argument 
of counsel was entirely appropriate in that counsel based its closing 
argument entirely upon the stated record. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE RELATED 
TO SEAT BELTS WAS PROPER AND WELL WITHIN THE 
COURT'S DISCRETION. 
The State of Utah has taken neither a legislative nor judi-
cial stand on the issue of the use of seat belts. There exists no 
controlling or even helpful case law within this jurisdiction re-
garding the issue of admissibility of evidence related to the use 
of seat belts; therefore, trial courts in Utah are compelled to 
consider .rulings issued by other courts in various jurisdictions. 
The law on the admissibility of seat belt evidence has been 
in a state of flux. The policy implications of the various rules 
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have been roundly debated, with a resulting patchwork-quilt of 
state law on the issue. In some states such evidence is wholly 
inadmissibile, on the theory that automobile manufacturers must 
design a vehicle that is safe for those who, foreseeably, will 
not wear seat belts. In other states, the seat belt defense is 
admissible under either a contributory negligence or mitigation 
of damages rationale* 
A. The Trial Court Ruled That Before Failure To Use A Seat 
Belt Could Be Used As A Defense, It Would Have To Be 
Shown That Plaintiff Knew Of The Availability Of Seat 
Belts And Made A Conscious Decision Not To Use One. 
In the instant case, counsel for plaintiff submitted a Motion 
in Limine regarding the admissibility of seat belt evidence. (R. 
1274-1294)• Defendant AMC/Jeep submitted memoranda in opposition 
to plaintiff's Motion in Limine. (R. 1425-1464). On October 18, 
1983, at the beginning of trial, the trial court ruled on plain-
tiff's Motion in Limine, granting the Motion in part: no refer-
ence to seat belts was to be made on behalf of any party during the 
opening statements. The judge further ruled, however, that if 
after the plaintiff's case any party wanted to introduce the sub-
ject of seat belts, they could made a proffer of proof at that 
time out of the presence of the jury. Judge Bullock advised all 
counsel that when such a proffer was made, he would rule as to 
the relevancy. (R. 4959). 
On October 24, 1983, counsel for plaintiff made a proffer to 
the court that expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiff would 
testify that even had the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead been utiliz-
ing seat belts, such use would not have prevented the injuries 
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sustained and probably would have aggravated the injury. (R. 4893). 
Judge Bullock gave defendant AMC/Jeep the opportunity at that time 
to make its proffer of proof regarding seat belt evidence. Defendant 
AMC/Jeep declined to make such a proffer at that time. (R. 4894). 
On October 31, 1983f AMC/Jeep made proffer that if its witness 
were so asked, he would respond that, "Had he been using the seat 
belt in all probability he would not have received the spinal injury 
that he did receive." (R. 3806). Counsel for plaintiff Whitehead 
notified the Court of the total failure to show that plaintiff 
Whitehead, a passenger in a borrowed vehicle, even had notice of 
the existence of seat belts in that vehicle, a 1971 Commando. 
The trial court, based upon the voluminous memoranda submitted 
by counsel and multiple opportunities for oral argument, ruled 
as follows: 
I've read the memoranda and some of the 
cases with regard to seat belts, and my 
conclusions are that there must be some 
showing that Mr. Whitehead knew of the 
seat belts and made a conscious decision 
not to use them. 
Second, there must be a duty to use the 
seat belts, either statutorily or circum-
stantial; that is, as far as circumstances 
are concerned, an awareness that under the 
circumstances danger is likely to occur in 
the vehicle which could be minimized by 
the use of seat belts, some special cir-
cumstances. 
And three, under the facts as I see them 
in this courtroom from the testimony of 
the witnesses, it — the question as to 
whether or not the injury would have occurred 
in this rollover, precisely the way that — 
well, as the witnesses, some of them testi-
fied that it did, or that the use of seat 
belts would have made any substantial 
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difference, is a matter too speculative 
for this jury to determine or to consider. 
It's a highly speculative thing, especially 
in view of the buffetting about, the ques-
tion as to when the injury occurred, and the 
fact that there isn't any question but that 
the accident occurred and the injury to the 
vehicle occurred. 
And to speculate what the seat belt might 
have done in this type of a situation is 
just something that the jury ought not to, 
and they will not have under my ruling, 
the obligation to consider. 
Therefore, there will be no more evidence 
in this case with regard to seat belts. I 
want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll 
go from there. 
(R. 3807-3808). 
The seat belts in the Commando vehicle were under the seat and 
as proffered by plaintiff's counsel, the plaintiff had no knowledge 
that the vehicle was equipped with seat belts and accordingly, 
could not have made a conscious decision not to use the restraints. 
It must be remembered that the vehicle was a 1972 model and it may 
well be expected by a reasonable person, that a vehicle of that age 
would not have seat belts. The court invited the defendants to 
proffer contrary evidence; however, at no time was evidence proffered 
by the defendants that the seat belts were visible or reasonably 
accessible to the occupants therein. 
As set forth hereinafter, the trial court's exercise of 
discretion to exclude seat belt evidence was based upon similar 
rulings within similar factual situations throughout a multitude 
of jurisdictions. 
-56-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. There Must Be Imposed Upon A Plaintiff A Duty Before 
Negligence Can Be Found And There Exists No Statutory 
Nor Common Law Duty To Utilize A Seat Belt* 
AMC/Jeep contends that plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt 
was a breach of duty to use the degree of care a reasonable person 
would have observed for his own safety. In support, appellants 
cite a Utah case decided under a totally dissimilar factual setting, 
a railroad crossing incident unrelated to the seat belt issue. 
Courts in most jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff has 
no duty whatsoever to utilize seat belts. The overwhelming 
majority of states have determined that it is an automobile's 
occupant who has the prerogative whether or not to utilize a seat 
belt. 
We do not adopt, at this time . . . that 
an occupant of an automobile either knows or 
should know of the additional safety factor 
produced by the use of seat belts. 
• * * 
. . . [T]he issue of the social utility of 
the use of seat belts is definitely not clarified 
in the mind of the public and the courts. Doubts 
remain as to whether seat belts cause injury, 
and the real usefulness of the seat belt in 
preventing injuries has not become public 
knowledge. 
• * * 
The social utility of wearing a seat belt 
must be established in the mind of the 
public before failure to use a seat belt 
can be held to be negligence. Otherwise 
the court would be imposing a standard of 
conduct rather than implying a standard 
accepted by society. [Citations omitted]. 
Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 897 (w. D. Penn. 
1975). 
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In Hampton v. State Highway Commission, 498 P.2d 236 (Kan. 
1972), the court considered the defendant's argument that in fail-
ing to utilize his seat belt, the plaintiff fell below that standard 
required of a reasonable man in protecting his own safety: 
Neither, we believe, was he falling below 
the standard required of the reasonable, 
prudent .nan. We have nothing before us on 
which we could confidently base the finding 
that the accepted community standard of 
care requires one to buckle up routinely; 
experience dictates to the contrary. 
Although Utah has passed legislation related to the design, 
installation and specifications of seat belts in vehicles operated 
within the state, no statute exists which requires occupants to 
utilize seat belts. Many courts have construed statutes as 
Utah's which set standards for belts, without an accompanying 
statute requiring the use of seat belts, as implicitly and inten-
tionally rejecting the passage of a statute requiring the use of 
seat belts. In Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293 (W.D. Penn. 
1975), the court held that a statute which required an automobile 
to be equipped with seat belts imposed no duty to wear such belts. 
Absent a statutory requirement, there is no duty. 
In 3ritton v. Doehring, 242 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1970)f the ccurt 
stated: 
In the absence of a statutory requirement 
admission of evidence of non-use of available 
seat belts can only be justified by resort 
to common law principles under our established 
rules of evidence. That is, by our taking 
notice of studies demonstrating that seat 
belts are effective protective devices in 
our requiring their use. In view of the con-
troversy which still surrounds the effec-
tiveness of seat belts, particularly in 
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those situations in which injuries may even 
be attributable to wearing such seat belts, 
we are unwilling now to accept such studies 
as of decisive probative value. [Emphasis 
in original]. 
In Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 
1980)f the court was faced with issues identical to issues herein. 
There was no statutory requirement that an automobile occupant 
wear a seat belt nor was there any case law on the subject. 
There, the plaintiff contended that the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions were in accord that there is no common law duty to 
wear a seat belt, and absent a statute requiring the wearing of a 
seat belt, negligence could not be predicated upon a failure to 
do so. Defendant therein contended that the use of seat belts to 
mitigate the injury was a proper question. The court then deter-
mined that: 
. The overwhelming majority of the cases, 
be they from contributory negligence states 
or comparative negligence states, refuse 
to penalize a plaintiff for not using seat 
belts and have rejected the defense. 
x
 Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); Barry 
v. Coca Cola, 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273; Birdsong v. ITT 
Continental Banking Co., 160 Ind. App. 411, 312 N.E. 2d 104 (1974); 
Britton v. Doehrinc, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666 (1970); Brown v. 
Case, 31 Conn. Supp. 207, 327 A.2d 267 (1974); Brown v. Kendrick, 
192 So.2c 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Cierpisz v. Singletony 247 Md. 
215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); D. W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 
So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); King Son Wong v. Carnation Co., 509 S.W. 
2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Insur-
ance Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1968); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 
A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 
App. 1976); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); 
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65 (1968); Fischer j/>_ 
Mocre, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Nash v. Kamath, 21 Ariz. 
Ape. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 
52 Mich. App. 619, 217 N.W. 2d 900 (1974); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 
Or. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 
88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (1975); Stallcup v. Taylor, 62 Tenn. 
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The court in Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 
48 (Okia. 1976), expressly rejected the defendant's assertion of 
a common law duty to use seat belts: 
There is no common law or statutory duty 
requiring the use of seat belts* . • . 
Recent technological advances are not usually 
inducted into doctrines of law, until such 
time as they have been sufficiently tried, 
proven and accepted for the purpose they 
were intended* Historically, the seat belt 
phenomenon is in its infancy. It is in a 
state of influx* 
It is clear that there exists no statutory nor common law duty 
within the State of Utah to utilize seat belts when occupying a 
motor vehicle. Where no duty exists, a fortiori, no negligence 
exists, and thus, imposed upon the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead was 
neither a duty nor corresponding negligence. 
C. The Imposition Of A Duty To Use Seat Belts Lies With 
The Legislature. 
Courts refusing to impose a duty upon motorists to utilize 
seat belts have routinely held that the responsibility of creating 
such a duty lies with the legislature. 
The United States District Court in Pennsylvania, in attempt-
ing to apply the law of the forum state, held: 
We believe that the Pennsylvania courts 
would follow the majority position and not 
permit a defend.ant to assert a seat belt 
defense. Until the legislature requires 
drivers and passengers to use safety belts, 
there is really no basis for such a defense. 
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Penn. 1976). In 
Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966), the court 
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It may be that after further research by 
various safety committees/ the law may be 
changed to require the use of seat belts 
and to affix some element of negligence for 
failure to use same. This is not the law 
today and it is not within the province 
of this court to legislate on the subject, 
regardless of what might be the thinking 
of the individual members of the court. 
The Congress of the United States has con-
sidered several bills pertaining to motor 
vehicle and highway safety but in neither 
bill as approved, has there been a mandatory 
use of seat belts. [Emphasis added]. 
The court in Britton v. Doehring, supra, stated the need 
for a fixed standard: 
An occupant of a car involved in normal, 
everyday driving should either be required 
to wear a seat belt or he should not. That 
determination should be left to the dis-
tinguished members of our State Legislature. 
Most recently, in Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 
1511 (6th Cir. 1983), the court stated: 
[T]he seat belt defense is complicated fur-
ther by the peculiarly legislative nature 
of the issue. The penalties to be attached 
to seat belt non-use are uniquely amenable 
to resolution by the state legislature. 
Indeed a number of other state courts have 
left to their legislatures the determination 
of the evidentiary effect of a2plaintiff•s 
failure to wear a seat belt. 
E.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668, 
683 (Mont. 1980) ("In light of the history and the numerous legis-
lative problems that must be considered to effectively extend the 
seat belt rule of law we . . . reach the conclusion that to adopt 
a seat belt defense when the legislature has failed to do so would 
be ill-advised.") See also State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 
(Inc. 1981); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 ?.2d 48, 
62 (Okla. 1976); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d 
458, 460 (1973); Britton v. Doehrinq, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 
2d 666, 675 (1970); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S-.W. 2d 293, 301 (Mo. 
App. 1970); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E. 2d 65, 
73 (1968). 
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Furthemore, the Utah legislature recently enacted a child re-
strain- law. It may be argued that the legislature has considered 
the subject and has limited its legislation to car restraints for 
children. That legislation has set the limit that the legislature 
has been willing to extend the law. It would be an abuse of author-
ity for this Court to impose its will upon the legislature and extend 
the parameters beyond which the legislature has thus far been unwil-
ling to go. 
D. The Duty To Mitigate Damages Cannot Arise Before The 
Plaintiff Is Damaged. 
The appellants are barred from raising mitigation of damages 
as a defense. Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense 
which must be pleaded or it is waived. Rule 8(c) and Pratt v. 
Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Martin v. Porak, 638 
P.2d 853 (Colo. 1981). There is no such plea. 
Jeep Corporation failed to raise mitigation of damages as an 
affirmative defense in its original answer filed on October 31, 
1980. On September 12, 1983, Jeep filed a motion to amend its answer 
to include several new defenses, including mitigation of damages. 
On October 7, 1983, the motion was denied as not timely made. (R. 
1366). AMC did not file an answer for more than three years. (R. 
84-87). On September 17, 1983, (R. 993-995) it filed its answer 
attempting to raise several new defenses. The court did not rule 
on the proposed affirmative defenses. (R. 1366). 
Assuming, arguendo, that such a defense had been properly raised' 
this theory has been relied upon by defendants and routinely 
rejected by courts throughout various jurisdictions. 
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In Derheim v. Fiorito Co., 492 P.2d 1030 (Wash. 1972), the 
trial court ruled, on plaintiff's motion in limine, that during 
trial defendant was prohibited from making any reference to plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt. Those pretrial rulings were 
assigned as errors. Specifically, the defendant asserted that 
plaintiff's failure should have been admitted in mitigation of 
damages or in proof of an avoidable consequence. By way of offer 
of proof, defendant offered testimony that plaintiff's injury 
would not have been sustained if his seat belt had been properly 
fastened. After reviewing the diversity of court holdings, the 
court in Derheim held: 
We believe the cases in those jurisdictions 
rejecting the "seat belt defense" are the 
better reasoned cases. It seems extremely 
unfair to mitigate the damages of one who 
sustains those damages in an accident for 
which he was in no way responsible, parti-
cularly when, as in this jurisdiction, 
there is no statutory duty to wear seat 
belts. 
In Taplin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1198 (Kan. App. 1981), defendant 
sought to introduce seat belt evidence on comparative negligence 
and mitigation of damages theories. The trial court sustained 
plaintiff's motion in limine which had the effect of precluding 
defendant from introducing evidence of plaintiff's failure to use 
the available seat belt. Citing Hampton v. State Highway Commission, 
supra, the court reiterated: 
While as a general rule one must use reason-
able diligence to mitigate one's damages 
once the risk is known [citation omitted] 
one is not required to anticipate negligence 
and guard against damages which might ensue 
if such negligence should occur [citation 
omitted]. 
-63-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In short, there was no duty to use a seat 
belt, either under the common law standard 
of care or to mitigate damages. 
After "[a] review of the civil war on this recent innovation 
in tort law," the ccurt in Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 
544 P.2d 719 (N.M. 1975) held: 
Due care in the use or non-use of a seat 
belt is pre-accident conduct and does not 
fall within the doctrine of "avoidable 
consequences". As a result, evidence of 
non-use of seat belt is irrelevant on the 
minimization of damages. [Citations omitted]. 
Most recently, in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 So. 
2d 1147 (Fla. App. 1983), the court illustrated the practical 
difficulties inherent in the mitigation of damages theory as applied 
to the use of seat belts: 
Mitigation of damages concerns a plaintiff's 
conduct after an accident, not before. 
Were we to admit evidence of non-use of seat 
belts, we may well be obligated to admit 
evidence of other pre-accident conduct deal-
ing with safety issues. For example, 
numerous studies have shown that standard-
size cars are safer than compact or sub-
compact cars. Should a plaintiff be penalized 
for not taking this safety factor into 
consideration when purchasing a car? Fur-
ther, hardtops are safer than convertible 
tops. Is this for jury consideration and 
for a court to instruct on? . . . 
We view such evidence of prior conduct as 
a Pandora's box which we decline to open. 
Furthermore, the prior regulation of conduct 
is a matter for the legislature rather than 
the courts to decide. [EMphasis added]. 
In its efforts to persuade the court that the failure to 
use a seat belt constitutes a failure to mitigate damages, AMC/Jeep 
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1301 (Utah 1981) as holding that the jury should "consider the 
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they 'have united as 
concurrent proximate causes of an injury' in strict liabaility 
cases." (Brief of Appellants, p. 62). Respondent respectfully 
submits that appellants are blatantly incorrect in their applica-
tion of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Mulherin. 
Appellants argue that even in the context of strict liability, 
the relative fault of the plaintiff and the defendant should be 
compared; however, in quoting the language of Mulherin, AMC/Jeep 
fails to point out that such a comparison of fault is strictly 
limited to any misuse of the product by the plaintiff or unreason-
able use of the product with knowledge of the defect and aware-
ness of the danger. Mulherin, supra, at 1302-3. AMC/Jeep 
failed to prove misuse of the vehicle (Stephen Whitehead was a 
mere passenger) or unreasonable use despite knowledge of the ve-
hicle's defects. Misuse of the product and unreasonable use of the 
product with knowledge of its defects are defenses which are wholly 
inapplicable in the context of the use of seat belts. Addressing 
this very issue, the court in Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 
concluded that: 
A seat belt defense is essentially a 
claim of contributory negligence, since 
the defendant is claiming that the injured 
person's failure to use the seat belt was 
unreasonable. Because contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to an action based 
on strict liability in tort, the seat belt 
evidence is irrelevant and should be excluded. 
Respondent submits that even in a comparative negligence con-
text, the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise before the plain-
tiff is damaged: 
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If the allegations of negligence are true, 
appellee did nothing to cause the accident. 
Should he be required to anticipate the 
negligence of the appellants? We think 
not. One's duty to mitigate damages cannot 
arise before he is damaged. The failure to 
minimize must occur after the injury. At 
most the failure of the appellee to use the 
seat belt merely furnished a condition by 
which the injury was possible. It did not 
contribute to or cause the accident. It 
is well established in our court that if 
the negligence merely furnishes a condition 
by which the injury was possible, and a 
subsequent act caused the injury, the exis-
tence of such a condition is not the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. 
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., supra. 
E. A Tort Feasor Must Accept The Plaintiff As He Finds Him. 
Several courts have denied defendants the opportunity to intro 
duce seat belt evidence based upon the rationale that the tort 
feasor must accept the plaintiff as he finds him, whatever the 
degree of vulnerability. So found the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Fischer v. Moore, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (Colo. 1973): 
We conclude, as the court of appeals, that 
the failure of the driver or passenger of 
a motor vehicle to use a seat belt . . . 
may not be pled as a bar to recovery of 
damages in an action against a tort feasor 
whose negligence provides the initiating 
force and is a proximate cause of an injury 
to a driver or passenger. [Citations omitted] 
If we were to hold otherwise, the person 
who was driving a Volkswagen, and not a 
Mack truck, could be said to be more vulner-
able to injury and, therefore, guilty of 
contributing to his own injury as a matter 
of law. Such a result would be contrary 
to the entire "fault" philosophy which is 
found throughout the law of tort. Under 
the common law principles of tort law, it 
is axiomatic that the tort feasor must 
accept the plaintiff as he finds him and 
may not seek to reduce the amount of damages 
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by spotlighting the physical frailties of 
the injured party at the time the tortious 
force was applied to him. [Citations omitted] 
Along similar lines of reasoning, the common 
law dictates that the tort feasor may not 
rely upon the injured party's failure to 
utilize a voluntary protective device to 
escape all or a portion of the damages which 
the plaintiff incurred as a consequence 
of the defendant's negligence. [Citations 
omitted] 
The court in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co.f supra, simply 
However trite it may bef we still hold to 
the basic concept that a tort feasor takes 
his plaintiff as he finds him. 
F. Testimony Related To Seat Belt Use Is Merely Conjectural 
And Speculative. 
The lack of statutory guidance, diversity of opinion found 
within case law, and the variety of conclusions drawn by experts 
with respect to the actual benefits of seat belt use have all worked 
together to compel the denial of admissibility of seat belt evi-
dence on the basis that such evidence would be merely conjectural 
and speculative. 
So, in this state of quandry, the plaintiff 
and defendant could each have argued on the 
merits of the use of seat belts, but each 
argument would necessarily have been con-
jectural and of doubtful propriety. We 
therefore dispose of the appellant's first 
point argued on appeal by holding that the 
trial court was not in error in refusing 
to allow the defendant to offer to the jury 
evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use 
the seat belt as constituting a defense to 
gross negligence on the part of the driver. 
Brown v. Kendrick, supra, at 51. Courts precluding seat belt evi-
dence could easily foresee the "battle of experts" each presenting 
the relative merits and disadvantages of seat belts. 
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A further problem bothers the courts, and 
that is the effect of injecting the seat 
belt issue into the trial of automobile 
personal injury cases. The courts are con-
cerned about unduly lengthening trials and 
if each automobile accident trial is to pro-
vide an arena for a battle of safety experts, 
as well as medical experts, time and expense 
of litigation might well be increased. 
Derhein v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 1035. In addition, the experts 
could not only routinely present general evidence related to seat 
belt use, but would also attempt to speculate on the nature of the 
injuries sustained in each accident. 
[Ajllowing the seat belt defense will lead 
to a veritable battle of experts as to what 
injuries would have or have not been avoided 
had the plaintiff been wearing a belt. At 
best it would cause substantial speculation 
by the trier of facts. 
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977). 
[T]he seat belt defense inevitably raises 
problems of conjecture. Not only must the 
jury determine what actually happened, it 
also must determine what would have happened 
if the seat belt had been used. 
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 139. Furthermore, the circle 
of speculation would be enlarged to encompass the area of apportion-
ment of "damages. 
The seat belt defense would soon become a 
fortuitous windfall to tort-feasors and 
would tend to cause rampant speculation as 
to the reduction (or increase) in the amount 
of recoverable damages attributable to the 
failure to use available seat belts. 
Fischer v. Moore, supra, at 460; see also Lafferty v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., at 1150. 
The relative merits of the use of seat belts and their causal 
relationship to any plaintiff's actual injuries is simply too specu-
lative to be placed in issue before a jury. 
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G. The Seat Belt Defense Is Inappropriate In The Context 
Of Strict Liability, 
Appellants' contentions based upon an alleged common law dutyf 
mitigation of damages and comparative negligence are simply inap-
propriate in the context of strict liability* 
Under Utah lawf strict liability can be defended on only two 
bases: 1) misuse of the product by the user or consumerf and 
2) unreasonable use of the product despite knowledge of the defect 
and awareness of the danger. Mulherin, supra. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in denying recognition of 
the victim's negligence as a defense in strict product liability, 
stated as follows: 
Strict liability is an abandonment of the 
fault concept in product liability cases. 
No longer are damages to be borne by one 
who is culpable; rather they are borne by 
one who markets the defective product. . . . 
We believe it is inconsistent to hold that 
the user's negligence is material when 
the seller's is not. . . . We hold that 
the plaintiff's or the defendant's negligence 
is irrelevant . . . 
Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W. 2d 155 (S. Dak. 1977). 
The Utah State Supreme Court's holding in Mulherin, supra, is 
in accord with this case as well as others which have refused to 
merge negligence principles with strict product liability. 
There is absolutely no evidence which could lead to the con-
clusion that Stephen Whitehead misused the Jeep Commando; nor 
under any circumstances of the facts, can it be shown that he had 
knowledge of the Jeep's defective or unsafe condition and subse-
quently made an unreasonable use of the vehicle. To assert the 
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seat belt defense under the auspices of the comparative negligence 
laws of the State of Utah is not appropriate in the factual cir-
cumstances of this case. 
Mere specifically, the court in Vizzini v. Ford Mocor Co., 
supra, noted the inapplicability of the seat belt defense in a 
strict liability context• 
In our case, although the plaintiff sued 
the manufacturer of the vehicle on claims 
of negligence as well as strict liability, 
the jury's verdict against the defendant on I 
liability was based on strict liability. 
. . . Evidence of non-use of a seat belt 
should be excluded, since it is akin to 
a claim of contributory negligence, which 
is not a defense in a strict liability case. j 
. . . . • • , 
Similarly, in the instant case, the jury's conclusion, that dl 
fendant AMC/Jeep was liable for its unreasonably dangerous producd 
was based upon strict liability principle; therefore, the seat beli 
defense is wholly inappropriate. j 
H
* Point IV Conclusion. f 
As recently as January 25, 1984, an appellate court decided j 
the issue of the admissibility of seat belt evidence and set fort* 
its entire opinion in one paragraph: j 
[W]e would clarify our position as to the 
issue of whether refusal to allow evidence 
on the effect of appellee's failure to wear 
his seat belt constituted reversible error. 
We hold that it did not . . . 
Volkswagen of America v. Long, 444 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. App. 1984). 
In holding that evidence related to seat belt use was inad-
missible under the facts and law applicable to this case, the trfl 
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court's ruling was in accordance with innumerable courts throughout 
a variety of jurisdictions. 
In sum, other courts so holding have relied upon the follow-
ing rationales: 
1) There is no statutory requirement in 
the forum state that seat belts be used. 
2) There is insufficient justification 
for a court to require the use of seat belts, 
take notice of their effectiveness, and 
impose a common law duty where none exists 
statutorily. 
3) The admission of such evidence of non-
use would permit the jury to "compare 
the negligence" which is wholly inappro-
priate in a strict liability context. 
4) The admission of such evidence creates 
a situation wherein a plaintiff in a 
vehicle with seat belts is penalized as 
compared with a plaintiff in a vehicle not 
so equipped. 
5) Requiring seat belt use results in one 
who is lawfully using the highways having 
to anticipate that another driver may be 
negligent; a plaintiff need not predict the 
negligence of the defendant. 
6) Permitting the jury to compare the 
damages attributable to the negligence of 
a defendant with that attributable to a 
failure to use available seat belts would 
allow the jury to enter into the realm of 
speculation and conjecture. 
7) Adoption of such a requirement may 
conflict with traditional tort doctrines 
such as comparative negligence, avoidable 
consequences and mitigation of damages. 
8) The decision to impose a prior restraint 
on an individual's activity, i.e. to impose 
a duty to utilize seat belts, is best left 
to the legislature. 
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9) Seat belts are not required in all 
vehicles and defendant should not be en-
titled to take advantage of the fortitous 
circumstances that plaintiff was riding 
in a car so equipped. 
10) It is a fact and persuasive that the 
majority of motorists do not habitually 
use their seat belts. ("Belt Use '16," 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 
1976). 
11) Admissibility of seat belt evidence 
would lead to a battle of experts as to 
the probability of injuries. 
In view of the lack of unanimity on the beneficial effect of 
seat belts, the lack of public acceptance, the considerations 
set forth above, in the absence of any common law or statutory 
duty and in absence of controlling case law, the trial court's 
exercise of discretion to exclude the seat belt issue in no con-
ceiveable manner constituted error. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' 
ATTEMPT TO RAISE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DEFENSE JUST PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
Plaintiff filed and served an Amended Complaint on August 1, 
1980, naming as defendants American Motors Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation. (R. 84-87). The complaint set forth the date of the 
cause of action as October 16, 1979. (R. 84). Paragraphs 13 and 
15 set forth the allegation that the vehicle, a 1972 Jeep, was 
manufactured and sold by defendants in an unreasonably dangerous 
condition. (R. 86). Thus, in August, 1980, defendants had suffi-
cient information to establish any defense based upon the appro-
priate statute of limitations. 
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The applicable statute of limitations defense is set forth 
within Utah's Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977). 
Utah's Product Liability Act was enacted in May of 1977 and 
applicable to those causes of action arising two years after its 
promulgation, i.e. May, 1979. Based on the allegations in plain-
tiff's complaint of August, 1980, defendants could readily ascer-
tain that the ten-year statute of limitations from the date of 
manufacture was not applicable; however, the barring, of the action 
based upon the six-year from the date of initial purchase limita-
tion was a possibility. If the vehicle in question were sold prior 
to October 16, 1973, defendants could perhaps have pursued the 
statute of limitations defense. 
Nevertheless, defendant Jeep Corporation submitted its answer 
on October 31, 1980, affirmatively alleging contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, alteration and misuse but failed to raise the 
defense of statute of limitations. (R. 113-114). Defendant Ameri-
can Motors Corporation failed to answer plaintiff's complaint for 
three years. On September 12, 1983, one month before trial, four 
years from the initial cause of action and three years after the 
complaint was filed against it, defendant American Motor Corpora-
tion submitted an answer which set forth the applicable statute 
of limitations defense. (R. 993-996). Simultaneously, defendant 
Jeep Corporation submitted a Motion For Leave to Amend Answer and 
add the statute of limitations defense. (R. 983-989). In response, 
plaintiff and the other defendants submitted Memoranda in Opposi-
tion To Defendant's Motion To Amend setting forth points and 
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authorities relative to attempts to amend at such late date and 
the corresponding prejudice to the plaintiff and other defendants 
and waste of judicial efficiency. (R. 1004-1013). 
On October 18, 1983f at the beginning of trial, the trial 
court ruled as follows: 
1. The motion of the defendant, Jeep 
Corporation, to amend their [sic] answer to allege 
the defense of the Utah Products Liability 
Act is denied on the basis that the motion 
was not timely made, the amendment of the 
answer would cause an undue burden upon 
the plaintiffs and other defendants and 
would result in the continuance of the 
trial date which the Court feels is unjusti-
fied under the facts and circumstances. 
(R. 1271-1272). 
The trial court did not, however, totally preclude defendants1 
opportunity to prove the applicability of the statute of limita-
tions, but instead, ruled as follows: 
2. The Court, however, will allow 
the defendant, Jeep, to proffer such proof 
at the time of trial as Jeep deems necessary 
to preserve its record. The Court reserves 
its ruling as to whether or not the defen-
dant American Motors Corporation nay raise 
the issue [of] the Utah Products Liability 
Act and the attendant statute of limita-
tions. (R. 1272). 
Respondent Whitehead submits to this Court that defendants made 
absolutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability 
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of trial; 
therefore, the issue is waived. 
Appellants AMC/Jeep made no mention whatsoever, nor offered 
an iota of evidence, which would substantiate the applicability of 
the product liability statute of limitations. The pertinent por-
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tion of the Act limits action based upon the date of manufacture, 
or upon the date of initial purchase. At this point in time, all 
parties to the lawsuit and the court below are yet without knowledge 
concerning "the date of initial purchase for use or consumption." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). The record is absolutely 
void of evidence on this issue. (R. 4774-4775). 
In Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the principle that where 
an amended pleading would delay trial and the substance of the 
amended allegation had been known a full year earlier, the trial 
court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend. 
Although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting 
of leave to amend, the matter remains in 
the sound discretion of the court. On 
the facts presented, we are not convinced 
that the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant the requested leave 
to amend. An amendment would certainly 
have delayed the trial and the substance of 
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full 
year earlier when plaintiff discussed it 
in his deposition. 
Westley, 663 P.2d at 94. 
The defense of statute of limitations must be set forth affirm-
atively at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Rule 8(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As set forth above, the instant 
action had been before the Court nearly four years before defen-
dants raised the product liability statute of limitations. That 
defense was available to the defendant at the early stages of liti-
gation. 
-75-
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The product liability statute of limitations defense was 
passed by the Utah Legislature in 1977 and effective prior to the 
service of pleadings upon defendants AMC/Jeep. The defense sought 
to be added to the defendants' Amended Answer was available to it 
at the cutset of the case and the facts giving rise to such defense 
were all set forth on the face of plaintiffs' complaint. The 
attempt zo raise the statute of limitations defense so late in liti-
gation was absolutely without excuse and not in accord with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor governing case law. 
Although Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
a party to amend pleadings, it is only by consent of the court in 
its discretion. The court below carefully considered the attempt 
by defendants AMC/Jeep to add the statute of limitations as a de-
fense and determined that such an amended answer, at that stage of 
the proceedings was not timely made. 
The determination made by the court below was based upon the 
burden which would be placed upon all parties to the lawsuit were 
a new defense allowed to be raised immediately prior to trial after 
four years of discovery. At that time, the plaintiff had incurred 
in excess of $50,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenses directed at 
preparation of the case against AMC/Jeep and the defendants 
Anderson and VALIC who had filed crossclaims against AMC/Jeep, had 
incurred large expenses in preparation of their contentions against 
AMC/Jeep. The trial was extremely complex, with numerous experts, 
witnesses and parties whose schedules and preparations would have 
had to ze adjusted, rearranged or repeated. The length of the 
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trial, nearly three weeks, the attendant difficulties of reschedul-
ing on the court calendar, and costs of changing the trial date 
would have been exhorbitant and wasteful. 
While statutes of limitation are a means of judicial expedi-
ency, they too are subject to an application that is fair and just* 
Such statutes ought not to be utilized to propitiate delay, waste of 
judicial resources or visit catastrophic economic and time losses 
on the parties who have relied on the defendant's waiver of a de-
fense that had been available for years during the pendency of the 
action. Furthermore, such a defense should be raised when first 
available and not because of timing for tactical or strategic 
reasons. 
There can be little question that to allow the amendment of 
the answer just prior to trial would require and mandate extensive 
discovery on behalf of the plaintiff. All of the manufacturer's 
documents relating to the date of manufacture would be required to-
gether with the documents relating to distribution of the vehicle 
to an automobile dealer. The evidence established that George 
Mullner, the owner of the vehicle, who was Deborah Whitehead's 
father, was not the original owner of the vehicle. (R. 2105). 
Documentary evidence relating to original purchase of the .vehicle 
would be imperative to a decision of a fact finder. In that regard, 
plaintiff had the right to conduct depositions of witnesses estab-
lishing date of initial sale. The postponement of such a costly 
and complex trial after three years of preparation simply cannot 
be justified in light of defendant's total failure to even proffer 
-77-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the court that it had any evidence that the statute of limita-
tion had expired when the action was commenced. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed this very issue. 
In Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1983), the defendant attempted to amend its answer, immedi-
ately prior to trial, to assert for the first time the statute of 
limitations. The trial court took the motion under advisement and 
at the close of evidence, the court denied the motion to amend. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
As a general proposition, we will not re-
verse a trial court's denial of a motion to 
amend, made at the commencement of or dur-
ing trial, to assert the statute of limita-
tions. 
Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190. See also Goeltz v. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 209 P.2d 832 (1956); Farmers & Merchants 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pulliam, 481 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971). 
In the Staker opinion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that: 
The statute of limitations defense must 
be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a 
responsive pleading, or it is waived, Utah 
R.Civ.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an amended 
pleading asserting the defense is allowed 
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a). 
[Citations omitted]. A trial court's re-
fusal to grant leave to amend is not re-
versible error unless the denial constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. E.g. Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); [Cita-
tion omitted]. 
In Staker, the court was not willing to reverse the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to amend its answer to add the 
statute of limitations defense. The court noted that the plaintiff 
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had gone to the expense of discovery and preparation for trial in 
reliance on defendant's answer filed over two years prior to trial. 
As set forth above, plaintiff herein had prepared for trial for 
nearly four years in reliance on defendants' answer. The court in 
Staker also noted that: 
The essential facts upon which the statute 
could have been asserted were known to the 
defendant from the beginning. Defendant 
alleges no surprise, discovery of new evi-
dence relating to the defense, or other 
justification for its delay in asserting 
the statute of limitations. 
Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190. The facts upon which the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
amend are identical to and perhaps even less persuasive than the 
facts upon which the trial court in the instant case based its 
decision. In Staker, defendants requested leniency based upon 
substitution of counsel two days before trial; no such possible 
excuse existed in the instant case. And while plaintiff relied 
on defendant's answer for two years in Staker, plaintiff herein 
relied and engaged in extensive trial preparation for four years 
in which this defendant actively participated. 
Clearly, in reliance upon its recent ruling rendered in Staker, 
the Court must uphold the decision of the trial court in denying 
defendants' motion to amend and subsequent denial of a directed 
verdict based upon the statute of limitation defense which defen-
dants failed to timely raise. (R. 4774-4775). Furthermore, the 
defendants absolutely failed to bring in any evidence, when express-
ly given the opportunity by the trial judge, to establish the dates 
of initial purchase of the vehicle in question. Therefore, the 
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nr 
* 
trial court was without evidence upon which a statute of limitations 
defense may have been predicated. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff submits that this case was carefully and thorough!; 
tried by experienced counsel to an experienced and erudite Court. 
All issues of law were thoroughly briefed and argued under circum-
stances giving the Court ample opportunity for considered judgment. 
The evidentiary rulings were made with deliberate care. The atmos-
phere in the courtroom was calm and decorus and all counsel, liti-
gants, witnesses and jury were treated with respect and courtesy. 
The trial was conducted by court and counsel to the highest standards 
of judicial procedure. All litigants have been afforded their day 
in court in accordance with the finest judicial tradition. The ver-
dict of the jury and the rulings of the trial court should be affirmeij 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON HOWARD, for: ^^X 
/HOWARD, L£WIS & PETERSEN 0 
^ ^ u r / ^ . 
OHNSON, for: 
S & PETERSEN 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants, Case No. 19695 
and 
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION 
and JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation 
Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep"), 
respectfully submit .this Reply Brief in answer to the new 
matters set forth in the brief of plaintiffs-respondents 
Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On this appeal, AMC/Jeep seeks reversal of the 
trial court's judgment on the grounds that the trial court 
made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions of law 
and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence. 
Specifically, AMC/Jeep argued in its opening brief to this 
Court that the trial court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs 
to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence (App. Br. 
at 26-36); (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's fundamental right to 
cross-examine plaintiffs1 witnesses (App. Br. at 36-42); (c) 
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by 
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence 
(App. Br. at 42-56); (d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for 
mistrial based on improper closing arguments by opposing 
counsel (App, Br. at 56-59); (e) in refusing to permit appel-
lant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to include a stat-
ute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 68-73); (f) in refus-
ing to direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of 
their statute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 73-74); and 
(g) in excluding all evidence relating to the presence of and 
plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts. fApp. 
Br. at 59-68). 
In their responsive brief, plaintiffs selectively 
address a few of the errors cited by AMC/Jeep but wholly 
ignore others- For example, AMC/Jeep assigns error to the 
admission by the trial court of three films showing Jeep 
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CJ5s, not Commandos, overturning under artificially induced 
conditions wholly dissimilar to the conditions of plaintiffs1 
accident (App. Br, at 27-31)/ and a chart purporting to show 
the so-called "roll-over threshold" of a Commando, but which 
was, in fact, based entirely upon information obtained by 
plaintiffs' expert in testing CJ5s. (App. Br. at 32). In 
their responsive brief, however, plaintiffs attempt to jus-
tify admission by the trial court of only one of the three 
films. No mention is made of the other two films or the 
chart erroneously received in evidence by the trial court. 
(Res. Br. at 19-27). 
In defense of the trial court's limitation of 
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts, the 
respondents' brief principally argues the volume of cross-
examination permitted without directly addressing the preju-
dicial effect of the specific limitations raised in appel-
lants' brief. Respondents further attempt to distract the 
Court's attention from the substantive errors below by delib-
erately mischaracterizing the tone and intent of appellants' 
brief as a personal attack on the integrity of the presiding 
trial judge. Such, of course, is not the case. The record 
merely reflects that the court below misunderstood the legal 
framework in which this case was presented, the elements of 
plaintiffs' cause of action, plaintiffs' burden of proof, 
AMC/Jeep's defensive theories, the relevance of defendants' 
evidentiary proffers and the complete irrelevance of the 
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majority of plaintiffs1 expert testimony. (See App, Br. at 
26-27). 
Similarly, in their effort to defend the trial 
court's exclusion of substantially all of AMC/Jeep1s demon-
strative evidence, plaintiffs suggest that the exclusions 
constituted "sanctions" imposed by the trial court for al-
leged discovery abuse by AMC/Jeep. As the record clearly 
reflects, however, no motion for sanctions was ever made by 
plaintiffs and none of AMC/Jeep's evidence was excluded for 
that reason. In every instance, AMC/Jeep's evidence was 
excluded based upon the trial court's failure to comprehend 
its relevance. The judgment below must be reversed and the 
case remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY PRE-TRIAL RULINGS 
Plaintiffs attempt to defend the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings against AMC/Jeep on the ground that such 
rulings are, in fact, "sanctions imposed by the trial court 
as a result of AMC/Jeep's failure to make discovery." (Resp. 
Br. at 11). Plaintiffs' arguments in this regard fail for 
three independent reasons. First, AMC/Jeep responded fully, 
or objected to, all of plaintiffs' discovery requests. 
Second, plaintiffs' discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep 
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information relating to the demonstrative evidence errone-
ously excluded by the trial court. Third, plaintiffs1 never 
moved the trial court to sanction AMC/Jeep nor did the trial 
court ever indicate that it was sanctioning AMC/Jeep for any 
discovery abuse. 
A. Plaintiffs' Brief Fails to Present 
the Complete History of the Pretrial 
Proceedings in this Case — AMC/Jeep 
Responded to all of Plaintiffs' 
Discovery. 
A comparison of AMC/Jeep's criticism of the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings to plaintiffs' defense of those 
rulings might lead the reader to wonder whether the parties 
are speaking about the same trial. AMC/Jeep's arguments 
regarding the trial court's exclusion of virtually all of 
AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence underscore the relevance of 
such evidence both as rebuttal evidence and to show state-of-
the-art. (Pet. Br. at 52-56). Plaintiffs' arguments in 
defense of the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evi-
dence , on the other handf center on references to certain 
pre-trial proceedings. (Resp. Br. at 5-19, 38-49). So the 
record is crystal clear on this point, the Court should be 
aware that the following portions of the record comprise all 
of the interrogatories, motions and hearings regarding pre-
trial discovery in this case. As is detailed in full below, 
there is nothing in these pleadings and transcripts which 
supports plaintiffs' charge that the trial cour:'s erroneous 
evidentiary rulings are supported by pre-trial activity in 
- Q _ 
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this case: (1) Plaintiffs1 first set of interrogatories -
March 4, 1981 (R. 128); (2) Plaintiffs' motion to compel 
answers to interrogatories - July 6, 1981 (R. 134); (3) 
American Motors' answers to interrogatories - July 20, 1981 
(R. 216); (4) American Motors opposition to plaintiffs' 
motion to compel - July 21, 1981 (R. 236); (5) plaintiffs' 
second set of interrogatories - September 15, 1981, (R. 246, 
256); (6) plaintiffs' motion to compel, referring to first 
set of interrogatories already answered by American Motors -
November 12, 1981 (R. 257); (7) plaintiffs' motion to compel, 
referring to second set of interrogatories - August 4, 1982 
(R. 588); (8) AMC/Jeep's answers to second set of inter-
rogatories - August 13, 1982 (R. 614); (9) plaintiffs' motion 
to strike or to compel - August 20, 1982 (R. 641); (10) 
AMC/Jeep's memorandum opposing motion to compel or strike -
September 14, 1982; (11) hearing before Judge Sorenson (T., 
10/29/82, at 1-49; R. 5006-5055); (12) hearing before Judge 
Sorenson (T., 12/29/82, at 1-16; R. 5056-5072); (13) 
AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers to interrogatories - January 
25, 1983 (R. 755); (14) plaintiffs1 motion in limine -
October 7, 1983 (R* 1063); (15) minute entry regarding motion 
in limine - October 7, 1983 (R. 1365); (16) transcript of 
trial court's consideration of motion in limine, October 27, 
1983 (T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576; R. 3337-3358). 
Plaintiffs' recount of the pre-trial proceedings in 
this case is as incomplete as it is misleading. For example, 
- 6 -
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plaintiffs fail to mention the pleadings numbered (2), (4)f 
and (13) above. The complete chronological recapitulation of 
those proceedings that follows reveals an utter lack of 
foundation for any "sanction," let alone a purported 
"sanction" of the devastating magnitude that resulted from 
the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings. 
Plaintiffs filed and served their first set of 
interrogatories to American Motors Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation on or about March 4, 1981. (R. 128). Plaintiffs 
moved to compel answers to this set of interrogatories on 
July 6, 1981. (R. 134). Plaintiffs' neglect to point out to 
this Court that American Motors provided /timely answers and 
objections to this set of interrogatories on July 20, 1981. 
(R. 216-233). This response was completer comprising more 
than 15 pages. Plaintiffs also fail to note that American 
Motors responded fully to their motion to compel on July 21, 
1981. (R. 236). 
Plaintiffs served their second set of interrog-
atories on American Motors Corporation and Jeep Corporation 
on September 15, 1981. (R. 246, 256). Plaintiffs next: filed 
a Motion for Order Compelling Discovery on November 12, 1981. 
(R. 257). However, as the memorandum accompanying that 
motion makes clear, plaintiffs' motion is directed entirely 
to American Motors' answers to plaintiffs' first set cf 
interrogatories. (R. 259-265). This first set of inter-
rogatories had already been answered by American Motors• 
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Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to its dis-
covery of AMC/Jeep's information for the next seven months. 
On August 4, 1982, however, plaintiffs filed a pleading 
styled "Third Motion for Order Compelling Discovery." (R. 
588). Here, for the first (not the third) time, plaintiffs 
moved the trial court to compel answers to plaintiffs' second 
set of interrogatories served on September 15, 1981. 
AMC/Jeep responded by filing complete answers and objections 
to this set of interrogatories on August 13, 1982. (R. 614-
636). Once again, AMC/Jeep's response was extensive, com-
prising some 21 pages. Included in this response was a list 
of 240 different drawings, blueprints and plans relating to 
the design and development of the Commando. (R. 632-635). 
These drawings, blueprints and plans were made available to 
plaintiffs and were completely responsive to plaintiffs1 
interrogatories. 
Plaintiffs next tactic, on August 20, 1982, was to 
move to strike AMC/Jeep*s answers to both sets of inter-
rogatories or, in the alternative, to compel. (R. 641-642). 
AMC/Jeep filed a memorandum opposing plaintiff's motion on 
September 14, 1982. (R. 671-642). In that memorandum, 
AMC/Jeep explained that many of plaintiffs' interrogatories 
were not answerable by AMC/Jeep due to the fact that the 
Commando vehicle at issue in this lawsuit was designed prior 
to 1966 by a predecessor corporation and that many records 
were either difficult to locate or no longer in existence. 
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AMC/Jeep offered to allow plaintiffs' counsel to depose any 
of its personnel who might have relevant knowledge. That 
offer was never acted on by plaintiffs. 
At this stage of the pre-trial proceedings, 
AMC/Jeep emerges as anything but the recalcitrant litigant 
portrayed in plaintiffs' brief. Ratherf AMC/Jeep had re-
sponded to all pending discovery and had responded fully to 
plaintiffs' charges that those answers were inadequate. 
B. Plaintiffs' Interrogatories did not 
Request Information Bearing on the 
Demonstrative Evidence Erroneously 
Excluded by the Trial Court. 
Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had responded fully 
to their interrogatories and motions, and despite the fact 
that AMC/Jeep had offered to permit plaintiffs to interrocate 
AMC/Jeep personnel to amplify such responses, plaintiffs 
brought their complaints about AMC/Jeep's responses before 
the trial court, Judge Sorenson presiding, on October 29, 
1982. At that hearing, the trial court, in an effort "to cut 
the Gordian knot in this case right now," (T., 10/29/82, at 
4; R. 5010)/ commenced reading the disputed interrogatories 
one by one, (1^ 3., at 9-49; R. 5015-5055 )• Despite plain-
tiffs' dramatic assertions to the contrary, (see Resp. Br. at 
5-19)f the net effect of Judge Sorenson's exercise is ex-
tremely difficult to determine. As Judge Sorenson himself 
noted during the course of this hearing: "We are making a 
terrible record here, a dreadful record. I wouldn't want to 
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be arguing it right as of now before an appellate court." 
(Id., at 38; R. 5044). 
Plaintiffs' contentions at the hearing centered 
on their alleged inability to obtain from AMC/Jeep certain 
information regarding the design and development of the 1972 
Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs never requested information either 
with respect to Jeep CJ5 vehicles or with respect to films or 
tests of other vehicles or even with respect to films or 
tests prepared after 1972. Judge Sorenson comprehended fully 
the limited scope of plaintiffs' interrogatories and 
restricted his observations on many of the interrogatories as 
follows: 
I will have you give them all available 
information or reasonably retrievable 
information as regards the 1972 model 
[Commando] only. Now that is all I can 
do Mr. Howard. 
(Ld., at 12; R. 5018; see also Ld., at 13-15; R. 5019-5021). 
Judge Sorenson's limitation of his comments to "the 1972 
[Commando] model only" is critical. Judge Sorenson recog-
nized, and plaintiffs' arguments to Judge Sorenson empha-
sized, that plaintiffs' interrogatories sought only informa-
tion regarding the design and development of the 1972 
Commando* 
The AMC/Jeep evidence which would later be excluded 
by Judge Bullock was not responsive either to the letter of 
plaintiffs' interrogatories or to the spirit of those inter-
rogatories as interpreted by Judge Sorenson. As amplified in 
- in -
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AMC/Jeep!s Brief, Judge Bullock excluded the following evi-
dence proffered by AMC/Jeep, none of which relates to the 
design and development of the 1972 Commando: (1) a 1983 film 
showing a 1979 model Jeep CJ5 undergoing emergency maneuvers 
and remaining upright (T., 10/27/83, at 1557, 1559, 1563-
1566, 1570-1571; R. 3339, 3341f 3345-3348, 3352-3353); (2) a 
film showing six non-Jeep vehicles (a 1977 Datsun B-210 
passenger car, a 1978 Toyota Corolla passenger car, a 1979 
Chevrolet Chevette passenger car, a 1980 Toyota 4-wheel-drive 
pickup, a 1981 Ford Bronco utility vehicle, and a 1982 Datsun 
4-wheel-drive pickup) with different centers of gravity than 
the Commando, showing that they all roll over under the same 
maneuvers depicted in plaintiffs' experts1 films (IcL, at 
1571-1572; R. 3353-3354; T. 10/28/83, at 1745-1746; R. 3528-
3529); (3) a film showing exemplar vehicles — a Commando and 
an Oldsmobile similar to the automobile driven by defendant 
Larry Anderson which struck plaintiffs Commando from the rear 
— undergoing certain tests intended to simulate plaintiffs' 
accident (T., 10/31/83, 1937-1938; R. 3724-3725); (4) a 
series of photographs depicting human beings in an exemplar 
vehicle in positions similar to those plaintiffs found them-
selves in during the course of their accident (j^., at 1962-
1967; R« 3749-3754); (5) a film demonstrating occupant move-
ment and damage during rollover (idi. , at 1985; R. 3773); (6) 
an exhibit demonstrating the fact that the accident vehicle 
had been involved in a prior accident (id., at 2024-2026; R. 
- i i — 
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3812-3814); and (7) a film showing an exemplar vehicle, a 
Commando, undergoing certain tests and maneuvers with outrig-
gers attached (_id. , at 1973; R. 3774). None of this evidence 
excluded by the trial court was responsive to plaintiffs' 
interrogatories, because none of this evidence related to the 
design and development of the 1972 Commando. In fact, much 
of it was relevant primarily as rebuttal evidence to issues 
raised by plaintiffs' presentation of their case-in-chief. 
Most certainly, plaintiffs have identified no interrogatory 
and rio statement by Judge Sorenson which would have required 
AMC/Jeep to produce these films, charts and photographs to 
plaintiffs prior to trial. 
C. Plaintiffs Never Moved for, nor did 
the Trial Court Impose, any Sanctions 
Against AMC/Jeep. 
Judge Sorenson continued his recitation of plain-
tiffs' second set of interrogatories on December 29, 1982. 
At this point, plaintiffs' counsel asked Judge Sorenson for 
sanctions based on an asserted failure by AMC/Jeep to comply 
with plaintiffs' versions of what had occurred at the October 
29 hearing. (T., 12/29/82, at 3-6; R. 5059-5062). Judge 
Sorenson stated: "All right, I will entertain your request 
for sanctions if you will follow the rules/ (Td., at 6; R. 
5062). Plaintiffs responded that they "will make an ap- > 
propriate motion for sanctions." (_Id./ at 7; R. 5063). No 
such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs and no ruling con-
cerning sanctions was ever made by the trial court in this 
_ 1 *> _ 
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case. Judge Sorenson continued through plaintiffs' second 
set of interrogatories, commenting along the way on the 
opaqueness of plaintiffs' language: 
I am going to make an observation as an 
attorney, Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' 
counsel]/ not as a Judge: The English 
language can be extremely treacherous, 
and some of these interrogatories — this 
is merely my observation as a student of 
the language of the law — are not well 
phrased in my opinion as a lawyer, not as 
a Judge* 
• • • • 
There is an absence of specificity in 
these interrogatories generally, 
(Ld., at 10f 12; R. 5066, 5068). In this respect, Judge 
Sorenson qualified many of his comments in the following 
fashion: "I will grant you permission to seek the informa-
tion you seek by interrogatory number twenty seven after you 
have clarified precisely what it is you are asking." (Id., 
at 11; R. 5067; see also id., at 12; R. 5068). No such 
clarification was ever attempted by plaintiffs. 
In short, the net result of Judge Sorensonfs exer-
cise, as outlined above, was to prod both parties into con-
cluding discovery in this case in a reasonable manner. The 
trial court criticized the lack of clarity in plaintiffs' 
interrogatories and directed them to clarify the interrog-
atories before AMC/Jeep would be required to answer many of 
them. AMC/Jeep was directed to provide such answers as were 
available to those interrogatories that were capable of being 
understood. Most importantly, however, and as noted above 
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but totally ignored in plaintiffs1 Brief, Judge Sorenson 
contemplated that a formal motion for sanctions would have to 
be filed by plaintiffs in the event plaintiffs wished to 
claim that AMC/Jeep thereafter failed to respond in good 
faith to the court's comments and suggestions. The court's 
minute entry in this regard is clear: "The court will enter-
tain plaintiff's request for sanctions providing Mr. Johnson 
follows the rules of practice." (R. 729). Judge Sorenson 
could hardly have been more precise in stating that his 
comments and suggestions, standing alone, would not form the 
basis for sanctions; a motion for sanctions would be re-
quired. No such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs. It 
strains credulity, therefore, for plaintiffs to defend the 
trial court's challenged rulings on AMC/Jeep's evidence based 
on Judge Sorenson's comments. 
Although plaintiffs never filed their promised 
motion for sanctions, AMC/Jeep did file "Supplemental Answers 
and Objections to Certain of Plaintiffs' Interrogatories" on 
January 25, 1983. (R. 755). These answers represent 
AMC/Jeep's response to Judge Sorenson's suggestions and 
i 
comments. Plaintiffs fail to note in their Brief that 
AMC/Jeep in fact responded to Judge Sorenson's suggestions 
and comments in this manner. AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers 
•I 
were never objected to by plaintiffs and no motion to compel 
with respect to them was ever filed by plaintiffs. 
- 14 -
•1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
D
* The Trial Court did not Base its 
Exclusion of AMC/Jeep's Evidence on 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, seeking to prevent 
AMC/Jeep from presenting certain evidence, was first con-
sidered by the trial court on the same day it was filed, 
October 7f 1983. The Motion contained no reference either to 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to sanctions. 
The trial court's minute entry for this hearing reflects only 
the following: 
Mr. Howard made a motion for Jeep to be 
prevented from raising matters which they 
failed to respond to in their answers to 
interrogatories. Matter discussed at 
length between Court and counsel. The 
Court ruled defendant may cross examine, 
but is not to bring up new facts which 
were not given plaintiff's counsel in 
their response to interrogatories; how-
ever, if some facts are used and defen-
dant's witness makes a different conclu-
sion, those opinions would be admissible. 
(R. 1365). This synopsis of the day's discussion contains no 
hint as to the sweeping evidentiary rulings to be made in the 
future by the trial court with respect to AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination and evidence. It states only that AMC/Jeep was 
"not to bring up new facts which were not given plaintiffs' 
counsel in their response to interrogatories." It does not 
state that AMC/Jeep would be precluded from presenting evi-
dence never requested in plaintiffs' interrogatories. Nor 
does it indicate that AMC/Jeep had failed to respond to 
plaintiffs' interrogatories. Moreover, the last clause 
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quoted above runs directly contrary to the trial court1 s 
blockage of AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine 
plaintiffs' experts. (See App. Br. at 36-42). Most impor-
tantly, there is absolutely no indication that the trial 
court's statements were based in any way on Judge Sorenson's 
prior hearings, or that the trial court intended to 
"sanction" AMC/Jeep. 
The trial judge's sole intimation of reliance on 
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial rulings is found in connection 
with plaintiffs' presentation of their Motion in Limine, in 
chambers, on October 27, 1983. (T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576; 
R. 3337-3358). The trial judge heard plaintiffs' version of 
Judge Sorenson's hearings and excluded one of AMC/Jeep's 
films on the ground that "Plaintiffs were entitled to have, 
or to see, the films and test results before the trial pur-
suant to their discovery interrogatories." (JEd., at 1571; R. 
3353). A careful review of the record reveals clearly, 
however, that this film bore absolutely no relation to any of 
plaintiffs' interrogatories. It was a film made in 1983 of a 
Jeep CJ5 and had nothing to do with the 1972 Commando. In 
fact, the film was not even prepared by AMC/Jeep. (IcL, at 
1557-1558; R. 3339-3340). Plaintiffs1 interrogatories never 
inquired either into testing of CJ5fs or into testing that 
occurred in 1983. When counsel for AMC/Jeep protested that 
the trial judge had misapprehended Judge Sorenson's intent, 
the trial judge clarified his ruling, stating: "My ruling 
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was based not only on that, but on what I consider to be the 
Rules of Civil Procedure." (Id,. , at 1574; R. 3356), Thus, 
even in this single instance when the trial judge referred to 
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial hearings, it is not at all clear 
that the trial judge intended to rely on those hearings to 
support his exclusion of AMC/Jeep evidence. It is absolutely 
clear, however, that even if the trial judge intended to rely 
on such hearings, the film excluded by the trial judge on 
this occasion was not within the scope of any interrogatory 
propounded by plaintiffs to AMC/Jeep. 
A review of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings 
throughout the trial reveals that such rulings were based on 
his view of the relevance of AMC/Jeep's evidence and cross-
examination, not on the transcript of the hearings before 
Judge Sorenson. The trial judge never related his systematic 
exclusion of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence to any inter-
rogatory or interrogatories; in fact, such relation was 
impossible because plaintiffs' interrogatories did not relate 
to the AMC/Jeep evidence excluded by the trial judge. More-
over, as is amplified in the preceding pages of this Brief, 
if the trial judge intended to sanction AMC/Jeep by excluding 
evidence crucial to the defense of this lawsuit, plaintiffs 
should have, at the least, been required to file a Motion for 
Sanctions to which AMC/Jeep could have responded. Hercules 
Drayage Company, Inc. v. Canco Leasing Corp., 24 Ariz. App. 
598, 540 P.2d 724, 726 (1975) ("Our interpretation of Rule 37 
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would require that the party wishing to avail itself of the 
sanctions for failure of discovery must move the court for an 
order sanctioning the alleged uncooperative party.") 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPTED DEFENSE OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS IS 
UNAVAILING 
The bulk of plaintiffs' Brief is consumed with the 
effort to single out and defend individually several of the 
trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings detailed in 
AMC/Jeep's Brief. (Resp. Br. at 19-38). Any one of the 
trial court's errors, standing alone, would justify reversal 
of the judgment on the verdict. Plaintiffs' attempt to 
focus, point by point, on a few selected rulings out of the 
many challenged by AMC/Jeep does not blunt the thrust of 
AMC/Jeep*s argument that the cumulative effect of the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings — its admission of plaintiffs' 
irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, combined with its 
blockage of AMC/Jeeps's efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' 
experts, combined with its exclusion of substantial portions 
i 
of AMC/Jeep's evidence — requires that the trial court's 
judgment on the verdict be reversed. The flaws inherent in 
plaintiffs' particular points are set out below, 
4 
A. The Dynamic Science Film was Irrel-
evant and Unduly Prejudicial and 
Should Have Been Excluded 
Plaintiffs discuss at length the admissibility of 
1 
the so-called Dynamic Science film. (Resp. Br. at 19-27). 
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This discussion is in apparent response to Point I of 
AMC/Jeep's Brief wherein this filmf along with two other 
films introduced by plaintiffs and one of plaintiffs1 ex-
pert's charts, are shown to be irrelevant to the issues of 
this lawsuit, (App. Br. at 26-36). Plaintiffs' decision to 
defend only one of the several demonstrative films and ex-
hibits challenged in AMC/Jeep's Brief is not explained in 
plaintiffs' Brief, but in any event AMC/Jeep's challenge to 
the receipt in evidence of the other two films is not dis-
puted by plaintiffs. 
Turning to the Dynamic Science filmf it will be 
recalled that AMC/Jeep's objection to this film and virtually 
all of plaintiffs' demonstrative evidence and expert tes-
timony centered on its lack of relevance to the only issues 
in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep: (a) whether the plain-
tiffs1 1972 Commando was defectively designed and unreason-
ably dangerous when it left the hands of the manufacturer 
because it rolled over when struck from behindf on an inter-
state highway, by a vehicle traveling approximately 70 miles 
per hour, and (b) whether the alleged design defect was a 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Rather than bearing 
on the above issues, the Dynamic Science film shifted the 
focus of this case away from plaintiffs' accident towards a 
rambling investigation of Jeep vehicles, not Commandos, in 
general. As plaintiffs' own witness candidly explained, the 
"defect" presented to the trial court and jury by plaintiffs 
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"may not have anything to do with this particular accident." 
(T., 10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714). 
The Dynamic Science film defended in plaintiffs' 
Brief is perhaps the best example of the irrelevant and 
inflammatory nature of plaintiffs' evidence. The film's lack 
of relevance is detailed at pages 28-29 of AMC/Jeep's opening 
Brief. Suffice it to note here that the film showed Jeep 
CJ5's, not Commandos, and was explained by an expert who had 
never tested a Commando. More importantly, the maneuvers 
depicted in the film were never shown to bear any relation-
ship to the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident. Simi-
larly, the movement of the anthropomorphic dummies seated in 
the CJ5 was never shown to bear any resemblance to plain-
tiffs1 movement during the course of their accident. 
Plaintiffs' statement in their Brief that "Mr. 
Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated 
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in 
which the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and 
conditions prevalent in this accident," (Resp. Br. at 20), is 
a misstatement of the record. Mr. Noettl never offered such 
testimony. In fact, Mr. Noettl could make no such statement 
because he had never tested a Commando nor had he recon-
structed plaintiffs' accident. (T., 10/26/83, at 1182; R. 
2907). Mr. Noettl was utilized by plaintiffs primarily to 
testify that "Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, are 
easier to overturn than a "passenger car." Id. at 1262; R. 
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3039). Plainly, Mr, Noettl was incompetent to render the 
Dynamic Science film relevant to the issues in this case. 
Plaintiffs also state that Mr. Noettl testified 
that "the tests that were appropriate for conditions basi-
cally similar to that giving rise to this litigation were the 
J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver [depicted in the 
film]. (R. 2972).M (Resp. Br. at 21). A review of the 
record cited by plaintiffs for this statement reveals that 
Mr. Noettl is referring to the tests shown in the film but in 
no way relates those tests to plaintiffs1 accident. Heref as 
throughout his testimony, Mr. Noettl assumes the role of one 
testifying to a legislative or administrative committee about 
the characteristics of off-road vehicles in general. His 
testimony, and the film he utilized to illustrate that tes-
timony, are not relevant to the issues in this lawsuit. 
Contrary to the insistence of plaintiffs that Mr. Noettl 
"testified that the film was material, for it demonstrated 
the rollover threshold of the Jeep Commando under circum-
stances similar to that which occurred on the day and place 
of the accident," (Resp. Br. at 21-22), plaintiffs are unable 
to cite any place in the record where such a foundation was 
laid. In fact, plaintiffs' counsel went so far as to stipu-
late that the film did not simulate the conditions prevailing 
at the time of the accident. (T., 10/26/83, at 1207; R. 
2984). 
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Plaintiffs respond inadequately to AMC/Jeep's 
argument that plaintiffs' experts' films should have been 
excluded because they lacked "a foundational showing that 
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to actual conditions." Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 
558 F.2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs1 Brief simply 
ignores the established rule which places "the burden ... 
upon the party offering evidence of out-of-court experiments 
... to.lay a proper foundation demonstrating a similarity of 
circumstances and conditions." Barnes v. General Motors 
Corp., 547 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs' at-
tempt to distinguish Haynes v. American Motors Corporation, 
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982), is simply disingenuous. The 
trial court in Haynes ruled that a commercial film showing a 
Jeep CJ5 in off-road situations was irrelevant and inadmis-
sible because neither the vehicle depicted nor the maneuvers 
illustrated in the film bore any relation to the plaintiffs' 
vehicle or circumstances. The case is directly on point and 
underscores the trial court's evidentiary errors below. 
B. Plaintiffs Fail to Justify the Trial 
Court's Erroneous Limitation of 
AMC/Jeep's Cross-Examination of 
Plaintiffs' Experts 
AMC/Jeep's opening Brief details, with full cita-
tion to the record, the trial court's blockage of AMC/Jeep's 
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts on their crucial 
opinion that "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles, overturned much 
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more readily than other vehicles and that non-Jeep vehicles 
would not have overturned under the circumstances of plain-
tiffs' accident. (App. Br. at 36-42). (See ?., 10/25/33, at 
1001-1005, 1018; R. 2780-2784, 2797; T., 10/26/83, at 1266, 
1275; R. 3043, 3052). 
Plaintiffs' respond to AMC/Jeep's argument by 
defending the trial court's "position in legal circles and 
his prominence among his colleagues, both before and after 
appointment to the bench ...." (Resp. Br. at 27-28). Counsel 
for AMC/Jeep certainly do not disagree with plaintiffs1 
assessment of the trial court's reputation, but it is facts 
and law, not gratuitous reference to the trial court's 
reputation and ability, which must govern the outcome of this 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs intimate that their experts1 comparison 
of "Jeeps" to other vehicles was not elicited on direct 
examination by plaintiffs' counsel and that the trial court's 
blockage of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination on this point was 
proper. (Resp. Br. at 32). Quite contrary to plaintiffs' 
suggestion, plaintiffs' experts rendered their opinion that 
"Jeeps" compared unfavorably to "other vehicles" under direct 
examination by plaintiffs' counsel. (T., 10/20/83, at 558-
560; R. 2331-2333 [direct examination by Mr. Howard]; T., 
10/25/83, at 896-897; R. 2676 [direct examination by Mr. 
Howard]). 
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Plaintiffs next attempt to confuse the issue by 
noting that AMC/Jeep was, indeed, allowed to voir dire and 
cross-examine their witnesses on several topics. (Resp. Br. 
at 28-35). What plaintiffs neglect to point out is that the 
pages of the record to which they cite involve voir dire and 
cross-examination on issues wholly unrelated to the critical 
opinion offered by these experts that a "Jeep11 overturns in 
circumstances in which "some other car" would not have over-
turned. 
The entire point of AMC/Jeep's argument in this 
regard, that plaintiffs' experts were permitted to compare 
"Jeeps" to other vehicles but that AMC/Jeep was blocked from 
cross-examining on this point, is utterly ignored in plain-
tiffs argument. Similarly, plaintiffs never address the 
documented charge of AMC/Jeep that "[t]he practical effect of 
the trial court's restriction of appellants1 right of cross-
examination was to allow plaintiffs' theory of the case to go 
unchallenged. Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify 
repeatedly and without foundation that 'Jeeps' performed 
poorly in comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was 
prohibited from exploring the basis for that comparison." 
(App. Br. at 39). 
C. The Trial Court's Exclusion of Vir-
tually All of Plaintiffs' Demon-
strative Evidence is Plain Error 
AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's exclusion 
of AMC/Jeep's evidence which would have demonstrated that the 
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tests depicted in plaintiffs' films bore no relation to 
emergency driving conditions and that "Jeeps" in general and 
Commandos in particular are reasonably stable vehicles which 
can successfully negotiate realistic emergency situations. 
(App. Br. at 42-56). 
Plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeeps contentions by 
shifting focusr once againf from the facts and the law. 
Plaintiffs' charge that AMC/Jeep has charged the trial court 
with "incompetence and corruption". (Resp. Br. at 39). 
Suffice it to say that such arguments are as unfounded as 
they are gratuitous. 
Plaintiffs next rehash their argument concerning 
the pre-trial proceedings in this case. The full and undeni-
able fallaciousness of plaintiffs' argument in this regard is 
revealed by their statement that the subject of the film 
offered by AMC/Jeep's expert, Mr. Heitzman, had been "prev-
iously specifically barred" by Judge Sorenson. (Resp. Br« at 
40). Judge Sorenson never did any such thing. 
First, the film at issue would have been utilized 
by Mr. Heitzman to illustrate his opinion concerning the 
handling qualities of the CJ5« The film was plainly relevant 
because the CJ5 had been much maligned by plaintiffs' experts 
and plaintiffs had presented to the jury the notion that the 
CJ5 and plaintiffs' Commando were identical. Plaintiffs can 
point to no interrogatory reviewed by Judge Sorenson which 
requests any information concerning the CJ5. Second, as has 
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been previously made clear, Judge Sorenson stated explicitly 
to plaintiffs that a motion for sanctions would have to be 
filed before the trial court would consider imposing any 
sanctions. No such motion was ever filed, either before 
Judge Sorenson or before the trial judge. Once again, plain-
tiffs make no attempt to defend the actual basis for the 
trial judge's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evidence; the erroneous 
belief that such evidence was irrelevant. 
It must be noted that plaintiffs make no attempt 
whatsoever to defend the trial court's exclusion of Mr. 
Heitzman's film showing vehicles with "outriggers" attached 
undergoing certain maneuvers. (See App. Br. at 44-47). This 
film was essential to demonstrate not only that plaintiffs1 
film of a Commando equipped with outriggers was misleading, 
but also that many vehicles besides "Jeeps" will roll over 
under the conditions depicted in plaintiffs' films. 
Plaintiffs next argue that AMC/Jeep is precluded 
from challenging the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's 
demonstrative evidence because "[m]atters not admitted in 
evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered on 
appeal before the Supreme Court." (Resp. Br. at -45, quoting 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 
(Utah 1983)). Pilcher has nothing to do with AMC/Jeep's 
challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings in this 
case. The errors cited by AMC/Jeep were carefully preserved 
through proffers reflected in the record before this Court. 
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Plaintiffs next defend the trial court's exclusion 
of two films offered to demonstrate the testimony of 
AMC/Jeep's expert Dr. Warner. The first of these films would 
have demonstrated the weaknesses in plaintiffs' experts' 
opinion that "Jeeps" overturn more easily than other ve-
hicles. The second film was of an exemplar Commando equipped 
with outriggersr showing that the Commando is a stable ve-
hicle. (See App. Bt at 47-49). Plaintiffs attempt to 
defend the exclusion of these two manifestly relevant films 
with the blithe comment that they were "rejected for the same 
reasons applicable to the Heitzman film." (Resp. Br. at 45-
46). Once again, plaintiffs raise the issue of Judge 
Sorenson's 1982 hearings, but no substance is provided by 
plaintiffs to support their argument. 
As with plaintiffs' argument concerning the ir-
relevant evidence admitted by the trial court over AMC/Jeep's 
objections, plaintiffs fail to address all of AMC/Jeep's 
claims of error in the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's 
evidence. Besides the films referred to above, the trial 
court also excluded erroneously a series of photographs 
offered to demonstrate Dr. Warner's testimony. Plaintiffs do 
not attempt to defend this action. 
Finally, plaintiffs simply ignore AMC/Jeep's argu-
ments that AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence should have been 
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admitted to rebut plaintiffs' irrelevant evidence."1 (App. Br. 
at 50-56). Although it can be surmised that plaintiffs 
disagree with the cases and authorities cited by AMC/Jeep, it 
is clear that plaintiffs have left AMC/Jeep and this Court no 
hint as to the basis for such disagreement. 
POINT III 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING 
COUNSEL WERE IMPROPER AND CONSTITUTED 
GROUNDS FOR A MISTRIAL 
AMC/Jeep has detailed the gross misstatements made 
to the jury by opposing counsel during closing arguments. 
(App. Br. at 56-59). Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had 
offered demonstrative evidence to rebut the testimony of 
plaintiffs' experts, and such evidence was kept from the jury 
2 by the trial court, counsel for defendant Larry Anderson 
Plaintiffs make a two sentence attempt to distinguish one 
of the many cases cited by AMC/Jeep for its argument that its 
demonstrative evidence was relevant to rebut the opinions of 
plaintiffs' experts. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the 
court in Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487 F. 2d 
595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974), did 
not decide the issue whether state-of-the-art evidence is 
relevant to the defense of a strict products liability 
action. Rather, as is clear on page 600 of the opinion, the 
court held that even if state-of-the-art evidence, standing 
alone, was not relevant in the defense of such actions, such 
evidence should be permitted to rebut the plaintiff's intro-
duction of similar evidence. 
2 
At page 20 of AMC/Jeep's Brief a statement made during 
closing argument is erroneously attributed to counsel for 
defendant Variable Annuity Life. The statement is correctly 
attributed to counsel for defendant Larry Anderson on page 57 
of the Brief. 
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argued as follows: 
Why didnft Jeep, having all of the test 
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing 
exactly what they had done, even to the 
height of the outriggers off the ground; 
why didn't they go out and test a 
Commando, put some outriggers on there 
and to do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 
MWe have done the same kind of tests that 
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same 
number of degrees of steer in on a 
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn 
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell 
you why: They are afraid to do it* They 
didn't dare do it. Because they knew 
that Commando would turn over, 
(T., 11/3/83, at 109; R. 4659). Similarly, counsel for 
plaintiffs argued to the jury that AMC/Jeep had "No positive 
proof. None at all," (.id. , at 32; R. 4582), that "They 
[AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all," (Ld., at 33; R. 
4583), and that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce 
of engineering data." (^ d., at 35; R. 4585). 
The rule stated in AMC/Jeep's opening Brief is that 
"a lawyer who has successfully urged the court to exclude 
evidence should not be allowed to point to the absence of 
that evidence to create an inference that it does not exist." 
State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277, 280 (Idaho App. 
1983) (quoting the American Bar Association Standards, The 
Defense Function, Section 7.8(a) (1971)). The "mischief" 
identified in Dudley is precisely the mischief engaged in by 
opposing counsel during their closing arguments. As this 
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Court has recently stated: "The proper remedy for prejudi-
cial attorney misconduct is to order a new trial." Nelson v. 
Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiffs argue that "AMC/Jeep is precluded from 
now claiming reversible error as a result of counsel's clos-
ing argument by way of its failure to timely object to the 
alleged prejudicial statements." (Resp. Br. at 51). Plain-
tiffs fail to note the undeniable fact that AMC/Jeep stren-
uously objected to these statements and even moved for a 
mistrial because of them. (T.f 11/3/83, at 193-197). It is 
of no moment that the objection was not made at the time the 
statements were made to the jury. As the court stated in 
Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350, 647 P.2d 806, 810-811 
(Idaho App. 1982) : 
We do not interpret [the rule requiring 
timely objections] to require counsel to 
raise all objections instantly, during 
closing argument itself. Frequent objec-
tions during argument, even if proper, 
risk alienating the court and may serve 
only to emphasize objectionable comment 
for the jury.... Rather, we hold that if 
counsel elects to raise the alleged 
improprieties by a motion for mistrial or 
by other appropriate means, before the 
case is submitted to the jury, the issue 
will be preserved for appeal. 
AMC/Jeep objected to, and moved for a mistrial based on, the 
quoted comments as soon as closing arguments were concluded 
and the jury had left the courtroom. The objection was 
certainly timely and served to preserve the issue for this 
appeal. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO 
UTILIZE AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS 
A. Three Members of this Court have 
Expressed a View Consistent with the 
Rule that a 
Utilize 
tutes a 
Avai 
Fail 
Plai 
labl 
ure 
ntiff's 
e Seat 
to Miti 
; Fail 
Belts 
gate 
ure to 
Consti-
Damages 
AMC/Jeep has presented the substantive arguments of 
the growing number of courts which allow juries to consider a 
plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts in connection with 
the issue of contributory fault and the plaintiff's duty to 
mitigate his own damages* AMC/Jeep also contends that the 
jury should have been permitted to consider the fact that 
plaintiffs' Commando was equipped with seat belts when decid-
ing whether that Commando was defectively designed. (App. 
Br. at 59-68). 
Plaintiffs' response to AMC/Jeep's presentation of 
the so-called "seat belt defense" issue is flawed from the 
outset. At the very beginning of their argumentf plaintiffs 
misstate that "[t]here exists no controlling or even helpful 
case law within this jurisdiction regarding the issue of 
admissibility of evidence related to the use of seat belts." 
(Resp. Br. at 53). Plaintiffs fail to note the concurring 
opinion of Justice Oaks (joined by Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Durham) in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 18133; 
(Slip Opinion—May 1, 1984) (petition for rehearing filed). 
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The plaintiff in Acculog brought suit to recover 
damages suffered when his van was destroyed by fire. One of 
the issues at trial was whether the plaintiff's failure to 
carry a fire extinguisher in his van was relevant to either 
the issue of contributory negligence or the issue of mitiga-
tion of damages• The trial court avoided this issue on the 
ground that the parties had stipulated to the amount of 
damages. At the conclusion of trialf the jury returned a 
special verdict but the trial court ruled that plaintiff had 
no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed and this court 
remanded for a new trial. In connection with the remand, 
Justice Oaks authored a concurring opinion in which he of-
fered "guidance" to the trial court on remand with respect to 
the issue of mitigation of damages. With the following 
statement, Justice Oaks embraced the arguments utilized by 
the courts that have adopted the "mitigation of damages" 
approach to the seat belt defense (see Pet. Br. at 61-66): 
[T]he amount of damages the plaintiff 
would be allowed to recover [after taking 
into account comparative negligence] is 
subjected to a further reduction dictated 
by the common-law rule of mitigation of 
damages or what the Restatement calls 
"the damages rule as to avoidable conse-
quences .... " Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Section 465 comment c (1965). 
This reduction, on which the defendant 
has the burden of proof, applies where 
the plaintiff is found to have been 
negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid 
damages and where this negligence is 
found to have increased his total damages 
beyond what he would have suffered if he 
had not been negligent in this manner. 
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Slip. Op. at 7 (emphasis added). 
Justice Oaks clearly advocates the admissibility of 
evidence regarding non-use of available safety devices in his 
quotation of the following "well-reasoned" example propounded 
by the court in Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W. 2d 118, 121-
122 n.2 (N.D. 1983): 
Assume: X driving a car, and Y driving a 
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not 
wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 
percent liable for causing the accident 
[the "injury" under Section 78-27-37], 
making Yf the motorcyclist, 40 percent 
liable for causing the accident. The 
jury also finds Y would have avoided 60 
percent of his injuries [damages] if he 
had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable 
for causing Y's [damages]. Y proves 
$100,000 in damages. 
On the basis of these findings, the 
$100,000 award would be reduced by 40 
percent, which account for Y's contribut-
ing to the cause of the accident. Hence, 
the award is diminished to $60,000. 
The $60,000 should now be reduced to 
the extent that Y's [damages] would have 
been [avoided] had he worn a helmet, 
i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves 
a total award of $24,000. 
Id., at 8 n.l. 
The issue before this Court does not involve any 
argument that plaintiffs caused their accident by failing to 
use their seat belts. Rather, AMC/Jeep's argument to this 
Court is found in the third paragraph quoted above; plain-
tiffs' damages should be reduced by the amount that their 
damages would have been "avoided" had they worn their seat 
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belts. Surely, if three members of this Court would consider 
non-use of a motorcycle helmet relevant to such an inquiry, 
evidence of non-use of the universally available seat belt is 
also relevant. 
This is precisely the view espoused by many courts 
that have permitted juries in product liability cases involv-
ing automobiles to consider a plaintiff's failure to utilize 
available seat belts in determining the plaintiff's damages. 
See Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 
2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444*, 323 
N.E. 2d 164, 167 (1974). These cases, and Justice Oaks1 
opinion, are consistent with Prosser's indication that the 
plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages is equivalent to the 
doctrine of avoidable consequence, which precludes recovery 
for any damages which could have been eliminated by reason-
able conduct on the part of the plaintiff. W. Prosser, 
Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 65, pp. 442-444 (4th Ed. 
1971). 
Although this concept has been applied most often 
to post-accident conduct, courts recognize that this does not 
preclude its application to pre-accident conduct. Plain-
tiffs' claim that "the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise 
before the plaintiff is damaged," (Resp. Br. at 62-66), 
exalts theory over common sense and sound policy. Evidence 
of a plaintiff's failure to utilize an available seat belt 
should be admitted because seat belts afford the automobile 
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occupant an unusually effective means by which a person "may 
minimize his or her injuries prior to an accident." Spier v. 
Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168. The simple fact is that in many 
cases, as in this one, it can be demonstrated that the fail-
ure of a plaintiff to use an available seat belt exacerbated 
the plaintiff's injuries. See Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary 
Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 231-
235 (1980). 
B. Plaintiffs' Knowledge, or Lack of 
Knowledge, With Respect to the Pres-
ence of Seat Belts in their Vehicle 
does not Bear on AMC/Jeep's Defense 
Based on Plaintiffs' Failure to Use 
their Seat Belts. 
Plaintiffs point out that AMC/Jeep was barred by 
the trial court from introducing evidence of plaintiffs1 
failure to use their seat belts because there was no showing 
that plaintiffs knew of the seat belts or that they made a 
conscious decision not to use them. (Resp. Br. at 54-56). 
The trial court's position, as well as plaintiffs1 argument 
in this regard is not supported by either law or common 
sense. Even assuming that the location of the seat belts is 
relevant to plaintiffs' culpability in failing to use them, 
such facts only present a question for the jury to decide, 
not a basis for excluding from the jury's consideration the 
failure to use the belts. 
In any event, plaintiffs' awareness of the seat 
belts does not bear directly on the issue at hand. There is 
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no dispute that plaintiffs' Commando was equipped with seat 
belts. It can hardly be the fault of AMC/Jeep that those 
seat belts "were under the seat" as alleged by plaintiffs. 
(Resp. Br. at page 56). Also, whether or not plaintiffs made 
a "conscious decision" to eschew the use of their seat belts 
is not at issue here. Whether conscious or simply unwise, 
AMC/Jeep contends, and the evidence would have shown, that 
plaintiffs' failure to use their seat belts contributed to 
their injuries. The amount that plaintiffs' damages should 
have been reduced by reason of that failure is an issue for 
the jury to decide. The trial court erred in preempting this 
issue of fact. 
C. The Absence of a Statutory Obligation 
does not Preclude the Imposition of a 
Common Law Duty to Utilize Available 
Seat Belts. 
Plaintiffs next argue that "there exists no statu-
tory nor common law duty to utilize a seat belt." (Resp. Br. 
at 57-60). AMC/Jeep has never contended that there is a Utah 
or federal statute requiring one to utilize an available seat 
belt. But plaintiffs' leap from that fact to the assertion 
that no duty exists at common law to utilize a seat belt is 
unsupported and unfounded. The absence of statutory obliga-
tions to use reasonable care and to mitigate damages has been 
no bar to the common law development of those doctrines. For 
example, the fact that there is no statutory obligation to 
wear a crash helmet when operating a motorcycle did not deter 
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Justice Oaks from stating that failure to wear a crash helmet 
would be relevant to the issue of mitigation or avoidance of 
damages. Acculog, supra, at 8 n.l. 
Plaintiffs argue that it is for the legislaturef 
not the courts, to decide whether to "penalize a plaintiff 
for not using seat belts ... . " (Resp. Br. at 59, quoting 
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 
1980); see also id., at 60-62). The Florida Supreme Court, 
in ruling that a jury should be allowed to consider evidence 
of a plaintiff's failure to use available seat belts, re-
sponded to this call for judicial restraint most convinc-
ingly: 
[The plaintiff] asserts that the single 
most compelling reason for such a holding 
[i.e., that the jury cannot consider the 
plaintiff's failure to use seat belts] is 
the principle that courts are law inter-
preting and not lawmaking and argues that 
we should not act in a peculiarly legis-
lative manner. 
We disagree and find this issue 
particularly appropriate for judicial 
decision. In the past, this Court has 
not abdicated its continuing respon-
sibility to the citizens of this state to 
ensure that the law remains both fair and 
realistic as society and technology 
change. 
To abstain from acting responsibly 
in the present case on the basis of 
legislative deference would be to con-
sciously ignore a limited area where 
decisions by the lower courts of this 
state have created an illogical exception 
to the doctrine of comparative negligence 
... and the underlying philosophy of 
individual responsibility .... 
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Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnisy supra, 451 
So. 2d, at 451. 
Product liability law creates incentives for manu-
facturers to design and make safe products and thus promotes 
the goals of tort law by limiting the risk of harm. But loss 
prevention and risk avoidance is not solely in the hands of 
manufacturers* Safety is a two-way street. Despite plain-
tiffs' charge that "the seat belt defense is inappropriate in 
the context of strict liability," (Resp. Br. at 69-70), the 
party in the best position to promote safety may be someone 
other than the manufacturer, such as the product user. 
In this case, the jury should have been permitted 
to consider whether and to what extent plaintiffs' failure to 
utilize available seat belts contributed to their damages. 
This is consistent with the Restatement's position that every 
person—product user, manufacturer, and retailer—has a duty 
to act reasonably by exercising "those qualities of atten-
tion, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society 
requires of its members for the protection of their own 
interests and the interests of others." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts Section 283 comment b (1965) (emphasis added). This 
is the basis for tort rules relating to contributory fault, 
misuse, assumption of the risk, last clear chance, avoidable 
consequences, comparative causation, and mitigation of dam-
ages, all of which hold the plaintiff responsible for the 
consequences of failing to exercise reasonable care for his 
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own safety. These rules apply with equal force to product 
liability actions where "the user frequently can control the 
risk by avoiding foolish uses or by making use of some spe-
cific knowledge about significant alternatives that are in 
his or her control." Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev, at 
225. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303 
(Utah 1981), holding that it is proper for the jury to con-
sider the faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they 
"have united as concurrent proximate causes of an injury" in 
strict product liability cases. 
D. Plaintiffs Fail to Respond to 
AMC/Jeep's Argument that the~~Jury 
Should have been Permitted to Con-
sider the Fact that the Commando was 
Equipped with Seat Belts in Con-
nection with the Issue of Design 
Safety. 
As AMC/Jeep argued in its opening Brief, the pres-
ence of seat belts in the accident vehicle is also relevant, 
in a design defect case such as this, on the question whether 
the vehicle is inherently unsafe and unreasonably dangerous 
because the safety of a vehicle's design cannot be fairly 
evaluated if the fact finder is precluded from considering 
the principal safety features designed into the vehicle for 
the express purpose of providing protection to the occupants. 
This Court has recognized that "[s]trict liability 
in tort is not the equivalent of making the manufacturer or 
seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and its 
use." Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Utah 1981). Tort law does not require automobile manufac-
turers to make "accident proof" vehicles. Larsen v. General 
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 499 (8th Cir. 1968). Such a 
vehicle is impossible to make because accidents and colli-
sions are inevitable. Thus, a manufacturer's duty is only to 
produce vehicles that are not unreasonably dangerous. See 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979) (adopting the language of Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of.Torts, requiring the plaintiff in a strict prod-
uct liability action to prove that the product at issue was 
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to the 
ultimate consumer). 
Whether the manufacturer's duty has been met in a 
particular case cannot be determined in a vacuum simply by 
focusing on the allegedly defective aspect of the design. 
Manufacturers make design decisions with the whole vehicle in 
mind, balancing a wide range of considerations. The jury in 
a design defect case like this one must be given the same 
opportunity to consider the vehicle as a whole. Wilson v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. 
Va. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-1175 (1978). 
In evaluating whether a vehicle's design taken as a 
whole is reasonably safe, many factors are relevant. See 
Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 
Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980). The size and style of the vehicle, 
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its price, and its intended uses are all pertinent. A person 
who purchases a convertible car cannot expect the kind of 
protection that he would have in a hard top and the courts do 
not impose a duty on the manufacturer to design a convertible 
car which meets the same safety standards. Dreisonstok v. 
Wolkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-1075 (4th Cir. 
1974); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811-812 
(10th Cir. 1981). 
Consideration must also be given to the safety 
features inherent in the design of the vehicle in question. 
E.g., Wilson, supra, 445 F. Supp., at 1371; Daly, supra, 575 
P.2d, at 1174. Cases alleging harm caused by a defect in 
design, regardless of the aspect of the product impugned, 
always raise questions about whether, through safety features 
designed into the vehicle, the manufacturer met its duty to 
design a vehicle that provides reasonable protection against 
foreseeable risks of harm. 
Seat belts are placed in vehicles for the express 
purpose of reducing the risk of injury to vehicle occupants. 
This was as true of the seat belts in plaintiffs' Commando as 
it is in the case of all modern vehicles. It is neither 
feasible nor fair to determine whether a vehicle is unreason-
ably dangerous without considering the presence of seat 
belts, the specific purpose and effect of which are to meet 
the manufacturer's duty to reduce unreasonable risks of 
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injury. See Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev., at 253-
254. 
The jury's consideration of the whole vehicle in a 
design defect case like this one is particularly appropriate 
in Utah. In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 
P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), this Court adopted the standard of 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 
402A provides, in pertinent part, that "[o]ne who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user of consumer ... is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user ...." (Emphasis 
added). Many courts and commentators have noted that in 
design defect, as opposed to manufacturing defect, cases the 
"unreasonably dangerous" language of Section 402A assumes 
particular relevance: 
[0]ur experience teaches us that, in the 
conscious design choice cases, where 
there is no other (available) standard, 
excision of the unreasonably dangerous 
concept denudes Section 402A of its only 
vehicle for infusing into the notion of 
"defect" a meaningful guide to its deter-
mination. Dean Wade has written that in 
(conscious) design defect cases, the 
concept of defective condition standing 
alone is inappropriate, and that it has 
no independent meaning and is apt to 
prove misleading. Wade, Strict Tort 
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 
15 (1965). Accord, Ross v. Up-Right, 
INc, 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968). We 
agree. Professor Keeton believes that, 
in the area of design problem "defective" 
means unreasonably dangerous. Keeton, 
Product Liability and the Meaning of 
Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 32 (1973). 
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Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
Thus, in deciding whether plaintiffs' Commando was 
defectively designed, as asserted by plaintiffs, the jury was 
required to decide whether the Commando was unreasonably 
dangerous. As the court stated in an analogous case, evi-
dence that an accident vehicle had been equipped with seat 
belts should be admitted for the purpose of determining 
whether the vehicle was defectively designed because the jury 
must determine "whether the auto as a whole was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous ....M Wilson v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1978). It 
is simply impossible to consider individual design decisions 
in a vacuum because such decisions are made as part of a 
myriad of design decisions that go into the manufacture of 
the whole vehicle. 
Plaintiffs would have it that their presentation of 
but one aspect of the Commando, the strength of its roof when 
subjected to a roll over, is enough to show that the Commando 
was defective. This precise argument was rejected by the 
California Supreme Court in Daly v, General Motors Corp., 144 
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978). The plaintiffs in that 
case sued the defendant manufacturer for damages suffered as 
the result of an automobile accident. The plaintiffs' theory 
against the manufacturer was that a door latch had been 
improperly designed. At trial, and over the plaintiffs' 
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objections, the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence 
that the accident vehicle was equipped with a seat belt-
shoulder harness system, and a door lock, either of which if 
used would have prevented the injury complained of. The 
plaintiffs' lost at trial and, on appeal, challenged a jury 
instruction which directed that Wf[i]n determining whether or 
not the vehicle was defective you should consider all of the 
equipment on the vehicle including any features intended for 
the safety of the driver.,M 575 P.2d, at 1174. It was the 
plaintiffs' contention, as plaintiffs contend here, "that 
only the precise malfunctioning component itself, and alone, 
may be considered in determining whether injury was caused by 
a defectively designed product." IcL The California Supreme 
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention, stating as 
follows: 
The jury could properly determine whether 
the (accident vehicle's] overall design, , 
including safety features provided in the * 
vehicle, made it 'crashworthy,' thus 
rendering the vehicle nondefective. 
Product designs do not evolve in a 
vacuum, but must reflect the realities of 
the market place, kitchen, highway, and 
shop. Similarly, a product's components 
are not developed in isolation, but as 
part of an integrated and interrelated 
whole. Recognizing that finished prod-
ucts must incorporate and balance safety, 
utility, competitive merit, and prac-
ticality under a multitude of intended 
and foreseeable uses, courts have 
struggled to evolve realistic tests for 
defective design which give weight to 
this necessary balancing. ... However 
phrased, these decisions emphasize the 
need to consider the product as an in-
tegrated whole. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id., at 1175. See also McElroy v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
420 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 1982). 
In this case, the Commando's roof, or even its roll 
over characteristics, are no more important a part of the 
vehicle than are its steering column, interior padding, door 
locks, suspension and seat belts. The trial court's exclu-
sion of any evidence relating to seat belts is no more logi-
cal than the exclusion of any other safety device that 
AMC/Jeep had designed into the Commando. In fact, the trial 
court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's seat belt evidence is par-
ticularly incongruous because that evidence would have shown 
that, if utilized, the seat belts would have prevented pre-
cisely the type of injury complained of by plaintiff Steven 
Whitehead. (T., 10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806). In effect, the 
trial court barred the jury from considering the most criti-
cal safety feature designed into the Commando by AMC/Jeep. 
This Court should hold that evidence of the pres-
ence of seat belts should be admitted on the issue of design 
defect in this case. Admitting this evidence is a simple 
matter of fairness. It will merely allow the jury to con-
sider evidence regarding the capacity of seat belts to pre-
vent and reduce injuries, along with all other relevant 
evidence, in determining whether the vehicle, taken as a 
whole, is defective and unreasonably dangerous as plaintiffs 
allege. 
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E. The Trier of Fact is Capable of 
Understanding and Applying Rationally 
the "Seat Belt Defense" 
Plaintiffs assert that evidence with respect to 
seat belts and their relationship to a plaintiff's injury "is 
simply too speculative to be placed in issue before a jury." 
(Resp. Br. at 67-68). A jury's task in deciding whether, and 
to what extent, a plaintiff's failure to utilize available 
seat belt contributed to his injury, however, is hardly more 
difficult than comparative causation principles applied 
regularly by Utah juries under Utah's comparative negligence 
statute. As this Court said recently, in holding that these 
comparative principles are applicable in strict liability 
actions, "we believe that judges and juries will have little 
difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to 
bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in such 
comparisons are relative fault and relative causation." 
Mulherin, supra, 628 P.2d, at 1304. A jury is capable of 
weighing seat belt evidence in any tort action, and this case 
should be remanded for a new trial so that a jury can con-
sider the evidence proffered by AMC/Jeep. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT BASED ON AMC/JEEP^S 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's erroneous 
decision to ignore AMC/Jeep's defense based on the statute of 
limitations found in Utah's Product Liability Act, Section 
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78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated. (App. Br. at 68-74). As 
plaintiffs admit, the statute of limitations defense was 
already before the trial court in the answer of defendant 
American Motors Sales Corporation. (R. 84-87). That answer 
was filed without objection. At the same time American 
Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer, defendant Jeep 
Corporation filed a motion for leave to amend its answer, 
filed previously, to bring it into accord with the answer of 
American Motors Sales Corporation. (R. 983-989). 
Conceding that AMC/Jeep would have a valid defense 
based on the statute's six year limitations provision, (see 
Resp. Br. at 73), plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeep's claim of 
error by arguing that the trial court was justified in deny-
ing Jeep Corporation's motion to amend its answer on the 
grounds that the amended answer would have delayed trial and 
would have required "extensive discovery on behalf of the 
plaintiff." (Resp. Br. at 77). Plaintiffs rely on Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1983), for their argument that such amendments to pleadings 
are rarely permitted at the commencement of or during trial. 
Totally ignored by plaintiffs, however, is the glaring fact 
which distinguishes this case from Staker and renders plain-
tiffs' arguments inapposite: The statute of limitations 
issue was already properly before the trial court in the 
answer of American Motors Sales Corporation. The prejudice 
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that plaintiffs claim would have resulted had Jeep Corpo-
ration's motion to amend been granted simply disappears in 
light of the fact that plaintiffs had to contend with 
AMC/Jeepfs defense based on the statute of limitations in any 
event. Under these unique circumstances, Rule 15(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedurey should have guided the trial court 
and leave to amend should have been granted in the interests 
of justice. 
Plaintiffs also argue that AMC/Jeep "made abso-
lutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability 
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of 
trial; therefore, the issue is waived." (Resp. Br. at 74). 
The facts critical to this defense were undisputed, however, 
and the trial court did not rely on any such argument in 
denying AMC/Jeep's motion for directed verdict based on the 
statute of limitations. The motion was denied by the trial 
court without comment. (T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-
4775). The trial court's failure to direct a verdict on this 
ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment should 
therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be 
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry 
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for the six independently 
sufficient reasons detailed in AMC/Jeep's Brief. Plaintiffs' 
Brief fails to address many of the significant issues raised 
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by AMC/Jeep. The arguments to which plaintiffs have re-
sponded are not explained away or even blunted by plaintiffs1 
Brief. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the 
reasons stated in AMC/Jeep's Brief, the judgment on the 
verdict must be reversed and a new trial or the entry of 
judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1984. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
By L<UT>r £>* s<£^~> 
Thomas B.^Green 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appel lants American MotorsN 
Sales Corporat ion and 
Jeep Corporat ion 
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AND JEEP CORPORATION were served this /^ day of October, 
1984, by mailing said copiesf first class postage prepaid, 
addressed to each of the following: 
Glen Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Larry Anderson 
Raymond M. Berry 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Company 
Jackson H. Howard 
Richard B. Johnson 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Deborah and 
Stephen Whitehead 
f /AvS 
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